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In this project, I defend a holistic, internalist conceptual-role theory of mental 
content (‘Holism’, for short). The account of communicative success which must be 
adopted by the Holist is generally thought to be unattractive and perhaps even 
untenable. The primary aim of my thesis is to show that this account is actually far 
more plausible than the accounts available to competing theories of mental content. 
Holism is thought to suffer from a special problem of communication because it 
entails that no two subjects ever mean the same thing by an utterance of the same 
word-forms, or share the same thought content. Many think that it is necessary for 
communicative success (or, at least, sometimes required) that the content grasped by 
the hearer is the same content as that which is expressed by the speaker. As such, 
theories such as social externalism are thought to be well-equipped to explain 
communicative success because they can posit shared content. Holism claims that 
subjects think, and speak, in their own idiosyncratic idiolects. As such, Holists must 
deny that it is ever required for communicative success that subjects share content. 
Holists must maintain instead that successful communication requires only similarity 
of content between speaker and hearer. This is supposed to be a serious cost of the 
view. In this project, I argue that it is, in fact, a virtue. Views like Holism, which can 
posit only mere similarity of content, are better placed to explain communicative 
success than views which can posit shared content. 
 
In the first part of my thesis, I argue that externalist theories of content face a 
dilemma when it comes to explaining communicative success. They must choose 
between (a), endorsing an account of communication which renders the relationship 
between the content expressed by the speaker and grasped by the hearer irrelevant to 
communicative success and (b), endorsing an account which gives implausible 
diagnoses as to the success and failure of communicative attempts. I argue that the 
reason that externalist theories face this dilemma is because they allow that content 
and understanding can come apart. Interestingly, it is, in part, because they posit a 
communal language that they face the dilemma. In contrast, the Holist’s similar 
content account does not face the dilemma. It can naturally incorporate 
understanding into its explanation of how mental content facilitates communicative 
success because, on Holism, understanding perfectly tracks mental content.  
 
In the second part of my thesis, I develop an account of communicative success for 
the Holist and defend the account from objections. The account claims that 
communication succeeds to the degree that content is similar across communication 
partners. In defending the view, I propose a criterion for similarity of content for the 
Holist. I also argue that (pure) internalists can agree with externalists as to the 
extensions of concepts and the truth-conditions of contents without the need to 
appeal to any factors outside of the individual. Finally, I explain how my account of 
communication impacts upon a theory of testimony. Most work on testimony 
stipulates that the content of the testimony grasped by the hearer is the same as that 
expressed by the speaker. I present and defend an account of testimony which claims 
instead that testimonial exchanges can be successful even when the content grasped 
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At first glance, it might look obvious that views of meaning and mental content 
which claim that we share thought content (and speak a public language) can 
underpin a plausible account of communicative success. What could make 
communication easier than sharing a language? In contrast, views which claim that 
subjects speak and think in their own private and idiosyncratic idiolects look like 
they will struggle to explain how we communicate. In this project, I will argue that 
this first-glance appraisal is mistaken. The primary aim of my thesis is to defend a 
theory of content which claims that subjects never share thought content. I defend 
this theory from the objection that it cannot explain communicative success. If my 
arguments are successful, I will have shown that this view is not just plausible, but 
superior to views which claim that subjects share content. 
 
The theory which I defend is comprised of the following three theses. 
 
A) Content internalism: the view that thought content is individuated by factors 
internal to the subject. 
B) Conceptual-role semantics: the view that thought content is determined by its 
relations to other contents in a subject’s cognitive economy. 
C) Conceptual-role holism: the view that thought content is determined by its 
relations to all contents in a subject’s cognitive economy. 
 
I call the combination of these theses ‘Holism’, for short. Currently, this view is 
relatively unpopular in philosophy. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
content internalism is a minority view. Most philosophers – both those who work on 
mental content and those who work in other areas of philosophy – believe that 
content externalism is true. This is the view that content is individuated, in part, by 
factors outside of the subject, such as the social or physical environment. 
Conceptual-role semantics is quite popular amongst internalists, but the holistic 




The objection which will be the focus of this project is one which claims that the 
account of communicative success which must be endorsed by Holism is, at best, 
unattractive and, at worst, untenable. Holism is thought to suffer from a special 
problem of communication because it entails that no two speakers ever mean the 
same thing by an utterance of the same word-forms, or entertain thoughts with the 
same content. Meaning the same thing, or sharing content, is thought to be necessary 
(or at least sometimes required) for successful communication. The Holist must 
maintain instead that successful communication requires only similarity of content 
across interlocutors. This is supposed to be a serious cost of the view. In this project, 
I aim to show that it is, in fact, a virtue. Views which insist that speaker and hearer 
must grasp the same content as each other provide surprisingly implausible accounts 
of communication. It is only views which claim that subjects do not share thought 
content which can provide attractive accounts of communicative success. 
 
The project is divided into six chapters. In the first half of the project, I argue that 
views of content which posit shared content face a dilemma when it comes to 
explaining communicative success. In the second half of the project, I present my 
positive account and defend it from objections. The following is a summary of each 
of the chapters. 
 
The first two chapters of this project are largely expository. Their purpose is to 
introduce positions and distinctions which will be necessary to understand the 
arguments presented in Chapters 3 – 6.  In Chapter 1, I introduce the mental content 
debate and situate Holism within this debate. In this project, I do not intend to 
present any arguments in favour of Holism (except insofar as its superior theory of 
communicative success should be considered a mark in its favour). My aim is simply 
to defend the view from the particular objection under consideration by developing 
an attractive account of communicative success which the Holist can endorse. 
Furthermore, my aim is to defend Holism from this objection only (although doing so 
will involve considering some related objections to the view). There are many other 




In Chapter 2, I introduce the Objection from Communication. This objection claims 
that communicative success (at least sometimes) requires that the hearer grasp the 
very same content as that which is expressed by the speaker. To assess whether this 
is indeed a plausible constraint on communicative success, it will be necessary to 
consider what our options are when it comes to constructing a theory of 
communication, and how these different options might affect the plausibility of 
theories of mental content. Much of Chapter 2 is devoted to exploring these various 
options. This project is concerned specifically with how various theories of mental 
content interact with constraints on communicative success. As such, I am only 
interested in certain aspects of a theory of communication: those which impinge 
upon one’s choice of a theory of content. There are features of theories of 
communication which can be considered independently of theories of mental 
content; I call these ‘Theory-Neutral’ conditions. I will set these features to one side. 
And, as such, I do not take myself to be proposing a complete theory of 
communicative success in this project. I identify two kinds of condition on 
communicative success which directly interact with theories of mental content. These 
I call the ‘Content Relation’ and the ‘Understanding Requirement’. Both the Content 
Relation and the Understanding Requirement figure in my argument in Chapter 3. 
  
In Chapter 3, I argue that social externalism (as well as other externalist views) 
cannot underpin a plausible theory of communication. The theory faces a dilemma: it 
must either (a) claim that which relation holds between the mental contents of the 
speaker and hearer is irrelevant to communicative success or (b) endorse an account 
of communicative success which gives implausible diagnoses as to the success of 
communicative exchanges. This argument also motivates the account of 
communicative success which I go on to develop in Chapter 4. The reason that 
externalist views of content face the dilemma is because they allow that content and 
understanding can come apart. In contrast, the Holist’s similar content account 
escapes the dilemma because it claims that understanding tracks content. Because of 
this, Holism can incorporate understanding into its explanation of how mental 
content facilitates communicative success without giving up on plausible theses as to 
the aims of communicative success. One consequence of the success of my argument 
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is that even views of content which can posit shared content should not claim that 
sharing content is relevant to communicative success. If this is so, there is no reason 
to suppose that Holism should have to claim that sharing content is relevant to 
success, and thus we lose motivation for the Objection from Communication raised 
against Holism in Chapter 2. This argument, considered alongside the plausibility of 
my positive account, should be enough to disarm the Objection from 
Communication. 
 
In Chapter 4, I set out my positive account of communicative success. This account 
involves two measures of communicative success. The first, ‘success simpliciter’, 
claims that communication succeeds to the degree that content is similar across 
communication partners. In addition to success simpliciter, there is ‘success relative 
to a context’. This measure selects a particular degree of success simpliciter as the 
threshold for success relative to a given context of communication. This context is 
determined by the particular communicative aims of interlocutors. After setting out 
this basic account, I develop a criterion for comparing concepts for similarity across 
different holistic conceptual networks. This account appeals to similarities between 
non-semantic elements in the broader cognitive economies of subjects which can 
‘anchor’ holistic networks. I argue that my account of conceptual similarity 
motivates a complication of the account of communicative success such that it takes 
into consideration different dimensions of conceptual variability along which 
concepts can be compared. 
 
In Chapter 5, I introduce another distinction between dimensions of conceptual 
variability which is relevant to communicative success. This is a distinction between 
conceptual-role and application-conditions. I then consider an objection to my 
account based on the commonly held view that internalist theories of content cannot 
provide an intuitively correct account of the application-conditions of concepts. I 
argue that internalists (and even holists) can agree with externalist views as to the 





In Chapter 6, I consider an objection to my account based on the view that 
testimonial knowledge exchange requires that interlocutors share thought content. I 
present a similar content account of knowledge through testimony and argue that it 
can maintain all the epistemic features of the traditional same content account. This 
account claims that a hearer can gain knowledge that P from testimony that Q 
providing that the content grasped by the hearer has the same truth-conditions as the 
content expressed by the speaker. This response builds on the arguments presented in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Across the six chapters, I will have presented a similar content account of 
communicative success with some interesting features. Not only does it avoid the 
dilemma that I present in Chapter 3, but it can claim that subjects with idiosyncratic 
concepts can represent the same objects despite not sharing content. This blocks a 
key motivation for externalist theories of content.  It is this feature of the account 
which allows it to maintain a plausible view of testimony. If my arguments are 
successful, the consequences for the mental content debate will be significant. 
Perhaps most importantly, we will get the surprising result that views which can 
posit communal languages are actually far worse at explaining communicative 
success than views which posit idiosyncratic idiolects. In fact, they are worse at 
explaining communicative success because they posit this shared language. This 
result strongly impacts the dialectic between internalists (at least of certain stripes) 
and externalists about mental content. For we will then have a new reason to reject 
externalist theories: if you want a plausible account of communicative success, you 





Chapter 1: Mental content, conceptual-role and holism 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the mental content debate and to situate 
the holistic theory of content that I will defend within this debate. I begin in Section 
1 by identifying the kind of content that is of interest in this project. In Section 2, I 
describe how the mental content debate has developed over recent years by 
introducing the externalist arguments of Kripke, Putnam, and Burge. In Sections 3, 4 
and 5, I introduce three families of theories of mental content: these are content 
externalism, content internalism, and two-factor theories. In Section 6, I introduce 
conceptual-role theories of content and survey a number of ways in which such 
theories have been understood in the literature. In section 7, I introduce Holism as a 
combination of theses about the individuation of mental content. With an 
understanding of Holism and its externalist competitors, we will be prepared to 
explore the consequences of these theories in the philosophy of communication and 
testimony. 
 
Section 1: Mental content 
 
The mental content debate is a debate about the metaphysics of a particular kind of 
apparently representational mental entity. A theory of mental content ought to 
provide us with an answer to the question of what things must obtain in order for a 
given entity to have the particular representational properties that it does. This is to 
ask what it is that individuates or determines mental content.
1
 The factors that 
individuate content could be elements of a subject’s external environment, they could 
be factors which are entirely internal to a subject, or they could be a more or less 
complicated mixture of the two. It is quite hard to say much about what mental 
content is from a theory-neutral perspective. However, in this section I will provide a 
rough characterisation of the kind of content that is central to this project. We can, at 
                                                 
1
 As stressed in Wikforss (2008) – following Stalnaker (1997) – this is a different question to the 




the very least, identify mental content by the way it is ascribed to the thoughts of 
subjects, and say roughly what role contentful thoughts are supposed to play, both in 
a subject’s cognitive economy, and in her interactions with others. 
 
1.1 Propositional attitudes and content ascriptions 
 
The term ‘mental content’ applies to the content of propositional attitudes (and 
perhaps other mental states as well such as perceptual states). Propositional attitudes 
are mental states such as beliefs, desires, hopes and fears. Mental content is what 
represents the (actual or non-actual) portion of the world that those attitudes are 
taken towards. A propositional attitude attribution has a linguistic form which can be 
divided into three parts. Firstly, there is a noun which represents a subject (or group 
of subjects). Secondly, there is a verb which represents an attitude such as belief. 
Thirdly, within the scope of this attitude-verb is a ‘that-clause’ which specifies which 
content that the subject takes her attitude towards. Embedded within the that-clause 
is a declarative sentence. For example: 
 
(1) Gottlob believes that there is milk in the fridge. 
 
So, if Gottlob believes that there is milk in the fridge, the content of his belief is 
THAT THERE IS MILK IN THE FRIDGE.
2
 The attitude which Gottlob takes towards this 
content is that of belief. Following Burge (1979), I will say that we ‘attribute’ 
propositional attitudes and content to speakers, and that we ‘ascribe’ that-clauses to 
propositional attitude reports. As Burge writes, “Ascriptions are the linguistic 
analogs of attributions.”
3
 So, in (1), we attribute the belief THAT THERE IS MILK IN THE 
FRIDGE to Gottlob. The very same content could figure in different propositional 
attitudes possessed by the same subject. For example, we could also attribute to 
Gottlob the hope THAT THERE IS MILK IN THE FRIDGE. In this case, we combine the 
same content with a different attitude and, in doing so, attribute a different 
propositional attitude to Gottlob. 
                                                 
2
Henceforth, I will use small caps to represent content and concepts. 
3




Mental content is comprised of concepts. Some philosophers talk as if concepts are 
just non-sentential content. My use of ‘sentential’ here is not meant to suggest that 
these things are literally sentences but, rather, that they are ascribed using that-
clauses with sentential form. Concepts are ascribed using non-sentential expressions. 
Concepts function so as to represent objects or sets of objects rather than states of 
affairs. Burge seems to think of concepts this way (i.e., as components of content), 
although he prefers to use the term ‘notion’ as he takes it to have less theoretical 
baggage: 
 
I shall be (and have been) using the term ‘notion’ to apply to components or 
elements of contents. Just as whole that-clauses provide the content of a 
person’s attitude, semantically relevant components of that-clauses will be 





Others talk of the content of concepts as well as the content of propositional attitudes. 
One reason for this is that some believe that, just as different kinds of propositional 
attitudes can be taken towards the same content, so too can different concepts present 
the same non-sentential content. François Recanati, for example, suggests that there 
are three different kinds of concepts, which he calls ‘basic’, ‘scientific’, and 
‘deferential’. Each of these three kinds of concept can have the same content – 
ARTHRITIS, for example – but represent this content under different modes of 
presentation.
5
 For ease of exposition, in what follows I will be using the term 
‘concept’ much like Burge uses ‘notion’: concepts are themselves just non-sentential 
content: they are the components of sentential mental content. 
 
The majority of those who work on mental content think that content is truth-
evaluable and that concepts have extensions. Mental content is supposed to 
determine (or perhaps be identical with) the truth- or satisfaction-conditions of the 
propositional attitudes in which it features. If the state of affairs that a belief is taken 
towards obtains, the content of the belief (the part of the attitude which represents 
this state of affairs) is true; and if the content of a belief is true, then that belief is 
                                                 
4
 Burge (1979) 75 
5
 Recanati (2000) 455 
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true. However, only certain propositional attitudes are intended to be evaluated for 
truth and falsity. For example, it is appropriate to desire things that have not yet 
obtained, and to hope that the things we fear will never obtain. But, it makes no sense 
to ask of a desire whether it is true or false (we should only ask this of the content of 
the desire). So, although the content of propositional attitudes is always 
representational, it does not always function to provide truth-conditions for the 
attitudes in which it figures. Some kinds of propositional attitudes such as desires are 
assigned satisfaction-conditions rather than truth-conditions: what is represented by 
the content is the state of affairs that would satisfy the attitude taken towards the 
content. If the content is true, the desire (for example) is satisfied. 
 
1.2 Mental content and linguistic content 
 
Propositional attitudes are not the only things to have semantic (i.e., representational) 
content. Propositional attitudes are expressed by means of utterances of sentence 
tokens which have linguistic content. So, if Gottlob believes that there is milk in the 
fridge, he may express this belief by uttering a token of the sentence, ‘There is milk 
in the fridge.’ Linguistic content is thought by most to be distinct from mental 
content, although the two are surely intimately connected. Whereas mental content is 
always the content of some mental state, linguistic content is the content of sentence 
tokens, where these may be thought of as distinct from the content of the 
propositional attitudes which they can be used to express. 
 
We should also distinguish between the linguistic meaning of sentence and word 
types, on the one hand, and the linguistic content of sentence and word tokens, on the 
other. Sentence types can contain ambiguous terms and unresolved indexicals, as in, 
for example, ‘I will meet you by the bank.’ Sentence tokens, on the other hand, are 
not ambiguous in this way (although it may not always be clear to the hearer which is 
the intended disambiguation or referent of an ambiguous or indexical term). There 
are also such things as mental content and concept types, tokens of which are what 
feature in the propositional attitudes of subjects. Sentence tokens are the linguistic 
counterparts of content tokens, and tokens of non-sentential expressions (like token 
11 
 
words and word-phrases) are the linguistic counterparts of concept tokens. Contents 
and concepts, like token expressions, cannot be ambiguous. For a word-type which is 
ambiguous, there is more than one concept that can be expressed by it. It is also 
natural to think that the same concept or content can be expressed by word and 
sentence tokens in many different languages, or maybe even with different tokens 
from within the same language.  
 
There are a variety of options for understanding the relationship between the mental 
and linguistic content of an individual speaker. Firstly, it is possible to hold that 
mental content and linguistic content should be identified, but this is a minority 
view.
6
 Secondly, one might think that the two kinds of content are individuated by 
the same factors, yet are individuated independently of each other, in a parallel 
fashion. Thirdly, one might think that linguistic content is a derivative kind of 
content to mental content: it inherits its content from mental content and thus is 
dependent for its individuation on mental content.
7
 Fourthly, one might think that it 
is mental content which is the derivative kind of content, in which case mental 
content would be dependent upon linguistic content for its individuation. Fifthly, one 
could think that the two kinds of content are individuated respectively by two 
different kinds of factor. For the purposes of this project, I will assume that linguistic 
content derives from mental content, where this assumption is supposed to allow for 
both individualist and anti-individualist methods of linguistic-content determination. 
 
1.3 The theoretical role of mental content 
 
Now that we have a rough characterisation of content, and what is involved in 
attributing contentful attitudes to subjects, I will say a few things about the 
explanatory utility of mental content and propositional attitude attributions. Authors 
typically take contentful attitudes to play a number of roles in the cognitive economy 
of the individual subject and also in interactions between subjects. Below, I will 
describe some of the more important roles that content is thought to play. 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Rapaport (2002). 
7




Firstly, the interaction between contentful propositional attitudes (and other mental 
states) is supposed to contribute in some way to explanations of the reasoning and 
subsequent intentional actions of subjects. There are two or three related issues here. 
The first issue is that propositional attitudes are supposed to play a causally 
efficacious role in explanations of action: that is, a subject’s being in a certain 
contentful state is supposed to form part of the causal explanation of her actions. The 
contents of these propositional attitudes are thought to have, at the very least, an 
explanatory role in explanations of action. However, depending on the theory of 
content endorsed, this role may not be a causal one.
8
 The second issue is that content 
attributions are supposed to capture the rationality of the subject.
9
 The way that a 
subject’s propositional attitudes interact with each other in reasoning depends on the 
contents of those attitudes and the logical relations between those contents. 
Attributions of content, it is thought, should not result in rendering a normal subject 
objectionably irrational (although most will allow that subjects can on occasion be 
less than rational). Further, given that a subject is (largely, or significantly) rational, 
we are supposed to be able to explain, not just why she draws the inferences that she 
does, but also why she chooses to perform certain actions by appeal to the inferential 
relations between her attitude contents. To take a very simple example, if Gottlob, a 
rational agent, possesses the belief that there is milk in the fridge, and the desire to 
drink milk, this is supposed to be part of the explanation of why he performs the 




Secondly, contentful propositional attitudes play a role in the explanation of 
communicative success and testimonial knowledge transmission between subjects, 
although they must do this via expressions of utterance tokens with linguistic 
content. It is these issues, of course, which are the focus of the present project. One 
                                                 
8
 The weaker version of mental causation thesis states that propositional attitudes are causes of 
intentional action. The stronger version of the thesis claims that propositional attitudes are causes of 
intentional action in virtue of the properties of their contents. See Jacob (1992). 
9
 A famous example of certain kinds of content attributions rendering a subject apparently irrational 
can be found in Kripke (1979). This example is discussed in Loar (1988) and Stalnaker (1990). There 
is ongoing debate as to whether externalist theories of content can capture subjective rationality. See, 
for example, Brown (2004), Kimbrough (1998) and Wikforss (2006). 
10




approach to communicative success, endorsed by Pagin (2008), takes success to be 
measured in terms of some relation between the content of an initial mental state in 
the speaker and the content of a terminal state in the hearer. It is this picture of 
communicative success, properly introduced in Chapter 2, which will be a working 
hypothesis of this project. Similarly, the so-called ‘Belief View’ of testimony treats 
beliefs as the primary bearers of epistemic properties and takes successful 
transmission of knowledge to depend on whether the resultant belief formed in the 
hearer possesses the same semantic and epistemic properties as the belief expressed 
by the speaker.
11
 This picture of testimonial knowledge transmission relies on 
something like the picture of communicative success which Pagin endorses.  
 
This rough characterisation of mental content might all seem initially plausible. 
However, as will become clear both in this chapter and throughout the rest of this 
project, it is remarkably hard to respect all of the features attributed to mental content 
in the above whilst appealing to a single method of content individuation. There are 
roughly three approaches to the individuation of mental content: content externalism, 
content internalism and two-factor theories. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, I will present 
these approaches. However, I will first turn to the series of thought experiments 
which have divided authors into these three camps. 
 
Section 2: Arguments for externalism 
 
Before various pro-externalist arguments began emerging in the 1970s, the dominant 
view of mental content was internalism or ‘individualism’. Roughly stated, this view 
(which I will set out in more detail in Section 4) claims that the content of a subject’s 
thought is determined entirely by factors internal – or intrinsic – to that subject. The 
idea that mental content is determined by such factors might seem like an intuitively 
plausible feature of a theory of content. After all, thoughts are things which are 
enjoyed by brains and brains are certainly usually internal to individuals. However, it 
was left absent from my characterisation in the previous section because it is now 
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(thanks to these pro-externalist arguments) a highly controversial thesis. Nowadays 
the popular consensus is that such theories of content are naïve and outdated, 
although the thesis still has some dedicated defenders. 
 
2.1 Kripke’s causal theory 
 
The revolution began in the philosophy of language as a reaction to the descriptive 
theory of the reference of proper names. The descriptive theory of reference, which 
has its roots in the work of Frege and Russell, states that the linguistic meaning of 
any given singular term is a description, or set of descriptions, which uniquely 
determines the referent of that term.
12
 So, a name such as ‘Aristotle’ denotes the 
object, Aristotle, because the description or set of descriptions associated with the 
name ‘Aristotle’ uniquely applies to that object. Due to the work of Saul Kripke 
(1980), the majority of philosophers now take descriptivism to be false. Although, 
there have been a number of prominent advocates such as John Searle (1958), Peter 
Strawson (1950), David Lewis (1984) and Frank Jackson (1997). Although Kripke 
conceded that, in some cases, it is plausible to say we do refer by description, he 
argued that, for the vast majority of cases, descriptivism is implausible. In ‘Naming 
and Necessity’, he levelled a number of objections against descriptivism for proper 
names. These objections are usually referred to as the ‘epistemic problem’, the 




The epistemic problem aims to show that descriptions cannot have the same 
meaning, or content, as proper names. This is because, if this were so, sentences 





2) Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander. 
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claims merely that these descriptions determine reference, but does not identify these descriptions 
with the content or meaning of a name. 
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Assuming that ‘the teacher of Alexander’ is the identifying description which is 
supposed to give the meaning of ‘Aristotle’, such sentences should appear trivially 
true, or analytic, to anyone who understands the name ‘Aristotle’. Kripke thinks that 
it is obvious that this is not the case. 
 
The semantic problem arises because descriptivism seems to often deliver the wrong 
verdict on the referents of proper names in the actual world. For example, even in 
cases in which an object does uniquely satisfy a description, this may yet be the 
wrong object (i.e., not the object we would intuitively take the speaker to be trying to 
refer to). Further, in cases where a description fails to uniquely determine a referent, 
we may still wish to say that the name refers. Kripke argues for these claims by 
asking us to consider examples. His most famous one is his Gödel/Schmidt case. In 
this example, he asks us to imagine a subject who thinks that the name, ‘Gödel’, 
applies just to whomsoever satisfies the description, ‘the prover of the 
incompleteness of arithmetic’. He then goes on to show that this description will not 
actually pick out the correct object as the referent of ‘Gödel’. Kripke writes: 
 
Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A man named 
‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances 
many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow 
got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the 
view in question, then, when our ordinary man uses the name ‘Gödel’, he 
really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person 
satisfying the description, ‘the man who discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic’. […] [S]ince the man who discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about ‘Gödel’, are in fact 





Kripke thinks that cases like these, in which we use a name despite possessing 
considerable misinformation, will be extremely common. As such, descriptivism will 
very often give us the wrong result in the actual world. A description which is 
uniquely satisfied might refer to the wrong object. And a description which is not 
uniquely satisfied may refer to no object at all. 
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Finally, Kripke argues that even when descriptivism happens to pick out the right 
object in the actual world, it will not yield the right results in counterfactual 
scenarios.
16
 This is the modal problem. This last problem results from the fact that 
names are thought to be rigid designators. Rigid designators are expressions which 
designate the same object with respect to every world in which that object exists. But 
descriptions are not rigid designators: they designate different objects in different 
worlds. To see this, consider that even if, in the actual world, the description, ‘the 
prover of the incompleteness theorem’, picks out Gödel, it will not pick out Gödel in 
counterfactual worlds in which (the object we intuitively take to be) Gödel did not 
prove the incompleteness theorem. 
 
Since ‘Naming and Necessity’, descriptivists have offered compelling responses to 
Kripke’s various objections;
17
 I will present some of these in Chapter 5. However, 
the majority of philosophers have been convinced by Kripke’s arguments. In place of 
the descriptive theory of reference, Kripke encouraged the adoption of a causal 
theory of reference for proper names.
18
 According to the causal theory of reference, 
the reference of a proper name is determined by a causal chain leading back to an 
initial baptism of the relevant object. For example, the referent of ‘Gottlob Frege’ is 
the man himself in virtue of the fact that it is he who is connected, by the relevant 
causal chain, to his initial baptism.
19
 Kripke writes, 
 
A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial ‘baptism’ 
takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of 
the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed from link 
to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use 




The causal theory of reference is an externalist theory of reference because it takes 
the determination of reference to depend (in a certain way) on objects and causal 
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relations which are external to the speaker. What Kripke attempted to show was that, 
when it comes to the reference of a proper name, the contribution of the external 
world is far more important than had been previously thought.  
 
Although Kripke’s arguments are concerned with the reference of proper names, a 
number of authors have since argued for similar kinds of theses concerning linguistic 
and mental content. The move from externalist theses about reference to externalist 
theses about linguistic meaning more generally began with Hilary Putnam and his 
infamous Twin Earth thought experiments. Putnam’s thought experiments were later 
extended by others to the individuation of mental content. I turn first to Putnam’s 
Twin Earth thought experiment. In later sections I will show how Putnam’s 
arguments have been adapted to argue for theses about mental content and mental 
states. 
 
2.2 Putnam’s Twin Earth 
 
Twin Earth style thought experiments appeal to our intuitions about how differences 
in a subject’s physical and social environments affect the reference, truth-conditions, 
and content of her thoughts and utterances. The arguments all highlight a tension 
between the widely accepted notion that content determines things like reference, 
extension, and truth-conditions on the one hand, and the previously popular idea that 
content is determined solely by factors internal to an individual. 
 
Putnam, in ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, introduced Twin Earth thought 
experiments to demonstrate that linguistic expressions denoting natural kinds – e.g., 
terms like ‘water’ and ‘gold’ – must have meanings which do not depend solely on 
factors internal to an individual.
21
 Like Kripke, Putman was primarily concerned 
with aspects of linguistic meaning rather than with the content of thought. The 
particular picture that Putnam was objecting to was one that held that the meanings 
of words were determined solely by the psychological states of the speakers who 
utter them. Here Putnam understands the notion of a psychological state to be 
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methodologically solipsistic; by this he means that, “No psychological state, properly 
so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom 
that state is ascribed.”
22
 These are psychological states in the ‘narrow’ sense. Putnam 
writes that the traditional theory of meaning to which he objects is based on two 
unchallenged assumptions: 
 
(I) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state […]. 
(II) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) determines its 





Putnam argues that these two assumptions cannot be jointly satisfied by a notion of 
meaning.
24
 He argues that, “It is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the same 
psychological state (in the narrow sense), even though the extension of the term A in 
the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of 
the other. Extension is not determined by psychological state.”
25
 Putnam argues for 





Suppose the year is 1750. Now imagine a man called ‘Oscar’, who lives on Earth. 
Oscar has many beliefs which he takes to be about a substance he calls ‘water’; he 
would express these beliefs with utterances containing word-forms such as the 
following: ‘Water is wet’; ‘Water is potable’; ‘Water is found in rivers and lakes’, 
etc. However, one belief he lacks is that water – the wet, potable stuff found in rivers 
and lakes – has the chemical composition H20. No one alive at his time knows 
anything of, or even speculates about, the chemistry of the future. Oscar has never 
even considered the possibility that there might be more to water than he is 
phenomenologically aware of. 
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Now consider Twin Earth, which exists an unthinkable number of light years from 
Earth. On Twin Earth, there lives another man called ‘Oscar’ by the inhabitants of 
Twin Earth. We’ll call him ‘Twin Oscar’ to distinguish him from Earth Oscar. Twin 
Oscar is an exact physical duplicate of Oscar, down to the last atom.
27
 Twin Oscar 
has beliefs which he would express with words of a dialect which is exactly similar 
to the dialect spoken on Earth, although it is not English. Twin Earth is also an exact 
physical duplicate of Earth, except for one crucial difference: on Twin Earth, the 
chemical composition of the stuff that fills the rivers and lakes is not H20, but a 
complicated compound substance: XYZ. XYZ gives rise to exactly the same 
superficial macrophysical properties as H20, but it is chemically very different. Of 
course, Twin Oscar, like Oscar, is completely unaware of the existence of any 
underlying chemical structure. He’s never even thought about it. 
 
Putnam thinks that the thought experiment demonstrates that the extensions of the 
word-form ‘water’ in Oscar and Twin Oscar’s respective languages will be different. 
When Oscar and Twin Oscar utter sentence tokens involving the word-form ‘water’, 
they will refer to different natural kinds. On Earth, Oscar’s tokenings of ‘water’ refer 
to H2O and thus his utterances are true if and only if H20 is wet; but this is 
supposedly not the case for Twin Oscar. Twin Oscar’s tokenings of ‘water’ refer to 
XYZ, and thus his utterances will be true if and only if XYZ is wet. Putnam 
concludes that the totality of internal facts about a subject is not sufficient to 
determine the extensions of their expressions (and truth-conditions of their 
utterances). For, ex hypothesi, there is no physical difference between Oscar and 
Twin Oscar internally construed. Thus, if the difference is not internal to them, it 
must be found in their environments.
28
 Despite the fact that they are microphysical 
                                                 
27
 Many authors have pointed out that, due to the amount of water in a human body, Oscar and Twin 
Oscar are actually far from microphysical duplicates. However, everyone agrees that this is just an 
unfortunate choice of natural kind and that the thought experiment could be run with a natural kind 
which need not be present in a human body. Furthermore, Farkas (2008) has argued that the Twin 
Earth thought experiments do not need to rely on the exact microphysical similarity of twins. 
28
 Putnam took meaning to be constituted by a number of factors; as well as extension, he suggested 




duplicates, there is a difference in the extensions of their words. As Putnam puts it, 




2.3 From semantic externalism to content externalism 
 
Putnam’s argument was intended to support semantic externalism – the thesis that, 
for some expressions in a language, the meanings of those expressions depend in part 
on the external world in some way. However, many have taken similar thought 
experiments to support content externalism.
30
 Content externalists believe that 
similar considerations support the thesis that the content of propositional attitudes is 
individuated, in part, by the external environment. Oscar’s thought THAT WATER IS 
WET is about H2O, whereas Twin Oscar’s thought THAT (TWIN) WATER IS WET is 
about XYZ. As noted earlier, content is supposed to be truth-conditional, in that it 
determines, or is identical with, the conditions upon which something in the world 
will make it true. Oscar and Twin Oscar’s thoughts that they express using the word-
form ‘water’ appear to be about different substances and to have different truth-
conditions, just as their utterances involving the word-form ‘water’ had different 
truth-conditions. As Wikforss explains, 
 
According to the content externalist [...] the externalist determination of 
meaning carries over to content in such a way that if the meaning of ‘water’ is 
determined externally, so is the corresponding concept expressed. This view 
is driven by the conviction that mental content is truth-conditional and hence 
the external determination of truth-conditions will carry over to the level of 
mental content.
31
   
 
If we accept the pull of the intuition that the truth-conditions of the contents of Twin-
beliefs are different, then it looks like we have reason to accept that, at least for some 
expressions, the totality of factors internal to a speaker is not sufficient to determine 
the content of her thoughts: the truth-conditional content of some propositional 
attitudes depends in part for its determination on the external environment. 
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2.4 Burge’s Arthritis 
 
What Putnam’s thought experiment is taken to show is that certain features of a 
subject’s physical environment – natural kinds – can affect the linguistic content of 
that subject’s utterances even when there are no relevant changes inside that subject. 
Tyler Burge, in his own thought experiments, extended Putnam’s work in four 
ways.
32
 Firstly, he extended the argument to apply to mental content as well as 
linguistic content; secondly, he sought to show that an individual’s social 
environment could function to individuate content in addition to the individual’s 
physical environment; thirdly, he attempted to show that, not just natural kind terms, 
but many other kinds of term can be ‘Twin-Earthed’ by varying the social 
environment of two microphysically exactly similar subjects;
33
 fourthly, his 
arguments can be taken to show that not just attitude content, but propositional 
attitude states themselves, are dependent on the external environment. Burge takes 
his argument to have a very wide application. His most famous thought experiment 
focuses on the term ‘arthritis’, but, he thinks, “It does not depend [...] on the kind of 
word ‘arthritis’ is. We could have used an artefact term, an ordinary natural kind 
word, a color adjective, a social role term, a term for a historical style, an abstract 





Burge’s thought experiment has a similar structure to Putnam’s Twin Earth, but 
Burge prefers to set things up using an actual and counterfactual scenario rather than 
by considering two spatiotemporally distant parts of the same world. For ease of 
exposition, I will refer to the thought experiments of both Putnam and Burge (and 
similar arguments) as ‘Twin Earth style’. Burge presents his argument in three steps.
 
He first asks us to imagine a subject, Alf, who possesses a large number of 
propositional attitudes which we would attribute using ascriptions of that-clauses 
which contain the term ‘arthritis’. Burge writes,  
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For example, [Alf] thinks (correctly) that he has had arthritis for years; that 
his arthritis in his wrists and fingers is more painful than his arthritis in his 
ankles, that it is better to have arthritis than cancer of the liver, that stiffening 
joints is a symptom of arthritis, that certain sorts of aches are characteristic of 




Although Alf possesses a large number of these attitudes, many of which are true 
beliefs, his grasp of the meaning of ‘arthritis’ is not perfect. There is a conceptual 
error in his understanding: he is disposed to apply the term ‘arthritis’ to rheumatoid 
ailments that occur in the thigh. As such, he also possesses a belief which he would 
express with (3): 
 
3) I have arthritis in my thigh 
 
Alf reports his belief to his doctor by uttering (3). The doctor responds by stating that 
this cannot be true: arthritis is an inflammation of the joints only. Alf, in the face of 
the doctor’s expertise, relinquishes his belief and accepts the doctor’s advice on what 
else might be causing the pain in his thigh. 
 
In the second step, Burge asks us to imagine a counterfactual situation in which Alf 
grows up precisely as he did in the first situation: he lives through precisely the same 
physical events up to and including his meeting with the doctor. He is stipulated to 
be exactly microphysically similar to Alf in the actual situation.
36
 In short, there is 
nothing different about Alf, internally described, in the counterfactual scenario. What 
is different is his social, or linguistic, environment. Unlike in actual Alf’s 
community, in the counterfactual community, the term ‘arthritis’ applies not only to 
what ‘arthritis’ applies to in the actual community, but to other kinds of rheumatoid 
ailment as well. In particular, the term in the counterfactual community applies to the 
condition that Alf has in his thigh, and thus encompasses actual Alf’s misuse of the 
term.
37
 Burge summarises counterfactual Alf’s situation thus: 
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The person might have had the same physical history and non-intentional 
mental  phenomena while the word ‘arthritis’ was conventionally applied, and 
defined to apply, to various rheumatoid ailments, including the one in the 




In the third and final step, Burge claims it is reasonable to suppose that 
counterfactual Alf lacks at least some (and probably all) of the attitudes that would 
be attributed with content containing the (actual world) concept ARTHRITIS.
39
 The 
reason for this, Burge argues, is that counterfactual Alf could not have picked up the 
notion of ARTHRITIS, as, in his community ‘arthritis’ doesn’t mean ARTHRITIS: it 
doesn’t refer to all and only inflammations of the joints. Burge explains, 
 
‘Arthritis’, in the counterfactual situation, differs both in dictionary definition 
and in extension from ‘arthritis’ as we use it. Our ascriptions of content 
clauses to the patient (and ascriptions within his community) would not 




Burge thinks this shows that the contents of Alf’s thoughts in the actual and 
counterfactual situations are different. It would not be appropriate to attribute beliefs 
with the same content to Alf in each scenario: the concepts are not extensionally 
equivalent. But, given that Alf was internally exactly similar in the actual and 
counterfactual situations, whatever it is that affects the content of his thought must 
lie outside of his mind. Burge summarises, “The upshot of these reflections is that 
the patient’s mental contents differ while his entire physical and non-intentional 
mental histories, considered in isolation from their social context, remain the 
same.”
41
 Thought experiments like this have helped to bring into sharper focus the 
options available when choosing a theory of mental content. I now turn to three 
broad families of theory: content externalism, content internalism, and two-factor 
theories. 
 











Section 3: Content Externalism 
 
Historically, content externalism, also called ‘anti-individualism’, is simply the 
denial of internalism (or ‘individualism’); that is, it is the denial of the claim that all 
mental content is individuated by factors internal to the subject. As such, it seems 
appropriate to count as externalist any theory which claims that the content of at least 
one mental state of a subject is partly individuated by external factors. However, 
different authors can use the term slightly differently. For example, some people 
might deem to be externalists only those who believe that, for all concepts, external 
factors are relevant to individuation. We might call this ‘total’ externalism. Some 
might hold the weaker position that, for at least some concepts (but perhaps not all), 
external factors are relevant to the individuation of that concept. I take it that 
externalism requires the weaker rather than the stronger claim.  
 
For a content to count as externally individuated, it must be the case that it is partly 
individuated by external factors: this is to say that its individuation depends on some 
relation between an individual and some feature (or features) of her environment. No 
externalist believes that content is wholly individuated by external factors – 
externalists allow that there are internal relata as well as external relata, although 
they have little to say as to the precise role played by the innards of the subject. 
Whatever role the internal relata play it will be minimal. For example, on social 
externalism, two internal requirements might be that the subject possesses general 
rational coherence and the intention (or disposition) to defer – thus some cooperation 
is required of the individual.
42
 For a physical externalist, the requirement might be 
more minimal still: it might just be that, given that you are an organism with a 
particular internal structure and/or evolutionary history, you cannot help but be a 
representer of particular objects in your external environment, whether you like it or 
not. 
 
One thing to note is that, the sense in which content is partly individuated by external 
factors on externalism is different to the sense in which content is partly externalist 
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on a two factor theory. Pure externalists with respect to a content think that there is 
only one method of individuation of that content. Two factor theorists think that for a 
given content there are two dimensions of content individuation: in addition to there 
being an externally individuated dimension, there is also a separate dimension which 
is internally individuated. We could put the distinction this way: content which is 
individuated by external factors is called ‘broad’ or ‘wide’ content. Content which is 
purely internally individuated is called ‘narrow’ content. To be an externalist is to 
believe that at least some mental states have only broad content (even though this 
broad content relies partially on some internal relata). Thoroughgoing internalists 
(about a particular kind of content) believe that there is only narrow content. If one 
adopts a two-factor theory of content, one thinks that, for some content, that content 
has both a wide and a narrow dimension. I turn now to two prominent forms of 
content externalism which will feature in this project: physical and social 
externalism. 
 
3.1 Physical externalism 
 
If a theory states that mental content is individuated by factors in a subject’s physical 
environment, it counts as physical externalism. The term ‘physical’ here is to be 
contrasted with ‘social’, regardless of whether one thinks that language communities 
are part of the physical environment. There are a number of different ways in which 
someone can be a physical externalist.
43
 One prominent example of a physical 
externalism about mental content is Jerry Fodor’s (1987) asymmetric dependence 
theory. Asymmetric dependence theory is a version of a causal theory of mental 
content.
44
 Causal theories of content claim that contents are determined by their 
causal relations to relevant objects in the external world. Fodor describes what he 
calls a ‘crude’ causal theory as follows: “The symbol tokenings denote their causes, 
and the symbol types express the property whose instantiations reliably cause their 
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 For example, the concept MOUSE represents mice because mental 
tokenings of MOUSE are appropriately causally related to real live mice. This very 
basic kind of causal account is problematic because it fails to allow for systematic 
misrepresentation: the problem is that plenty of objects in the world which are not 
mice can still cause tokenings of MOUSE in a subject’s mind (for example, shrews on 
a dark night). This problem is known as ‘the disjunction problem’; the challenge is to 
explain why, for example, a given concept, C, is the concept MOUSE and not the 
disjunctive concept, MOUSE OR SHREW ON A DARK NIGHT when both mice and night-
shrews sometimes cause mental tokenings of C. In an attempt to get around the 
problem, Fodor adds to the basic causal theory the notion of ‘asymmetric 
dependence’. The idea is that certain objects which are causes of tokenings of C are 
in some sense fundamental, whereas other objects which are causes of tokenings of C 
are non-fundamental. The non-fundamental cause will not be a content-determining 
cause because this cause (for example, night-shrews) would not cause tokenings of C 
unless the content-determining cause (the mice) did so. But supposedly the reverse is 
not true: the fact that mice cause tokenings of C is in no way dependent upon the fact 
that shrews sometimes do. Thus, mice are the fundamental, content-determining 
cause of tokenings of C. As Fodor explains, 
 
Misidentifying a cow as a horse wouldn’t have led me to say ‘horse’ except 
that there was independently a semantic relation between ‘horse’ tokens and 
horses. But for the fact that the word ‘horse’ expresses the property of being 
a horse […], it would not have been that word that taking a cow to be a horse 




Another form of physical externalism which claims to allow for misrepresentation is 
Ruth Millikan’s (1984, 1989) teleosemantic theory of content.
47
 On this theory, the 
content of a mental state is individuated by appeal to the biological ‘proper function’ 
of that mental state. The basic idea is that a concept bears a representational relation 
to a particular object because it is that concept’s proper function to represent that 
object. The function itself is determined by the history, or ancestry, of the kind of 
concept possessing the function. As Millikan writes, “Proper functions are 
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determined by the histories of the items possessing them; functions that were 
“selected for” are paradigm cases.”
48
 Certain functions are adaptive and, as such, are 
the functions which are etiologically selected and preserved in the evolution of a 
species. This kind of approach is supposed to allow for systematic misrepresentation 
(and thus avoid the disjunction problem), because a concept such as MOUSE for a 
subject may be caused by the wrong kind of object, but will still represent mice 
because that is what it was evolutionarily selected to represent. The subject’s mouse-
representing mechanism has evolved to represent mice and is thus malfunctioning if 
it represents non-mice such as night-shrews. 
 
3.2 Social externalism 
 
A second prominent externalist view is social externalism. Social externalism, as 
developed by Tyler Burge (1979), is the thesis that it is a subject’s social or linguistic 
environment which individuates content. As we saw in Burge’s ‘arthritis’ thought 
experiment, social externalists think that differences in a subject’s linguistic 
community will affect the content of that subject’s thought. On social externalism, 
subjects speak a shared language. And they succeed in entertaining thoughts with the 
same content as others in their linguistic community even when they are not fully 
competent with these concepts. They can do this if they satisfy two conditions. 
Firstly, they must possess basic linguistic competence – not with respect to any 
particular concept at their disposal, but with respect to their language as a whole. As 
Burge writes, the individual must “maintain a minimal internal and rational 
coherence and a broad similarity to others’ use of the language”.
49
 Secondly, with 
respect to concepts with which they are not fully competent, they must defer to 
experts in their community who are masters of those concepts.
50  
 
Thinking using community concepts gives rise to the phenomenon of ‘partial grasp’ 
or ‘incomplete understanding’, in addition to full understanding or mastery.
51
 For the 
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social externalist, a subject can think with a concept he or she incompletely grasps or 
understands.
 
Many forms of physical externalism will also claim that subjects can 
think using a concept they do not fully understand and, as such, will also claim that 
there is such a thing as incomplete understanding. Concept possession, on social 
externalism, is not a matter of mastering a concept. Attributing possession of a 
concept to a subject is consistent with that subject having very little understanding of 
the application conditions of the concept, or its conceptual relations to other 
concepts. Despite this incomplete understanding, social externalists claim that it is 
correct to ascribe content involving communal concepts to individuals. There are two 
kinds of incomplete understanding which Burge identifies. The first is ‘incorrect 
understanding’. This is characterised as the possession of at least one false belief as 
to the correct application of a concept by the subject.
52
 The second is ‘agnostic 
understanding’. A subject possesses agnostic understanding of a concept when she is 
unsure about that concept’s application conditions despite there being a determinate 
fact of the matter as to whether it applies to any given entity.
53
 Incomplete 
understanding is thought to be extremely widespread on social externalism.
 
As a 
result, subjects are quite frequently to be attributed beliefs in conceptual falsehoods 
such as the belief THAT ARTHRITIS OCCURS IN THE THIGH. It should not noted that, 
although Burge appeals to partial grasp in his thought experiments, he also thinks 
that, even when a subject possesses mastery of a concept, that concept is still reliant 
for its individuation on her language community. This is because, although a subject 
may understand a given concept correctly in the actual world, had her social 
environment been different, the content of her thought would have been different too: 
it would have been such that her counterfactual understanding was incorrect 




As things stand, this presentation of social externalism appears to give us only a 
partial theory of content individuation. We are only told how a subject can sustain 
communal concepts (both in cases of partial and complete grasp) in virtue of the fact 
that she is willing to defer. But we are still owed an explanation of how content is 
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determined by community practice such that it can then figure in the thoughts of 
cooperative participants in that community: it cannot just be deference all the way 
down. There must be some mechanism of content determination in place in addition 
to the deferential practices of subjects. It is surely the case that different versions of 
social externalism could appeal to different explanations of what determines content. 
For example, a ‘pure’ social externalism would hold that the supervenience base of 
mental content is the linguistic community alone and does not include the greater 
physical environment. On such a view, one could just appeal to similar internal 
mechanisms as are appealed to by internalists. Although, the social externalist would 
surely allow that these mechanisms can be distributed over more than one subject 
such that someone who is an expert in one concept might yet defer with respect to 
some of the concepts he uses to explicate the concept about which he is an expert. 
There is evidence that Burge thinks that such mechanisms could, in some cases, be 
wholly present within a single individual. For he countenances the possibility of 
individuals who op-out of the cooperative and, because of this, are to be properly 
attributed idiosyncratic concepts.
55
 Burge only explicitly tells us the conditions under 
which a subject can think a thought with a given content. He does not explicitly tell 
us how that content itself is determined, although he does gesture towards a 
combination of factors which he takes to be relevant. For example, in his (1986) he 
suggests that both the social and the physical environment can play a role in content 
determination. He writes, “The mental natures of many of an individual’s mental 





Social externalism is rather different to physical externalism. Most noticeably, on a 
purely physical externalism, the external factors relevant to individuating content can 
be external to all subjects;
57
 social externalism does not claim this. On social 
externalism, content is determined by factors internal to subjects (at least partially): it 
is determined by the minds and practices of the experts (or perhaps groups of 
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experts) and grasped by deferring to these experts. This emphasis on the importance 
of community experts may cause social externalism to ascribe different contents to 
the propositional attitudes of subjects than physical externalism. As Wikforss 
explains,  
 
For instance, social externalism does not support Putnam’s claim that in 1750 
(before the development of modern chemistry) ‘water’ on Earth expressed a 
different meaning than ‘water’ on Twin Earth. In 1750 the experts on Earth 
and the experts on Twin Earth would have associated all the same 
descriptions with ‘water’, and hence the term ‘water’ in English would have 




Despite this, one needn’t necessarily think of physical and social externalism as 
competitors. One could hold that different kinds of concepts are individuated by 
different kinds of external factors providing one has motivation for treating each kind 
of content differently. It is perhaps also conceivable that purely external content 
could have a two-factor structure in a similar fashion to how some think that 
internalism and externalism can co-exist; although, it is not clear what would 
motivate one to adopt such a theory.  
 
Despite the differences between social and physical externalism, there are things 
which they agree on. Two of these things are important for my purposes. Firstly, one 
thing that these externalists typically hold is that subjects can succeed in thinking 
thoughts with the same content as each other (even though the theories might 
disagree as to the precise nature of this content). This is because, on physical 
externalism, different subjects are related to their physical environment in the same 
ways; and, on social externalism, different subjects are related to their social 
environment in the same ways. The second point of agreement which is of interest to 
this project is that both theories think that content internalism is false: factors internal 
to an individual are not sufficient to determine the mental content of that individual. I 
turn now to content internalism. 
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Section 4: Internalism 
 
Internalism, although quite popular before the shift towards externalism, has become 
a minority view since the arguments of Putnam and Burge. These thought 
experiments caused a flurry of responses by philosophers who still retained 
internalist intuitions (or, at the very least, did not have externalist intuitions). This 
resulted in the philosophical community generating a far clearer idea of what it is to 
be an internalist, and why one would want to be one. Narrow content is alleged to be 
required as at least part of a theory of content; it is thought by some to play a crucial 





Content internalism is often presented as the thesis that, necessarily, the content of an 
individual’s thought is determined solely by factors internal to that individual.
60
 
There are at least two ways in which to sharpen this initial characterisation of 
internalism. One popular way to state internalism is as the thesis that, necessarily and 
for any individual, the content of that individual’s thought is individuated solely by 
factors internal to that individual such that any two microphysical duplicates will be 
identical with respect to content. This kind of internalism is clearly the thesis that 
Putnam and Burge had in mind: both their thought experiments are attempts to show 
that microphysical duplicates do not necessarily share content. From this, they move 
to the claim that internalism is false. However, not all internalists will accept this 
characterisation. Some would prefer to characterise internalism as the thesis that, 
necessarily, for any individual, the content of that individual’s thought is 
individuated solely by that individual’s intrinsic properties such that two subjects can 
be microphysical duplicates and yet differ with respect to the content of their 
                                                 
59
 Of course, many externalists will deny that narrow content is needed to in order to deal with these 
issues. 
60
 This is what makes internalism distinct from a pure social externalism. Pure social externalism 
(which, as I noted above, is not Burge’s version of the view) claims that thought content is determined 
by factors internal to individuals, but what is distinctive about the thesis is that is allows that the 
content of one individual’s thought can be dependent on another individual, or group of individuals, 
so long as those individuals stand in the right kinds of relations to each other. 
32 
 
thoughts (due to differences in their intrinsic properties).
61
 Both kinds of internalists 
will typically take the thesis to hold of nomological necessity. It will become clear in 
Chapter 5 that it is a consequence of my theory that internalism should be 
characterised in this second way. Externalists will deny both these characterisations 
of internalism. It is possible, on social externalism, that a particular item of mental 
content for a subject be entirely determined by her individual psychology (as might 
be possible in the very unlikely event that a subject is an expert in the use of all of 
her concepts, or when she simply refuses to defer to others). However, for even the 
most stubborn polymath, it is always possible that her situation will change such that 
changes in her linguistic community will alter the contents of her thoughts despite 
there being no relevant changes internal to her. It should be stressed that internalists 
will agree that, as a matter of fact, a subject’s external (physical and social) 
environment will have an enormous causal effect on the content of that subject’s 
thought: for example, it is (as a matter of contingent fact) through interacting with 
other speakers that we gain our language and come to form new concepts in the first 
place. What internalists deny is that such environmental factors play any kind of 
content-individuating role; the effect is merely a contingent, causal one. The 
relationship between the individual and her environment is irrelevant to the 
individuation of content. Any given contentful state possessed by a subject could 
have obtained despite that subject inhabiting a very different environment or, 




Whereas externalist theories of content typically claim that speakers in a language 
community speak (and think) using a shared sociolect, many (but not all) internalists 
claim that each individual thinks using her own idiolect (and possibly speaks in this 
idiolect as well).
63
 For example, Tim Crane (1991) responds to Burge’s thought 
experiment by claiming that Alf does not think using the community concept, 
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ARTHRITIS, but with an idiosyncratic concept which applies in both the actual and 
counterfactual scenarios. Thus the truth-conditions of his beliefs in the actual and 
counterfactual scenario are the same. The mistake that Alf makes in the actual world 
is merely metalinguistic.
64
 In claiming that subjects think using idiosyncratic rather 
than community concepts, internalists need not claim that speakers are happy to 
mean seriously divergent things by their utterances, and to represent different things 
with their thoughts. Internalists who deal in idiolects tend to think that speakers 
strive to speak an idiolect which is either the same as, or at least similar to, that of 
their peers. Because of this, internalists allow that speakers are likely to accept 
correction from experts, and do, in some sense, defer to these experts’ greater 
understanding of how the words of a language are supposed to be used. However, 
deference works differently on internalism: importantly, it doesn’t allow subjects to 
literally think thoughts which contain communal concepts, or concepts which are 
only partially understood. On internalism, a deferring subject’s concept might be 
something like a placeholder for a richer concept which she does not yet possess. For 
example, ‘arthritis’ for a subject with a poor understanding of the term might express 
a concept like WHATEVER THE EXPERTS MEAN BY ‘ARTHRITIS’. Thus, although for the 
internalist deference does not allow a subject to think with a concept which is 
mastered by an expert, it might enable an ignorant subject and the expert to whom 
she defers to both refer to the same thing with the term ‘arthritis’ even though they 
possess different concepts. This will be roughly my approach in Chapter 5. 
 
The choice between internalism and externalism about mental content is at root a 
question of what individuates content; it is a question of which things must obtain in 
order for subjects to have thoughts with the very content which they do, in fact, have. 
What motivates internalism, typically, is a need to account for the sense in which 
something is shared between Twins. And, relatedly, it is argued that narrow content 
is what explains rationality, mental causation and intentional action.
65
 From the 
prominence and influence of the arguments of Burge and Putnam, one might think 
that what motivates externalism is the need to provide truth-conditional content. 
Internalists, it is often said, either provide the wrong truth-conditions for content or 
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cannot provide any truth-conditions at all. It is true that many authors believe this to 
be the case. However, I think that things are more complicated than this. First of all, 
recall Wikforss’s point that different kinds of externalists disagree amongst 
themselves as to what truth-conditions are correctly ascribed to propositional 
attitudes. Perhaps then, what motivates externalism is the thought that subjects’ 
thoughts (at least, those which are expressed with the same words) ought to have the 
same truth-conditions as each other. But, once again, it is not the case that internalists 
uniformly deny this. Farkas’s (2008) theory, for example, provides a truth-
conditional theory of content of a purely internalist kind which allows for ascriptions 
of truth-conditions which cohere with the supposedly externalist intuitions of the 
Twin Earth thought experiments. And my own version of conceptual-role semantics 
claims to be truth-conditional in this way and yet purely internalist. One might think 
that a major difference between the two views is that externalism can claim that 
subjects share content whereas internalism can, at best, claim that subjects can 
entertain (different) thoughts with the same truth-conditions. But, as mentioned 
above, there are internalists who claim that subjects share thought content. The only 
uncontroversial difference between internalism and externalism then seems to be the 
role of the environment in the individuation of thought content. 
 
There are a wide and colourful variety of candidate theories of narrow content. For 
example, Chalmers (2002) offers an epistemic conception of narrow content. And 
Horgan and Tienson (2002) and Farkas (2008) offer phenomenological theories. 
These internalist theories have much to recommend them. However, for the purposes 
of this project, I will be defending only one very particular internalist theory of 
content: conceptual-role semantics. Before turning to conceptual-role theories, I will 
first present a third family of theories of mental content: two-factor theories. Many 
theorists who adopt a conceptual-role theory do so as one part of a two factor theory 
of content. As such, it will be easier to understand the differences between the 





Section 5: Two-factor theories 
 
Philosophers who are impressed by the motivations for both internalism and 
externalism can adopt a theory of content which incorporates both. So-called ‘two-
factor’ theories of content claim that, for at least some mental content, that content is 
individuated by both internal and external factors.
66
 There is more than one way of 
understanding what this amounts to. The first is the claim that the internal and 
external factors separately determine two different aspects of content.
67
 Another 
approach would be to claim that each concept has two separate kinds of content: one 
narrow and one wide. A two-factor theory can incorporate whichever two particular 
theories of content individuation you like. Block, for example, suggests that the 
internal aspect might be combined with a causal theory of reference, although he 
chooses to remain neutral on the correct way to understand the external component.
68
 
Two-factor theories could be described as Fregean insofar as they appeal to 
something like the need for a sense/reference distinction for content. However, many 
of them are distinctly non-Fregean in two important respects. Firstly, Fregean senses 
are supposed to be shareable. Many theorists think that narrow content has this 
feature, but some do not. As such, some varieties of narrow content have more in 
common with what Frege called ‘ideas’.
69
 Secondly, whereas Frege believed that 
sense determines reference, most two-factor theorists invoke wide content precisely 
because they think that their internal factor does not suffice to determine the 
reference, or truth-conditions, of a given concept or content. With this third theory of 
content individuation in place, I now turn to conceptual-role semantics. 
 
Section 6: Conceptual-role semantics 
 
In the following sub-sections, I will introduce conceptual-role semantics (CRS) as a 
thesis about content individuation and survey the ways in which the thesis has been 
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understood in the philosophical literature. I will also introduce a linguistic theory 
which bears a striking resemblance to CRS. In Section 7, I will introduce the version 
of CRS which I will defend in this project. 
 
CRS takes the contents of mental states (or expressions of a language) to be 
individuated by, or identical with, the role that that content (or expression) plays in 
thought (or language). CRS takes content to be individuated by its role, or position, 
in a network, where this position is defined in terms of its relations to the positions of 
other mental entities in that network. As we will see in Section 7, CRS theories can 
be more or less holistic depending on whether it is the total network, or some subset 
of it, which is relevant to individuating a particular content. On CRS, all concepts (or 
contents) can be represented as nodes in a network. For every word (or sentence) that 
you have in your vocabulary, there is a corresponding concept (or content) in your 
conceptual (or inferential) network. These concepts (or contents) are connected to 
each other by complex relations which determine how they interact with each other 
in your cognitive economy in response to various inputs.  
 
The conceptual-role of a concept or content includes that entity’s relationships to 
representations caused by perceptual input and behavioural output as well as its 
internal conceptual-role. As Block writes, 
 
The internal factor, conceptual role, is a matter of the causal role of the 
expression in reasoning and deliberation and, in general, in the way the 
expression combines and interacts with other expressions so as to mediate 




And Harman writes, 
 
[…] [M]eaning has to do with evidence, inference, and reasoning, including 
the impact sensory experience has on what one believes, the way in which 
inference and reasoning modify one’s beliefs and plans, and the way beliefs 
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In addition to relations to perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs, the conceptual-
role of a concept can include that concept’s relations to other non-linguistic 





On CRS, it is mental entities which possess conceptual-roles. These entities are, at 
the very least, language-like insofar as they obey some systematicity/productivity 
principle such as the principle of compositionality. CRS is, at least, committed to 
there being some mental correlates of linguistic entities such as sentences and non-
sentential expressions. However, as Block identifies, a proponent of CRS need not 
think that subjects literally think in their native language.
73
 For ease of exposition, I 
will often talk as if we think in our native language. But officially, I wish to remain 
neutral on this matter. I will also talk of contents as if they are mental sentence 
tokens and of concepts as if they are mental non-sentential expression tokens. 
However, contents and concepts are not literally sentences and non-sentential 
expressions; rather, they are their mental correlates. 
 
CRS theorists promote the idea that in understanding meanings we are not, at least 
primarily, ‘grasping’ anything (such as the truth-conditions of a sentence or the 
meaning of  term); rather, semantic understanding is a matter of getting used to using 
words; understanding meanings is a matter of knowing how rather than knowing that. 
As Harman and Greenberg explain,  
 
The basic understanding one has of the meaning of one’s own words and 
expressions consists in one’s being at home with one’s use of those words 
and expressions. It is a kind of knowhow: one knows how to proceed. One 
can have that basic kind of knowledge of meaning without having any sort of 
theoretical understanding of meaning and without being able to say what is 
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As such, CRS’s picture of language-competence is intellectually undemanding. A 
subject can be ‘at home’ with her use of a given concept without necessarily being 
able to explicate how that concept should be employed. 
 
6.1 Varieties of conceptual-role theory 
 
CRS has its roots in a number of different places; for example, in the work of 
philosophers such as Wittgenstein (1953), Quine (1951) and Wilfred Sellars (1955) 
and in the functionalist theory of mind.
75
 In ‘Reflections on Language Games’, 
Sellars describes a picture of language according to which what it is to use language 
is to perform certain actions in certain situations. This he viewed as making moves in 
a language game. For Sellars, it is not the ‘pieces’ (so-to-speak) in the language 
game which have meaning, but their positions. And, of course, these positions cannot 
be understood independently of the positions of other pieces in the game. Sellars 
writes, 
 
As I see it, abstract singular terms such as ‘redness’ […] and ‘that 
Chicago is large’ are to be construed, in first approximation, as singular terms 




Since Sellars, CRS has gained many contemporary advocates in philosophy. 
Prominent defenders include Gilbert Harman (1982, 1987), Ned Block (1986), 
Hartry Field (1977) and Paul Churchland (1979). There are also similar kinds of 
theories endorsed by linguists such as Hudson (2007) and Lamb (1998), cognitive 
scientists such as Johnson-Laird (1977), and in artificial intelligence the thesis has 
been defended by William Rapaport (2002). Not all of these authors employ the 
conceptual-role machinery in the same way. In the proceeding, I will distinguish 
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6.1.1 Inferential-Role Semantics 
 
The term ‘Conceptual-Role Semantics’ is used to refer to two slightly different 
versions of conceptual-role theory. The first is Inferential-Role Semantics. 
Inferential-Role Semantics claims that the fundamental bearers of conceptual-role are 
mental ‘sentences’, which should be thought of as content tokens. Non-sentential 
mental entities such as concepts possess conceptual-roles as well, but these are 
derivative of the conceptual-roles of the sentences in which they figure as parts. The 
conceptual-roles of non-sentential expressions are defined in terms of the set of all 
inferential-roles of sentential contents in which those non-sentential expressions 
figure as a constituent. Block (1986) endorses this view as part of a two-factor 
theory. He writes, “A crucial component of a sentence’s conceptual role is a matter 
of how it participates in inductive and deductive inferences. A word’s conceptual 
role is a matter of its contribution to the role of sentences.”
77
 The term ‘inference’ on 
Block’s theory should be very broadly construed so as to include even mere 
psychological associations. Inferential-roles, on Block’s view, should be understood 
in terms of the causal-roles of contents in a subject’s web of attitudes: it is causal-




Hartry Field also endorses an inferential version of conceptual-role semantics.
79
 
However, Field prefers to understand inferential-role in terms of subjective 
probability.
80
 The basic idea is that the inferential-role of a sentence or content 
should be understood in terms of its subjective conditional probability in relation to 
all sentences in the language (or web of belief) of which it is a part. Field uses the 
approach to define intra-subjective synonymy for two sentences. On Field’s view, if 
two sentences have the same subjective conditional probability with respect to all 
other sentences in the language (or the same subset), then they have the same 
inferential-role in that language. Field writes, 
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[T]wo sentences have the same conceptual role for a person if these sentences 
are equipollent with respect to that person’s subjective probability function. 
That is, ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ have different 
conceptual roles for me as long as my subjective conditional probability 
function has the property that there are sentences C for which the subjective 
probability of ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ given C is lower than the subjective 




Field’s inferential-role theory, like Block’s, figures as one half of a two-factor 
theory. 
 
6.1.2 (Non-sentential) conceptual-role semantics 
 
Non-sentential conceptual-role semantics simply reverses the order of dependence 
between inferential-roles and non-sentential conceptual-roles. On this view, it is the 
conceptual-role of concepts that is fundamental and the inferential-roles of contents 
that are derivative. Such a view is defended by Harman, who endorses the following 
theses: 
 









Harman’s view is distinctive in that, while it takes itself to be a one-factor view of 
mental content, it is neither purely internalist nor purely externalist. Harman is 
disparaging of the idea that truth-conditions should play a central role in a theory of 
meaning.
84
 Nonetheless, he still thinks that a subject’s external environment (both 
physical and social) is relevant to the individuation of content. It enters, not as a 
determiner of some external, truth-conditional factor, but as an extension of the 
conceptual-role of a concept. Conceptual-role reaches out of the subject and into the 
world. Harman calls this a ‘non-solipsistic’ or ‘long-armed’ conceptual role theory.  
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Another non-sentential conceptual-role theory is William Rapaport’s ‘Syntactic 
Semantics’. Rapaport’s view is interesting because it purports to explain semantics 
purely in terms of syntax (in the liberal sense of ‘syntax’ which pertains to symbol 
manipulation). Rapaport writes, 
 
Semantics, considered as the study of relations between uninterpreted 
markers and interpretations of them, can be turned into syntax: a study of 
relations among the markers and their interpretations. This is done by 
incorporating (or ‘internalizing’) the semantic interpretations along with the 
markers to form a system of new markers, some of which are the old ones 




According to Syntactic Semantics, semantic understanding is a matter of modelling 
one domain (the syntactic domain) in terms of another domain (an antecedently 
understood semantic domain). However, our understanding of this semantic domain 
is itself to be treated as a new syntactic domain, which, in a recursive fashion, is 
again to be understood in terms of some further antecdently understood semantic 
domain. To prevent a regress, Rapaport posits a bottom level on which there is just 
syntactic understanding. Rapaport writes, “This base case of semantic understanding 
is ‘syntactic understanding’ […]: understanding a (syntactic) domain by being 
conversant with manipulating its markers.”
86
 Thus, Rapaport echoes the suggestion 
from Greenberg and Harman quoted above that language understanding is really just 
a matter being ‘at home’ in one’s use of the language.  
 
Modelling an item in a syntactic domain in terms of some item in a semantic domain 
is to be understood as a matter of pattern matching. The system compares the two 
items to determine what role each item plays in its respective domain. As Rapaport 
explains, 
 
The result of a comparison is a determination that the ‘new’ item ‘plays the 
same role’ in its (syntactic) domain that the corresponding ‘given’ item plays 
in its (semantic) domain. The two items are analogous to each other; a pattern 
seen in one domain has been matched or recognized in the other. Each item—
new and given—plays a role in its respective domain. 
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According to Rapaport, the roles played by each item are syntactic roles: “that is, 
roles determined by relationships to other items in the domain.”
87
 Rapaport wishes to 
identify a term’s meaning with its syntactic role. As such, he classifies his view as a 
version of a conceptual-role theory: the meaning of a term, or concept, is determined 
by its syntactic role – where its syntactic role is determined by its relationships to the 
syntactic roles of other concepts in the same domain. Unlike Harman, Rapaport takes 
conceptual-role to be ‘short-armed’. Rapaport argues that internal (rather than non-
solipsistic) conceptual-role is all that is needed to make sense of the language 




6.2 Conceptual-role in linguistics 
 
The present approach to mental content has friends in linguistics, where conceptual-
network approaches to language-modelling are very popular. A prominent recent 
example of such an approach is Richard Hudson’s (2007) theory, ‘Word Grammar’.
89
 
Word Grammar represents language structure using an inheritance network. A 
central claim of Word Grammar is that language is a conceptual network and nothing 
but a conceptual network – that “Everything in language can be described formally in 
terms of nodes and their relations.”
90
 Hudson writes that the claim that language is a 
conceptual network of interconnected elements is a commonplace in various 
branches of linguistics.
91
 He writes that theories in cognitive linguistics such as 
Cognitive Grammar, Construction Grammar, Stratification Grammar and Systemic 
Functional Grammar (an earlier incarnation of Word Grammar) all share this 
feature.
92
 Hudson sharply distinguishes these theories from theories in linguistics 
which appeal to conceptual networks in addition to a set of rules which complement 
the network.
93
 What is distinctive about Hudson’s view is that he believes that 
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nothing in addition to the conceptual network is required: even the rules can be 
represented as part of the network. 
 
Word Grammar represents language by means of a network of nodes and links. In 
Word Grammar, all concepts are represented as nodes in the network. These nodes 
are connected by a small number of primitive relations, represented by links (or 
‘arcs’). Hudson’s theory is strikingly similar to CRS – in particular in its emphasis on 
the thesis that the meaning of a concept is determined by its relations to other 
concepts. Hudson writes, 
 
The entire content of a network is held by the links between nodes. The nodes 
in a network are not little boxes full of information held in some other format; 
rather, nodes are nothing but the points where links meet. In slogan, ‘It’s 
network all the way down.’ All the content of a concept – the properties 
which distinguish cats from dogs, for example – is held in terms of network 
links. Nor is there any distinction in a network between links which somehow 
define a concept and those which merely describe it (i.e., between ‘analytic’ 





There are different kinds of links which connect the nodes in different ways. Hudson 
stresses that the classification of the kinds of links required to model language is 
something which should be left to linguists.
95
 It is an empirical question precisely 
which primitive relations hold between the nodes. Hudson appeals to just five 





Hudson’s work is influenced by work in psychology and psycholinguistics on 
‘spreading activation.’ Spreading activation is the process whereby activation (of 
neurons, for example) spreads ‘blindly’ between nodes which are neighbours in a 
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 Spreading activation is a phenomenon which is generally accepted in 
psychology. Hudson writes, 
 
[S]preading activation is massively supported by psychological experiment as 
well as by observation of speech errors, and that it in turn gives 
overwhelming support for the Network Postulate […], the claim that the 




Hudson notes that the evidence that supports spreading activation is to be found at 
every linguistic level: phonology, morphology, syntax, meaning and perception of 
the environment of the utterance.
99
 Given that there is so much evidence for the 
existence of spreading activation, Hudson thinks that recognition of the phenomenon, 
“provides a crucial constraint on any theory of language structure: it must model 
language as a network.”
100
 This is because the notion of spreading activation only 
makes sense on the assumption that language is a network (rather than a set of rules) 
as only the latter involves a notion of topological distance between nodes across 
which activation can spread.
101
 One interesting consequence of the work in 
psychology which Hudson cites, then, is that the notion of ‘distance’ between nodes, 
which some philosophers have complained is an unhelpful metaphor,
102
 actually 
turns out to be psychologically real and experimentally supported. 
 
Word Grammar uses networks to model the language of human subjects. However, a 
good number of linguists take their models to aim at capturing the way language is 
structured in reality, and realised in the brains of human subjects. Hudson writes, “a 
theory of language structure can and should aim at the ‘psychological reality’ that 
has been on the agenda for some decades now.”
103
 Word Grammar, for example, 
does not just provide a static representation of the conceptual connections between 
words in an abstract language. It aims to show how that network functions 
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dynamically inside an individual. Hudson thinks his view can offer explanations of 




In this section, I have suggested how work in linguistics – supported by work in 
psychology – proceeds along an approach which has much in common with CRS.  
But, of course, even supposing that some conceptual network theory in linguistics is 
true, this does not provide support for the truth of conceptual-role semantics as a 
thesis about the individuation of content. An externalist will think we are making a 
mistake: we are conflating what constitutes content (or meaning) with what 
constitutes our epistemic or cognitive grasp of that content. No externalist will deny 
that there are structures in the brain which are responsible for storing and processing 
language. What they will deny is that these structures fully individuate content. What 
the linguists are modelling, they will say, is our linguistic understanding, our 
knowledge of meaning. But content itself – the thing which is understood – is 
determined quite independently of these mental structures. I wish to stress here that, 
in the view which I defend, I am not accidentally conflating these two enterprises. 
Rather, I am deliberately and enthusiastically identifying the two in the hope that 
doing so will provide us with a satisfactory theory of mental content (where it is an 
open question as to whether doing so will succeed in providing such a theory). 
Having introduced various conceptual-role approaches in the literature, I now wish to 
state the form of the theory that I will defend. 
 
Section 7: A holist, internalist conceptual-role theory of mental content 
 
The view that I will defend in this project is a combination of three theses. These are 
as follows: 
 
A) Content internalism: for any subject, the content of her thoughts and concepts 
is individuated solely by factors intrinsic to that subject. 
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B) Conceptual-role semantics: the content of a thought or concept for a subject is 
fully determined (or constituted) by that content or concept’s conceptual-role 
in the subject’s cognitive economy. Conceptual-role is determined by a 
content or concept’s causal relations to other contents or concepts in that 
subject’s cognitive economy, and includes relations to sensory inputs, 
behavioural outputs, imaginings, memories, etc. 
C) Holism about conceptual-role: the content of a thought or concept for a 
subject is determined (or constituted) by that content or concept’s causal 
relations to all other contents or concepts in that subject’s cognitive economy 
(including its relations to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, imaginings, 
memories etc.). 
 
I will call the combination of these theses ‘Holism’ – with a capital ‘H’. The reason 
for this is simply that ‘Fully Holistic Internalist Conceptual-Role Theory’ is a 
mouthful. As I will explain in the next section, Holism (with a capital ‘H’) is a very 
specific form of holism (with a lowercase ‘h’). 
 
In the above characterisation of the view, I have chosen to remain neutral as to a few 
debates within conceptual-role semantics. Specifically, theses (B) and (C) are 
designed to remain neutral with respect to two issues. Firstly, I wish to remain 
neutral as to the choice between inferential-role semantics and non-sentential 
conceptual-role semantics. I believe that my arguments in this project are consistent 
with both these theses. However, I will mostly talk as if non-sentential conceptual-
role semantics is true. Secondly, I wish to remain neutral over the issue of whether 
the conceptual-role of a concept is something which constitutes that concept, or 
whether content is said to be merely determined by conceptual-role. I think most 
authors opt for the latter option, taking conceptual-role to be the determination base 
for content. However, there are exceptions. Rapaport, for example, sometimes 
presents his conceptual-role theory as the thesis that “The content of a thought is its 
functional role.”
105
 One issue which I will not remain neutral on is the following. I 
have chosen to state internalism as a thesis about the intrinsic features of a subject, 
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because I believe that two subjects can be microphysical duplicates and yet differ 
with respect to the content of their thoughts as a result of differing in their intrinsic 
properties. Why this is the case will become clear in Chapter 5.  
 
7.1 Conceptual-role and holism 
 
A variety of theses in the philosophy of language, mind and epistemology have been 
described as holistic.
106
 For example, holism of some form is present in the works of 
Hempel (1950) and Quine (1951). Here the kind of holism in play is confirmation 
holism, or epistemological holism.
107
 Another form of holism in the literature is 
belief holism. This is the idea, found in Davidson (1975) and Stich (1983) that, in 
order to have a particular belief, it is necessary that the subject have many other 
particular beliefs as well. These theses are distinct from content holism, and I will 
not be concerned with them in the present project. 
 
There are roughly three divisions we can make amongst characterisations of content 
holism to be found in the literature. I have presented these in terms of the content of 
thoughts and concepts, but there are corollary theses which pertain to the meaning of 
linguistic expressions. 
 
i. Total holism: The content of a thought or concept depends on that content’s 
relations to all other contents in the conceptual web. (e.g., Rapaport, 2002) 
ii. Molecularism: The content of a thought or concept depends on that content’s 
relations to contents in some privileged subset of the contents in the total 
conceptual web. (e.g., Fodor and Lepore, 1992, Devitt, 1996
108
) 
iii. Many-one holism: The content of a thought or concept depends on that 
content’s relations to all other contents in the conceptual web. Different 
determination bases can determine the same content. (e.g. Jackman, 1999) 
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Theses (i)-(iii) are each slightly different. Thesis (i), ‘total holism’, is the thesis 
which is involved in my presentation of Holism above. It is the most radical of the 
three theses. Total holism entails what authors have called the ‘Instability Thesis’. 
This thesis states that any change in a subject’s conceptual web will determine a 
change in all concepts and contents in that web (although these changes can be 
minute). The Instability Thesis, and its alleged unsavoury consequences, will be 
introduced properly in Chapter 2. One consequence of the Instability Thesis is that 
no two subjects ever mean the same things by their utterances, or think thoughts 
which share content. This is because no two subjects will ever possess exactly the 
same conceptual webs. As such, on Holism (and other forms of total holism), there 
are as many languages as there are non-identical speakers (and perhaps non-identical 
time-slices of speakers). For example, there is no such thing as the word ‘dog’, or the 
concept DOG. In light of this, when talking about concepts on Holism, I will always 
be taking about a concept for a subject. To represent this, I will either talk about a 
concept, C, for a subject, or I will add a subscript which contains either a subject’s 
name, or the first letter of a subject’s name, to indicate which subject entertains the 
concept. So, for example, the concept DOG for a speaker, Sally, would be represented 
as DOGSALLY or just DOGS. On Holism, two concepts for two non-identical subjects can 
never be exactly similar (or type-identical). For each pair of non-identical subjects, 
Holism can posit only ‘merely’ similar concepts and contents. Externalism, in 
contrast, can posit concepts which are exactly similar, or type-identical. 
 
Total holism takes concepts to change whenever there are any changes made to other 
parts of the total conceptual web. Theses (ii) and (iii) are different in this regard, but 
for different reasons. Thesis (ii), which is the kind of view considered by Fodor and 
Lepore, characterises holism as the view that concepts depend for their content on 
their relations to many, but not all, other concepts in the same conceptual web. Fodor 
and Lepore describe such concepts as ‘very anatomistic’. An ‘atomic’ concept, Fodor 
and Lepore write, is one which “might, in principle, be instantiated by only one 
thing.”
109
 An anatomic property is such that “if anything has it, then at least one 
                                                 
109





 As such, Fodor and Lepore understand (molecular) content 
holism as the claim that “properties like having content are holistic in the sense that 
no expression in a language can have them unless many other (nonsynonymous) 
expressions in that language have them too.”
111
 The way Fodor and Lepore 
understand molecularism, then, is such that it is the property of having content which 
is holistic. Another way to state the thesis is just as the claim, presented in (ii), that 
content is determined by some privileged subset of the total relations which a given 
concept bears to other concepts in its conceptual web. These determination relations 
can perhaps be asymmetric such that concept, C, is part of the determination base for 
concept, D, but D is not part of the determination base for C.  Molecularism is weaker 
than total holism. This is because total holism demands that content be determined 
by its conceptual relations to all other contents in its network. Molecularism merely 
requires that content be determined by some sub-set of these relations. As such, 
molecularism is not committed to the Instability Thesis. Molecularism allows that 
there can be changes to a conceptual network which alter the content of some 
concepts but not others. Thesis (iii) attempts to avoid the Instability Thesis in a 
slightly different way. It does so by claiming that the determination of content by its 
holistic base can be many-one rather than one-one. Such a theory is suggested by 
Pagin (2006) and Jackman (1999). This is supposed to secure the result that subjects 
with different conceptual webs can still share content, and that changes to the 
conceptual web do not necessarily entail changes in all content and concepts within 
that web. This is because different total bases can determine the same contents. 
 
For the purposes of this project, I will set theses (ii) and (iii) to one side. I do this for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, with regard to molecularism, there is much scepticism 
in the literature as to whether some sub-set of a concept’s total conceptual relations 
can be isolated in a non-arbitrary way.
112
 These kinds of worries might well carry 
over to the problem of determining when two different bases determine the same 
content on the many-one view. Secondly, the reason authors typically want to 
endorse (ii) or (iii) in the first place, is because they believe that total holism entails 
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the Instability Thesis and that the Instability Thesis is bad. But it is my aim in this 
project to argue that, contrary to popular belief, a fully holistic theory of content 
actually better explains the role of content in communication in spite of (or perhaps, 
because of) the fact that it entails the Instability Thesis. As such, a molecular view 
which is weakly holistic (i.e., which holds that the subset of conceptual relations 
relevant to content determination is small relative to the entire conceptual web), may 
actually suffer from the very same problems which, I will argue, are suffered by 
externalist accounts of content individuation. Similar considerations apply to ‘many-
one’ holistic theories of content-individuation. One last thing to note about theses (ii) 
and (iii) is that the arguments in this project might be used to defend certain versions 
of these views, although I will not argue for this. Versions of these views will 
confront similar problems to total holism. For example, a molecular (or many-one 
theory) which is not fully-holistic, but highly or mostly holistic will entail a slightly 
weaker version of the Instability Thesis anyway. If it is problematic that subjects 
never share content, is likely also problematic that subjects almost never share 
content. However, if, as I will argue, a commitment to the Instability Thesis is not a 
reason to reject total holism, then one might think that similar arguments can be used 
to defend these weaker theories. 
  
In fact, many holists in the literature are total-holists rather than molecular or many-
one holists. For example, Rapaport writes, 
 
Nodes that are very distant from the original one may have little to do directly 
with its meaning or role. But they will have something to do with other nodes 





Hudson also hints that his networks are holistic. This is brought out when he explains 
his opposition to nativism:
 
  
The only way in which a specific concept, with a specific content, might be 
innate is for all its links […] to be put in place genetically. But this means 
that every single concept must be innate because every concept is defined by 
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its relations to other concepts. For example, if Cat is innate and links to Fur, 




As I will explain in more detail in the following chapter, fully holistic theses like 
these, and like the one I set out in this section, entail the Instability Thesis. It is my 
aim in this project to show that this result should be welcomed with open arms. 
 
Section 8: Chapter summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an introduction to the mental content 
debate, and to identify the particular theory of content, Holism, which I will defend 
in this project. I began with a rough characterisation of mental content: I described 
certain properties which content is popularly thought to possess and certain roles 
which it is popularly thought to play in a subject’s cognitive economy (and in her 
interactions with others). Next, I summarised the recent history of the mental content 
debate. I described three very famous arguments which are all aimed at 
demonstrating that factors internal to a subject are insufficient to determine various 
semantic properties of her thoughts and utterances. Many of these arguments will 
crop up again in later chapters. For example, in Chapter 3 I introduce some Twin 
Earth style examples of my own in support of my argument against externalist 
theories of communicative success. And in Chapter 5, I reconsider Kripke’s 
arguments against descriptive theories of reference. After presenting these pro-
externalist arguments, I went on to describe three families of theories of mental 
content. These were content externalism, content internalism, and two-factor 
theories. I then introduced conceptual-role semantics and described the particular 
version of the view, Holism, which I defend in this project. The purpose of the next 
chapter is to introduce the Objection from Communication, and to introduce various 
options for constructing accounts of communicative success which will enable us to 
assess the plausibility of this objection.  These first two chapters lay the groundwork 
for understanding the arguments presented in the rest of this project.
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Chapter 2:  Mental content and communication 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced Holism as a combination of theses in the 
philosophy of mental content. The purpose of this chapter is to present the Objection 
from Communication, to introduce some background assumptions about 
communication, and to present a variety of theses which can be combined to create 
accounts of communicative success. I divide views of communicative success into 
two broad camps: those which endorse a ‘Same Content View’ of communicative 
success, and those who endorse a ‘Similar Content View’. Behind the Objection 
from Communication is the assumption that only the Same Content View is 
plausible. If the objection succeeds, only views of content which can endorse the 
Same Content View can offer plausible accounts of communicative success. It is the 
purpose of this project to demonstrate that this could not be further from the truth: in 
fact, the Similar Content View offers a far more plausible picture of the role of 
content in communicative success. And, further, only views like Holism, which deny 
that content is shared, can endorse an attractive version of the Similar Content View. 
I will argue for this in Chapters 3 and 4. However, before introducing these 
arguments, it will be necessary to introduce certain distinctions and views which will 
be essential to understanding them, and to assessing the Objection from 
Communication. As such, much of this chapter is devoted to delineating various 
different kinds of condition on communicative success which will be relevant in the 
chapters which follow. Over the course of the chapter, I will identify two kinds of 
condition on communicative success which are directly relevant one’s choice of a 
theory of mental content.  
 
The first kind of condition states that an account of communicative success should be 
stated (in part) in terms of a particular relation between the content expressed by the 
speaker and the content recovered by the hearer. I will call this the ‘Content 
Relation’. After presenting the Content Relation, I shall consider a second kind of 
condition on communicative success which will be of central importance to this 
project. The second kind of condition claims that communicative success requires 
that the hearer must also understand the speaker (in some sense to be specified). I 
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call this the ‘Understanding Requirement’. I will present four different versions of 
the Understanding Requirement. 
 
It is the Content Relation and the Understanding Requirement which will be of 
central importance to understanding the arguments set forth in Chapter 3. However, 
these are plausibly not the only conditions on communicative success. In the final 
section of this chapter, I will briefly introduce various conditions on communicative 
success which will not be of central concern to this project. I call these ‘Theory-
Neutral’ conditions. The reason that they will not interest us is because this project is 
chiefly concerned with the ways in which considerations pertaining to 
communicative success affect the plausibility of various theories of mental content. 
These Theory-Neutral conditions are conditions on communicative success which 
will not affect the plausibility of endorsing any particular theory of mental content. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I will introduce the ‘Objection from 
Communication’. In Section 2, I introduce some information and background 
assumptions about the general picture of communication and communicative 
attempts which I will assume in this project. In Section 3, I introduce the Content 
Relation as a central feature of this account. In Section 4, I distinguish between 
different theses concerning understanding. In Section 5, I introduce the 
Understanding Requirement as a central feature of an account of communicative 
success and describe how different versions of the Understanding Requirement 
interact with different theories of mental content. Finally, in Section 6, I introduce 
the Theory-Neutral conditions. 
 
Section 1: Holism and the Objection from Communication 
 
Fodor and Lepore have launched an aggressive attack on holistic theories of mental 
content such as Holism. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Holistic theories of content are 





Instability Thesis: Any change, however minute, in a subject’s web of 
attitudes will determine a change in all concepts and contents within that 
web.  
 
As subjects are constantly undergoing changes in attitudes, this leaves content 
extremely unstable: content is constantly changing as we gain and relinquish 
propositional attitudes and learn new concepts. A number of apparently serious 
problems are supposed to follow from this. Fodor and Lepore claim that these 
problems include the following, 
 
that no two people ever share a belief; that there is no such relation as 
translation; that no two people ever mean the same thing by what they say; 
that no two time slices of the same person ever mean the same thing by what 
they say; that no one can ever change his mind; that no statements, or beliefs, 




It is their third claim which is supposed to pose a problem of communication for 
Holism: as all subjects (who are not intrinsic duplicates) will possess different total 
conceptual webs, all these subjects will mean different things by their utterances of 
the same word-forms; similarly, the contents of the thoughts which they would 
express with these word-forms will also be different. The problem arises because, on 
Holism (and theories like it), a hearer can never mean precisely what a speaker 
means by a given utterance, or entertain a thought with the same content.
116
 But, 
according to the Objection from Communication, it is necessary (or at least 
sometimes required) for communicative success that the hearer grasps the same 
content as that which is expressed by the speaker. And so a theory which entails that 
content is rarely (if ever) shared is a theory which denies that successful 
communication often (if ever) occurs. This argument is not made explicitly by Fodor 
and Lepore. Rather, authors have taken it to follow from the Instability Thesis that 
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Holism will suffer from the objection.
117
 We might present the strongest form of the 
argument roughly as follows: 
 
O1) It is necessary for communicative success that the content grasped by 
the hearer is the same as the content expressed by the speaker; 
O2) Holism entails that subjects never share content; 
O3) Holism entails that subjects never succeed in communicating; 
O4) Subjects do succeed in communicating; 
C)  Holism is false. 
 
If we accept premise (O1), that sharing content is necessary for communicative 
success, then Holism is in serious trouble, for the theory willingly precludes that such 
sharing is possible. A slightly different argument involving a weaker version of (O1) 
which claimed that sharing content is sometimes required for success would also be 
extremely problematic for Holism given (O2). As noted in Chapter 1, one way to 
defend a form of holism about meaning or content is to claim that holism can posit 
shared content. This would be to reject premise (O2). This approach is suggested in 
Jackman (1999) and Pagin (2006). As I have already mentioned, I will not be 
pursuing this kind of defence. In fact, I think that all theories of communication 
should reject both premise (O1) and the weaker claim that sharing content is 
sometimes required – even those theories which can easily claim that content is often 
shared across subjects. The version of Holism which I defend in this project does 
indeed entail that premise (O2) is true.  
 
In response to this argument, various holists have suggested that communication can 
succeed providing the content grasped by the hearer is similar to the content 
expressed by the speaker.
118
 Thus, there are roughly two views of the role of content 
in communicative success: views which claim that hearers must (at least often) grasp 
the same content as that expressed by the speaker, and views which allow that grasp 
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of a merely similar content is always sufficient.
119
 In Section 3, I will present these 
options in more detail. Before considering what communicative success might 
consist in, however, I think it would be useful to take a step back and introduce some 
background information and assumptions about the nature of communication and 
communicative attempts. I turn to this now. 
 
Section 2: Communication and communicative attempts 
 
The term ‘communication’ can be used to refer to a range of different human, animal 
and possibly even inanimate activities. Communication via human language is one 
widely discussed kind of communication, but not all communication is linguistic, nor 
is it always between humans. The term ‘communication’ is sometimes used to refer 
to events which involve the more or less unconscious signals which are sent and 
received through body language. And some non-human animals seem to be capable 
of communicating with relatively primitive sounds and gestures. It also seems 
appropriate to talk of communication between artificial intelligences such robots or 
computers. All the above forms of communication have some things in common. 
Each involves creatures (or perhaps inanimate objects) with internal states, and the 
transmission of a signal, via various mediums, from the first creature to the second, 
causing a change in the internal states of the second creature. And, importantly, each 
kind of communication has success conditions. 
 
Linguistic communication, as I will understand it here, is a phenomenon whereby a 
speaker can induce various mental states in her audience simply by making certain 
sounds, displaying certain written symbols, or performing certain complex gestures, 
in that audience’s vicinity. For the purposes of this project, I will be concerned with 
human linguistic communication, and its success conditions. I will also restrict my 
attention to spoken linguistic communication, although I take what I say in this 
project to be equally applicable to communication which proceeds via written 
language. Linguistic communication is, at least usually, a purposeful act. When we 
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deliberately engage in linguistic communication with others, we are trying to induce 
a specific representational state in our audience. Typically, we have in mind a 
particular representation or thought which we want to cause our audience to have in 
mind as well. Communication seems to be a matter of a speaker attempting to get her 
audience to grasp a particular representation, and of the hearer attempting to grasp 
the representation intended; it is a matter of a speaker getting her audience to come to 
see how she is representing the world with her thoughts and utterances, and of the 
hearer coming to grasp this. As such, communication, when successful, involves a 
kind of coordination of thought between two interlocutors. There are various 
purposes to which communication can be put, but all rely on this coordination of 
thought for success. Sometimes we communicate to make each other laugh, 
sometimes we communicate to issue orders, and sometimes we communicate to ask 
for information about the world, or to offer such information ourselves. All these 
purposes rely on the hearer coming to recognise what the speaker is trying to convey. 
This very last purpose, the transfer of information between speakers, has recently 
received a lot of attention in the philosophical literature. When certain conditions are 
met, the transmission of information via spoken (and written) communication allows 
a hearer to acquire testimonial knowledge. For now, I will set this issue aside, 
although I will return to it at length in Chapter 6. 
 
In this chapter, I will be concerned specifically with the nature of communicative 
events and their success conditions insofar as these issues interact with different 
theories of mental content. As will become clear, certain features of accounts of 
communicative success will directly affect the plausibility of endorsing various 
theories of mental content. The main focus of this chapter (and this project) is just 
these aspects of a theory of communicative success, as I am ultimately interested in 
the plausibility of theories of mental content. There are also features of 
communicative success which do not have any obvious impact on the plausibility of 
theories of mental content. These features are not directly relevant to the aims of this 
project. As such, it will be beyond the scope of this chapter (and this project) to fully 
address certain issues which might fall under the heading ‘the philosophy of 




In the next section, I shall present the basic structure of a communicative event 
which I will be assuming in this project. I will also say a few words about the 
appropriate criteria by which to judge various competing accounts of communicative 
success. With this set up in place, I will move on to considering what communicative 
success might consist in. 
 
2.1 Communicative attempts 
 
Following Pagin (2008), I will assume for the purposes of this project that 
communicative attempts are events with a particular structure. Pagin describes the 
structure of the event as follows, 
 
In a communicative event there is a sender, a signal, and a receiver. The event 
is a process that starts with some inner state of the sender and ends with some 
inner state of the receiver. In between a signal is transmitted between sender 
and receiver. The relevant inner state of the sender takes part in causing the 





This description is not intended to be exhaustive; it is merely supposed to give a 
rough idea of what is important about the nature of the phenomenon we are dealing 
with. There are surely further details which should be added to this picture in order to 
provide an adequate account of the structure of a communicative attempt. For 
example, presumably, this terminal state must be arrived at by some particular causal 
route. There are a number of candidates for what the nature of this causal route might 
be. For example, the ‘Code Model’, defended by Shannon and Weaver (1949), states 
that subjects attempt to communicate simply by encoding, sending and decoding 
signals. More contemporary approaches tend to think that much more is involved in a 
communicative attempt. The ‘Inferential Model’, endorsed by Grice (1957, 1975) 
and also Sperber and Wilson (1986), claims that inferential elements play a large role 
in communication in addition to the decoding of signals. For example, the recovering 
of a particular content will require inference or enrichment from background 
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information and other pragmatic processes. Thirdly, the ‘Collaboration Model’, 
endorsed by Herbert Clark (1992), stresses the fact that, oftentimes, communicative 
success requires two or more subjects working together – for example, by asking and 
answering questions.
121
  It is beyond the scope of this project to assess which of these 
models of communication is correct. It is possible that all three are consistent with 
the views of success which I consider in this project. I am concerned, primarily, with 
the conditions on the success of a communicative attempt, rather than the precise 
structure of the attempt itself. I am interested in the question of which relations must 
hold between the content expressed by the speaker and grasped by the hearer in a 
communicative exchange, rather than the precise causal route which connects these 
two contents. 
 
The sender and receiver, in the communicative events that are of interest to us, will 
both be human subjects. I will leave it open whether it is appropriate to talk of 
communication between other kinds of senders and receivers. The initial and 
terminal states of the sender (the speaker) and the receiver (the hearer) will be mental 
states with mental content.
 
I set aside views which state conditions on 
communicative success purely in terms of linguistic content or behavioural factors.
122
 
The signal in the communicative event, for our purposes, will be transmitted via an 
utterance of a sentence token. These utterances have linguistic content. It should be 
noted that there is much more to what is conveyed with a speech act than the just the 
literal content of the sentence token or thought.
123
 In addition to grasping the literal 
content of an utterance or thought, the hearer must also pick up on any pragmatic 
implicatures intended by the speaker which contribute to the total speech act. There 
are different ways to understand how pragmatics enters the various pictures of 
communicative success under consideration in this project. For example, one could 
think that the Content Relation applies to what is conveyed by the total speech act, 
such that success requires either that the hearer grasp exactly what the speaker 
attempts to convey, or that she grasp something merely similar. Alternatively, one 
could think that the Content Relation applies to what is literally said but not to the 
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total speech act. It should also be noted that recovery of literal content will itself rely 
on certain ‘near-side’ pragmatic processes. Sperber and Wilson (1986), for example, 
argue that recovery of the ‘semantic’ content of an utterance – its ‘explicature’ – will 
rely on processes of pragmatic enrichment. Thirdly, an account could state that the 
hearer must grasp the literal content of the speaker’s utterance or thought, but that 
she need only grasp something similar to the total speech act conveyed by the 
speaker. There is not space here to properly address the role of pragmatic processes 
in an account of communicative success.
124
 In this project, I wish to remain neutral 
on the role of pragmatics in communication. The examples that I appeal to in my 
arguments will not involve anything more than simple cases of so-called ‘near-side’ 






Before moving on to consider the various accounts of communicative success on 
offer, we should pin down how to measure the adequacy of such an account. Many 
theoretical considerations – such as simplicity, explanatory power, ontological 
parsimony, etc. – are relevant to assessing the adequacy of a philosophical theory. 
When it comes to assessing the adequacy of competing accounts of what 
communicative success consists in, it is plausible that commonsense judgement 
carries more weight than it might in the assessment of certain other philosophical 
debates. For example, few would think that a theory of time travel need respect 
pretheoretic or folk judgements. One important constraint on a theory of 
communicative success will be the condition that our account ought to agree with our 
commonsense practice of judging whether a particular communicative attempt was 
successful or unsuccessful. This is not to say that folk judgements play a guiding role 
in formulating the theory, but rather that they play a role in assessing the theory: the 
theory’s assessment of which communicative attempts are to count as successful 
ought to cohere, at least largely, with our commonsense judgements. As such, it will 
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be taken to be a virtue of a theory that its judgments as to the success of 
communicative attempts accord (at least largely) with what commonsense would 
judge. This is the approach taken by both Pagin and Paul. Pagin writes, 
 
 What we have is a common sense practice of judging communicative success 
 or failure in vernacular terms such as ‘He did not understand,’ ‘She 




And Paul offers the following descriptive adequacy criterion, 
 
Descriptive adequacy criterion: an account of communicative success […] 
has to accord with our intuitions of agents understanding and failing to 





Any theory which disagrees significantly with commonsense would need to provide 
very good reasons for thinking that it is, in fact, the correct analysis of 
communicative success and, in addition, it must provide some plausible story as to 
why our commonsense judgements have gone awry. With this guide to judging the 
plausibility of a theory of communicative success in place, I now turn to presentation 
of what form such a theory might take. 
 
Section 3: Communicative success 
 
3.1 The Content Relation 
 
Speakers can make hundreds of communicative attempts in a single day, but not all 
of them will be successful. Our background assumption about the structure of a 
communicative attempt appealed to two contentful inner states in the speaker and 
hearer respectively. But it is surely not enough for any old contentful state to be 
caused in the hearer: further conditions must be met in order for the attempt to 
succeed. It is plausible that an account of communication will measure success, in 
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part, in terms of a relation between the initial contentful state of the speaker and the 
terminal contentful state in the hearer. A version of this view is argued for in Pagin 
(2008). The view will be a working hypothesis of the project, although in Chapter 3 I 
will argue that a content externalist cannot sensibly endorse it. It is this kind of view 
which is assumed in the Objection from Communication. Those who are convinced 
by the objection will claim that the relation between the initial state of the speaker 
and the terminal state of the speaker must be one of identity. The argument is that 
Holism cannot explain communicative success because it cannot claim that the 
hearer grasps the same content as that which is expressed by the speaker. Thus, one 
potential ingredient of an account of communicative success will be the ‘Content 
Relation.’ 
 
Content Relation: A communicative attempt with succeed only if some 
particular relation holds between the content of the terminal state of the 
hearer and the content of the initial state of the speaker. 
 
One thing to stress about the Content Relation, as I have presented it, is that it claims 
that the relation we are considering is one which holds between the content of the 
mental states of the speaker and hearer. It does not claim that any particular relation 
needs to hold between the content of the speaker’s utterance and the terminal mental 
state in the hearer. This will be an assumption of the project, but I think it is a 
reasonable one. It also allows us to sidestep a potentially confusing issue. 
 
The issue is as follows. In the previous chapter, I stated that I am assuming in this 
project that the content of an utterance (where this is understood as ‘what is said’ by 
the utterance) is just inherited from thought content. On a very strong reading of this 
assumption, this means that even in cases where a speaker misspeaks, her utterance 
still has the content of the thought she attempted to express.
128
 For example, suppose 
a speaker possesses the belief THAT THERE IS A BEER IN THE FRIDGE and wishes to 
communicate this to a hearer. But suppose the speaker accidentally utters (1),  
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(1) There is a bear in the fridge.  
 
On the strong version of the assumption, the content of the speaker’s utterance is still 
THAT THERE IS A BEER IN THE FRIDGE. If the strong reading is correct, then, whatever 
Content Relation holds between the hearer’s mental content and the speaker’s mental 
content will also hold between the hearer’s mental content and the speaker’s 
utterance content (although the word-forms involved the utterance will not be a good 
guide as to its meaning). As such, on this sort of view, one could hold that the 
Content Relation involves utterance content as one of its relata; but this is because 
any relation that holds between the hearer’s mental content and the speaker’s 
utterance content will necessarily hold between the hearer and speaker’s mental 
contents. 
 
One might take issue with the strong reading, however. We can still maintain a sense 
in which utterance content depends on the thought content of the speaker whilst 
holding that ‘bear’ expresses BEAR and not BEER in the example above. For example, 
we can claim that a word expresses whichever concept it is typically used to express. 
If we claim this kind of view, however, we should not claim that a Content Relation 
must hold between the hearer’s thought content and the speaker’s utterance content. 
For then, communicative success would simply require that the hearer in the above 
example grasps THAT THERE IS A BEAR IN THE FRIDGE. In such a case, the terminal 
state of the hearer will have a markedly different content to the initial state of the 
speaker (which is THAT THERE IS A BEER IN THE FRIDGE). And, in such cases, I think 
most would agree that communication has failed. For the speaker was not trying to 
communicate that there is a bear in the fridge to the hearer when she uttered (1).
129
 
We could make the following amendment to this view to get around this problem and 
still maintain a view upon which utterance content is one of the relata in a Content 
Relation. If we make it a necessary condition on communicative success that the 
speaker expresses her attitude correctly, then communication will only be said to 
succeed if the content of the speaker’s utterance is the same as the content of her 
thought. However, one might think this is too strong a condition. The reason for this 
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is that, in many cases in which a speaker misspeaks, the hearer will be able to work 
out from the context that the speaker must have misspoken. And, in many of these 
situations, the hearer will be able to repair the speaker’s utterance and work out what 
she intended to be expressing by relying on inferences from contextual and 
background information. As such, a hearer may succeed in recovering the content of 
the speaker’s initial mental state even when she fails to grasp (or deliberately 
disregards) the content of the speaker’s utterance. I think it is much more plausible to 
think of the content of a speaker’s utterance as a mere part of the evidence (alongside 
contextual information and background beliefs) that a hearer has for working out 
what content the speaker was trying to express. Communication appears to be a 
process which involves a great deal of inference, rather than a process which simply 




Notice that all of the plausible options above claim that, in successful communicative 
attempts, a particular relation must hold between the initial state of the speaker and 
terminal state in the hearer. The approaches simply disagree about the role of 
utterance content in this picture. As such, the assumption that the Content Relation 
holds between mental states is supposed to be compatible with the above 
complications of the picture. In what follows, I will leave it (somewhat) open as to 
whether grasping the speaker’s utterance content is necessary (or sometimes 
required) for communicative success. If one thinks that a Content Relation must hold 
between the content of the terminal state of the hearer and the content of the 
speaker’s utterance, this can be accommodated providing that the account involves 
some condition which ensures that the content of the speaker’s utterance is just the 
same as (or perhaps sufficiently similar to) the content of the speaker’s initial mental 
state. In what follows, I ignore this complication and just talk of a relation between 
mental contents. Given this, I stress that when I talk of ‘the content expressed by the 
speaker’ I mean to be talking about the mental content which is expressed by that 
speaker and not the content of the utterance which is used to express that content. 
When stating different versions of the Content Relation, I talk of the ‘initial’ and 
‘terminal’ states of the interlocutors to avoid this confusion. There are two 
                                                 
130
 For arguments to this effect, see Bezuidenhout (1998) and Rysiew (2007). 
66 
 
contenders for what the relation between the initial and terminal states must be. I 
introduce these in the following two sub-sections. 
 
3.2 The Same Content View 
 
The first option for a specification of the Content Relation is the one which lies 
behind the strongest version of the Objection from Communication. I will call this 
thesis ‘Necessity of Sameness of Content’: 
 
Necessity of Sameness of Content (‘SamConN’) – A communicative attempt 
will succeed only if the content of the terminal state of the hearer is the same 
as the content of the initial state of the speaker. 
 
There are also weaker versions of this thesis which simply claim that sameness of 
content is sometimes required for success (but that similarity is sometimes 
sufficient). I will call any view which claims that sameness of content is at least 
sometimes required for success a ‘Same Content View’ of communicative success. It 
should be noted that a complete view will comprise further conditions in addition to 
the Content Relation. Some of these I will consider later in this chapter. I will talk of 
Same Content Views as views which require that a speaker and hearer ‘share 
content’. This is just for ease of exposition. This talk of shared content is not meant 
to suggest that interlocutors must share all their concepts. Rather, the phrase is just 
meant to indicate that interlocutors must share the concepts involved in the content 
communicated. 
 
The Same Content View is perhaps a prima facie plausible account of 
communicative success – it might just seem obvious that sharing content is required 
for communication. Indeed, the view appears to quite popular, at least with respect to 
certain distinctive kinds of communicative success. It is, for example, usually 
stipulated in debates about testimony that a hearer grasps the very same content that 
the speaker attested to.
131
 Goldberg (2007) argues that sharing content is necessary 
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for communication of knowledge via testimony. And Burge, too, sometimes suggests 
that the facilitation of communication (at least in cases of testimony) might require 
shared content.
132
 Newman (2005) uses something like the Objection from 
Communication to attack Searle’s de se view of mental content.
133
 Newman writes, 
“[I]f no one else could believe, disbelieve, or bear any other such attitude toward the 
proposition I believe when I believe that my pants are on fire, then I could not 
communicate the content of that belief to others in the way we ordinarily assume I 
can.”
134
 The Same Content View might be popular, but it is not the only option for a 
specification of the Content Relation. In response to the Objection from 
Communication, Holists have suggested adopting a weaker view, which I will call 
the ‘Similar Content View’. I turn to this now. 
 
3.3 The Similar Content View 
 
In the literature, the standard response to the Objection from Communication is to 
deny that sharing content is required for communicative success. The Objection from 
Communication relies on what might seem like a perfectly intuitive constraint on 
successful communication. However, although it may seem prima facie appealing, 
we need not accept this claim. Holists should reject it and replace it with the view 
that communication can succeed in the absence of shared content providing that the 
speaker and the hearer mean similar things by their utterances of the same word 
forms (and entertain similar thought contents). Thus, in opposition to the Same 
Content View, we have the Similar Content View. This view endorses the following 
specification of the content relation: ‘Necessity of Similarity of Content’. 
 
Necessity of Similarity of Content (‘SimConN’) – A communicative attempt 
will succeed only if the content of the terminal state of the hearer is similar to 
the content of the initial state of the speaker. 
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I will call any view which endorses SimConN (and rejects SamConN) a ‘Similar 
Content View’. Like the Same Content View above, a complete view will comprise 
further conditions on success in addition to the one stated in SimConN. 
 
There are a number of defenders of Similar Content Views in the literature. Rapaport 
(2003) proposes such an account. He proposes that an account of communicative 
success should appeal to similarity of content, where this similarity is achieved and 
increased through our continued attempts to communicate with each other. As such, 
his approach has much in common with the Collaborative Model of communication 
mentioned above. He claims that what is required of two subjects in order for them to 
communicate successfully is the ability to detect misunderstandings through a 
process of negotiation.
135
 Rapaport argues that, in all communicative attempts, the 
content grasped by the hearer is an interpretation of what the speaker intended to 
express, and this interpretation is a conclusion based on defeasible inference.
136
 
According to Rapaport, because of the holistic nature of content-determination, we 
will always fail to correctly interpret our interlocutors. However, although this state 
of misunderstanding is the norm, providing what we interpret is similar to the 
content expressed by the speaker, we will most often very nearly succeed. Rapaport 
writes, 
 
This is the paradox of communication. Its resolution is simple: 
Misunderstandings, if small enough, can be ignored. And those that cannot be 
ignored can be minimized through negotiation. In this way, we learn what our 




Negotiation is a process whereby speakers may, to an extent, identify and correct the 
differences in content present between them. The process involves testing-out 
hypotheses about the content of an interlocutor’s speech acts. This testing can be as 
simple as asking the interlocutor questions as to what she meant by her words in 
cases where she uses her words in ways which conflict with our original hypotheses 
as to what she meant by them. In this way, we may revise our beliefs as to what a 
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speaker takes various expressions in her language to mean. Rapaport writes, “By 
successive approximation, we can asymptotically approach mutual 
comprehension.”
138
 Rapaport argues that cases of negotiation leading to increased 
similarity of content are present in child language acquisition: a child wishing to 
learn how to use words in accordance with her language community will be engaged 
in a process of attempting to align her own concepts with the concepts of those 
people who are teaching her.
139
 He states that there is evidence of negotiation 





Jorgensen (2009) offers a similar defence. Again, he argues that shared content is not 
a prerequisite for communication; but, rather, that continued attempts at 
communication result in increased similarity of content. He writes, “What we will 
see is broad convergence and agreement in use as a result of speakers’ efforts to 
interpret each other.”
141 
The contents of our thoughts do, on the whole, tend to be 
very similar and this is because of the fact that we spend a lot of our time attempting 
to communicate with each other. And the more we communicate, the more similar 
our idiolects are likely to become. This sort of solution to the Objection from 
Communication concedes that we cannot eliminate differences in content 
completely, but we can minimise them to the point where they no longer matter to 
our communicative goals.  
 
In the above, I have described candidates for what the Content Relation consists in. 
The candidates are SimConN, which forms the basis of the Similar Content View; 
and SamConN, which forms the basis of the Same Content View. As noted above, 
there is also an intermediary view which claims that sharing content is sometimes, 
but not always required for success (I have classified the latter view as a Same 
Content View). It will be a working hypothesis of this project that one of these 
Content Relations must form the basis of a theory of communicative success; the 
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question I am interested in is, ‘Which one?’ Answering this question is not 
straightforward. One of the reasons for this is that different theories of mental 
content interact with each of the Content Relations in different ways. As we have 
seen, what might be a plausible Content Relation for one theory of content can be a 
completely implausible Content Relation for another. Although it looks like 
externalist views of content can comfortably endorse the Same Content View, this 
would be disastrous for the Holist. The Same Content View can only be sensibly 
endorsed by theories of content which posit shared content, or a communal language. 
I will call such views ‘sociolectical’ views of content. It is worth noting that 
sociolectical views do not entail the Same Content View. Rather, they can choose 
between the two. In contrast, views which posit idiosyncratic idiolects such as 
Holism (I will call these views ‘idiolectical views’) can only sensibly endorse the 
Similar Content View (although, again, they do not entail it).  
 
One thing to stress about the present debate is that even if it could be shown that 
sharing content is not necessary for communicative success, this would not secure 
the result that Holism can endorse a plausible view of communicative success. There 
are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as mentioned above, if the correct theory of 
communicative success is one which claims that communication only sometimes 
requires shared content, Holism would still be in trouble. In this case, we could run a 
weaker version of the Objection from Communication which claims that sharing 
content is sometimes, or often, required for communicative success. This weaker 
argument would still be enough to defeat the Holist, as she must claim that content is 
never shared. Secondly, even if it can be shown that the Similar Content View states 
sufficient conditions on communicative success, there is a further worry, pushed 
explicitly by Fodor and Lepore (1992), that the idea of conceptual similarity cannot 
be made sense of on Holism (although other theories may be able to make sense of 
it). I deal with this objection in Chapter 4. Thirdly, even if it can be shown that the 
Holist’s Similar Content View is tenable, there might still be good reason to think 
that the account of success available to Holism’s competitors will be better. An 
account of mental content which posits shared content may be able to provide an 
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account of communication which is simpler or more compelling than the Holist’s 
idiolectical account. 
 
The outlook for a plausible account of communication for Holism may look quite 
grim. However, in the following chapter, I will argue that, contrary to appearances, it 
is actually sociolectical theories of content which struggle to explain communicative 
success. I will argue that sociolectical theories cannot endorse either Content 
Relation. In fact it is only theories like Holism which can plausibly maintain that 
mental content facilitates communicative success. This argument relies on the central 
role of understanding in explaining communicative success. I turn to the issue of 
understanding now. 
 
Section 4: Understanding 
 
Any philosopher working on communication is likely to agree that communicative 
success requires that the hearer understand the speaker in some sense. That is, they 
will endorse an Understanding Requirement as part of their theory of communicative 
success: 
 
Understanding Requirement: A communicative attempt will succeed only if 
the hearer understands the speaker. 
 
I have left this statement of the Understanding Requirement deliberately vague for 
the moment. This is because there are a number of different options for specifying 
the requirement. The different ways in which it can be specified will take a bit of 
unpacking. 
 
We use the term ‘understanding’ to refer to a variety of relationships between a 
subject and many different kinds of object. We can, for example, say of a subject that 
she understands how to play chess, or that she understands the game of chess, or that 
she understands why she has lost the game, or that she understands that she has lost 
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the game. However, the only object of understanding which concerns us here is 
understanding of content (both linguistic and mental). Even with our focus restricted, 
there are still further ways to understand what this consists in. In the following 
sections, I will identify several theses concerning different kinds of understanding 
and identify how these are relevant to communicative success. As we will see, 
different theories of mental content will interact with these theses concerning 
understanding in different ways. 
 
I will first distinguish between three modes of linguistic and conceptual 
understanding. I will then distinguish understanding directed towards one’s own 
concepts, or ‘home language’ (‘self-directed’ understanding), from understanding of 
the thoughts and utterances of an interlocutor (‘other-directed’ understanding). Once 
these initial distinctions are in place, I will be prepared to introduce the key 
distinctions between varieties of other-directed understanding which will be 
implemented in my arguments in Chapter 3. The first is a distinction between 
understanding the content of a speaker’s thought (or utterance) and understanding the 
way in which the speaker herself understands this content. The second is a distinction 
between what I will call ‘Subject-Sensitive’ theories of understanding and ‘Subject-
Insensitive’ theories. My aim in the sections which follow is not to argue for a 
particular theory of linguistic or conceptual understanding (although it will be clear 
which my preferred theory is). Rather, my aim is to draw distinctions between kinds 
of theory which will allow me to make my arguments in Chapter 3. 
 
4.1 Abilities, acts and states 
 
Firstly, let’s distinguish between a subject’s standing disposition – or ability – to 
understand a language or element within that language (her ‘dispositional-
understanding’), and a subject’s act of understanding a particular content or 
expression on an occasion of use (her ‘act-understanding’). Green explains the 
distinction as follows, 
 
[I]n the “ability” construal of understanding, one understands a sentence in 
one’s home language even if one has never encountered it before, either in 
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thought or communication. By contrast, the “act” construal of understanding 





Longworth argues for an additional variety of understanding, which he calls ‘state-
understanding’.
143 
He describes state-understanding of sentence tokens as, 
“Understanding as a state entered through successful exercise of [ability-
understanding] – e.g. one’s being in a state of understanding, or having [understood] 
what someone has said.”
144
 The kinds of states he has in mind here are propositional 
states (states of knowledge, or states of belief) as opposed to dispositional states. The 
reason he introduces this category is that it seems most natural to state theories of 
understanding which treat understanding as a kind of propositional knowledge as 
theories which take the success conditions on understanding to consist in the entering 
of a certain propositional state. To see this, consider that, if such an account were 
stated in terms of acts or dispositions, one would have to claim that understanding 
involved ‘acts of knowing’ or ‘dispositions to know’.
145
 Longworth notes that these 
locutions seem incapable of capturing the idea that language understanding consists 




These three modes of understanding are related in the following way. It is a subject’s 
dispositional-understanding (the dispositions she has to understand certain concepts 
or word-forms in certain ways) which, when exercised, determines how that subject 
act-understands the content she grasps on a particular occasion. An act of 
understanding on a given occasion will result in a hearer entering a state of 
understanding. An act of understanding involves, at the very least, some process 
whereby the target of the act of understanding – an utterance, for example – is 
assigned some interpretation in the subject’s home language as an item of mental 
content. It may require more than this: for example, it may require that the hearer 
have some grasp of the conceptual and inferential connections between the assigned 
content and other contents in her conceptual web. Which interpretation is assigned 
will depend on the subject’s dispositional-understanding of the concepts employed in 
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the content. But it will also depend on her understanding of the compositional 
structure of that content, and on any background beliefs and contextual information 
relevant to interpreting what is said with the utterance, or what was expressed by the 
speaker. 
 
The three modes of understanding presented above are normative in that there are 
standards for success. For example, dispositional-understanding is normative in that 
one must possess the correct dispositions in order to count as having the ability to 
understand a given expression or concept. State understanding is normative in that a 
subject must enter the correct state in order to successfully understand an expression 
(for example, a state of knowledge, or of true belief). It should be noted that there is 
more to understanding than success conditions – for understanding is not always 
successful. There is a factive way of talking of understanding such as in sentences of 
the form ‘S understood that ‘p’ means that m’. But there is also a non-factive way of 
talking of the understanding such as in sentences of the form ‘S understood ‘p’ to 
mean that m.’ I think it is important to recognise that, even in cases where a subject 
fails to meet the requirements for successful or correct understanding, it is still the 
case that there is some way in which she understands the relevant utterance or 
content which she grasps: there is some state of understanding which she enters or 
disposition that she possesses, or act that she performs; it just might not be the one 
which is required for success in a given context. Thus, even when a subject fails to 
understand an utterance or content correctly, there is still some way to characterise 
the way in which she understands. There is some way to characterise her 
misunderstanding. Misunderstanding will be of central importance to my argument in 
Chapter 3.  
 
The Understanding Requirement places conditions on the success of acts of 
understanding, which in turn will require that the hearer possesses a particular 
dispositional-understanding. Precisely which conditions are placed on dispositional-
understanding will be considered in subsequent sections. Before turning to this, I will 




4.2 Self-directed vs. other-directed understanding 
 
A further distinction that I think it will be useful to draw is the distinction between 
‘self-directed’ understanding and ‘other-directed’ understanding (and also between 
the success conditions on these two kinds of understanding). The first kind of 
understanding concerns the manner in which a subject understands her own thoughts 
– it concerns conceptual mastery.
147
 The second kind of understanding concerns the 
manner in which a subject understands an interlocutor.  It is this other-directed 
understanding (and the success conditions on other-directed understanding) that the 
Understanding Requirement is concerned with.  
 
The distinction between self-directed and other-directed understanding is different to 
the distinction between dispositional-understanding and act-understanding. Plausibly, 
both dispositional-understanding and act-understanding are required for other-
directed understanding. It is also possible that both are required for self-directed 
understanding.
148
 One might think that the amount of dispositional-understanding 
required is just the same in each case: one might think that, for example, to 
understand an utterance on a particular occasion, the hearer must herself both possess 
the concepts employed in the utterance and fully understand, or master, those 
concepts (in the self-directed sense). However, I think that most would agree that this 
is not the case. Rather, it is more plausible to think that the success conditions on 
self-directed understanding and other-directed understanding will place different 
requirements on a subject’s dispositional-understanding. Although mastering a 
concept may mean one possesses a dispositional-understanding of that concept which 
will enable one to perform successful acts of understanding of that concept, one 
might also think that one does not need to master a concept (i.e., to possesses full 
dispositional-understanding of that concept) in order to possess sufficient 
dispositional-understanding for this purpose. The distinction between self-directed 
understanding and other-directed understanding confronts different theories of 
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mental content in different ways. In the next two sub-sections I will describe some of 
these ways. 
 
4.2.1 Sociolectical theories 
 
Recall that, in Chapter 1, social externalism was presented as a theory of content 
which allows that we can think with concepts that we have not mastered.
149
 As such, 
there are success conditions on the amount of dispositional-understanding required 
for conceptual mastery. One (apparently) attractive feature of social externalism is 
presumably that it can claim that subjects can communicate with these partially 
grasped concepts. On social externalism, the conditions on concept mastery 
(understood as full, or at least very rich, dispositional-understanding) are surely very 
demanding. A social externalist might, for example, require that a subject be able to 
correctly explicate her concept.
150
 Alternatively, conceptual mastery might simply 
require that the subject employ a concept in her reasoning and speech acts in the 
correct way, where the correctness conditions are determined by the usage of experts 
in her community. On this latter option, the subject might be said to display implicit 





If one masters a concept, this may be sufficient for successfully act-understanding a 
content which contains that concept (providing the other concepts involved in the 
content are also understood). But a social externalist need not (and probably should 
not) make conceptual mastery a necessary condition on act-understanding the 
utterance (or thought content) of an interlocutor. The reason for this is that social 
externalists tend to think that subjects will think with a significant number of 
concepts which they do not master and, further, that they can be quite mistaken as to 
a concept’s application conditions and yet still grasp the concept in question. Thus, if 
mastery were necessary for act-understanding the thoughts and utterances of 
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interlocutors, social externalism would have to claim that we frequently fail to 
communicate. This is surely a result they wish to avoid. 
 
The difference in the amount of dispositional-understanding required for conceptual 
mastery and the amount of dispositional-understanding required for act-
understanding of an interlocutor, might be a matter of kind, or it might be a matter of 
degree. If one opts for the latter, there is then a question as to just how much 
dispositional-understanding is required for understanding the thoughts and utterances 
of interlocutors. Let us suppose it would be less than full mastery, but how much 
less? Could the social externalist claim that the level is very minimal such that no 
more understanding is required for communicative success than is required for mere 
concept-possession? In Section 5, I will present a version of the Understanding 
Requirement which claims this. It should also be noted that the kind of dispositional-
understanding required for successful acts of other-directed understanding might not 
be correct understanding. I explore this option in a later section. 
 
4.2.2 Idiolectical theories 
 
The distinction between self-directed understanding and other-directed understanding 
confronts idiolectical theories such as Holism in a slightly different way. This is 
because, on Holism at least, understanding perfectly tracks mental content.
152
 As 
such, there is a sense in which, on Holism, subjects are always masters of their own 
idiolectical concepts: given the way in which concepts are individuated, there is 
simply no such thing as thinking with a concept one partially understands. But this is 
just a point about the metaphysics of concepts. Importantly, this is not to say that 
there are no correctness conditions on conceptual understanding for the Holist. As 
noted in Chapter 1, internalists who deal in idiolects will typically claim that 
cooperative subjects strive to bring their conceptual understanding in line with the 
conceptual understanding of others in their community. Subjects will master all of 
the concepts in their conceptual web; nonetheless, there is still some sense in which 
subjects can make mistakes. It is tempting to treat these mistakes as a kind of failure 
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of conceptual mastery. However, to avoid confusion, I think we should reserve the 
expression ‘conceptual mastery’ just for the phenomenon of understanding one’s 
own thoughts. Let us call the kind of mistakes that subjects can make, on Holism, 
failures in ‘linguistic competence’. The interesting question here is then not, ‘When 
does a subject master a concept?’ for she cannot but do this. The question is, rather, 
‘When does a subject possess a concept which is correct relative to the standards set 
by her community?’ Linguistic competence, on Holism, is a matter of closely 
approximating the understanding of experts. For any given word-form of the 
subject’s language, she will want to express a concept with that word-form which is 
similar to the concept that an expert would express with that same word-form. Given 
the Instability Thesis, improving linguistic competence will be a matter of replacing 
deviant concepts with ones which more closely approximate community usage, 
rather than a matter of change in an enduring concept. On Holism then, a 
(cooperative) subject will be said to be linguistically competent with respect to a 
given word-form, when the conceptual-role for the concept expressed by that word-
form closely approximates the conceptual-role of the concept that an expert would 
express with the same word-form – although her concept will nonetheless be a 
distinct concept from that of the experts due to differences between her total 
conceptual web and the webs of the relevant experts. So, to summarize, subjects 
cannot think with concepts they incompletely understand (i.e., which they do not 
master), but they can think with (fully-understood) concepts which are incorrect 
relative to the standards set by the linguistic community. This provides a kind of 
normativity of meaning for Holism. Cooperative subjects will adhere to a 
hypothetical imperative: if a subject wishes to comply with community usage, she 
will do what she can to possess the concepts which she should possess (according to 
the standards of that community). And, as Rapaport and Jorgensen have suggested, 
her continued attempts to communicate will enable her to increase this similarity 
between her own concepts and those of others in her community.  
 
Things are a little more complicated on Holism when it comes to other-directed 
understanding. The reason for this is that, due to the idiolectical nature of content-
individuation, the contents of the utterances and thoughts of a speaker might diverge 
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quite significantly from the content of the thoughts and utterances that an expert 
would express with the same word-forms. Thus, having full linguistic competence 
(where this is understood as possessing a concept with a similar conceptual-role to 
the concept that an expert would express with the same word-form) might not enable 
one to understand one’s interlocutor if that interlocutor expresses a significantly 
deviant content with an utterance containing the relevant word-form. Equally, it 
might not be necessary for understanding one’s interlocutor if both subjects possess 
concepts which are deviant in the same way. Act-understanding of an interlocutor’s 
utterance or thought, on Holism, might require that the hearer possesses 
dispositional-understanding of the content she grasps, but this dispositional-
understanding can be quite different from an expert’s dispositional-understanding of 
whichever content that expert would express with the same word-forms. Thus the 
standards for linguistic competence can be quite different to the standards for other-
directed understanding of a particular interlocutor on a given occasion. It should also 
be stressed that, once a hearer has satisfied SimConN by grasping a similar content, 
she will automatically understand this content correctly because of the relationship 
between content and self-directed understanding. On this view, we could think of 
acts of understanding as being the means by which the Content Relation is satisfied. 
 
In the above – and particularly in Section 4.2.1 on sociolectical theories – I have 
largely been talking as if a certain picture of other-directed understanding is correct. 
This is a picture upon which other-directed understanding involves the hearer 
correctly understanding the utterances or thoughts of an interlocutor. This seems like 
an intuitively plausible picture. However, as I will explain shortly, it is not the only 
way to think of what understanding an interlocutor consists in. In the next section, I 
will begin explaining two dimensions along which the Understanding Requirement 






Section 5: The Understanding Requirement 
 
In the preceding sections, I have set out a number of different issues pertaining to 
understanding and identified other-directed act-understanding as the kind of 
understanding which the Understanding Requirement is concerned with. I also 
explained that the way in which a hearer act-understands the speaker will be 
determined by her dispositional-understanding of the content she grasps as a result of 
the communicative exchange. Thus, the Understanding Requirement will place 
constraints on the hearer’s dispositional-understanding. Now let’s return to this 
Understanding Requirement: 
 
Understanding requirement: For a communicative exchange to be successful, 
it is necessary that the hearer understand the speaker. 
 
There are two dimensions along which we can sharpen this initial characterisation. 
The first, which I consider in the following section, concerns the target of the act of 
(other-directed) understanding. The second concerns the kind of dispositional-
understanding which is involved in this act of other-directed understanding. 
 
5.1 The target of understanding 
 
What do I mean by the ‘target’ of the act of understanding? The target of the act is 
the thing which is understood. There are, I think, at least three options for what this 
target might be. The first is the content of the utterance of the speaker. The second is 
the content of the mental state of the speaker. And the third is the speaker’s 
understanding of the content of that mental state. These last two options both involve 
understanding the speaker’s mental content, but in different ways. I will go through 
each of these in turn.   
 
As mentioned above, a communicative attempt involves a speaker with an initial 
contentful state, an utterance with a certain content, and a hearer with a terminal 
contentful state. As such, when considering the Content Relation, there was a 
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question as to whether the relation relevant to success was one which held between 
the content of the hearer’s terminal state and the content of the speaker’s utterance, 
on the one hand, or between the content of the hearer’s terminal state and the content 
of the speaker’s initial mental state, on the other. I stated that I will assume in this 
project that the Content Relation should apply to the content of the initial and 
terminal mental states of interlocutors. I also claimed that such a relation can hold 
between the utterance content of the speaker and the mental content of the terminal 
state of the hearer only in circumstances under which the content of the speaker’s 
utterance is the same as (or, perhaps, similar to) the content of the mental state it is 
used to express. 
 
Interestingly, many theories and discussions of other-directed understanding in the 
literature are concerned with the requirements on understanding the content of a 
speaker’s utterance rather than (directly) understanding her mental content.
153
 
However, given the assumption in this project that the Content Relation holds 
between the mental contents of interlocutors, I think we should discount the option 
that the target of the hearer’s act-understanding is the content of the speaker’s 
utterance. This would leave us with two options remaining: either the hearer must 
understand the content of the speaker’s mental state, or she must understand this 
content in the same way as the speaker. Just as above, if we hold that the speaker’s 
mental content is the target of the act of understanding, then we can also claim that 
understanding a speaker’s utterance content is necessary for communicative success, 
but only if this utterance content is the same as (or perhaps sufficiently similar to) the 
speaker’s mental content. But, as above, this would only be because, on such a view, 
utterances would have the same content as the thoughts they are used to express and 
thus, in understanding the utterance, we would understand the mental content 
expressed. For ease of exposition, I suggest we think of understanding utterance 
content as, at most, instrumental in achieving communicative success, but not a 
necessary requirement. When coming to understand what a speaker was trying to 
express, hearers will rely on both the apparent content of the utterance expressed, and 
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all kinds of background information and contextual factors (This will be so even 
when the utterance content is just the same as the mental content it is used to 
express). So, just as with the Content Relation, I think one could claim that utterance 
understanding is necessary for communicative success, but only if one also thinks 
that the content of the utterance must be the same as the content of the mental state 
expressed. I will ignore this complication in what follows. 
 
With this complication set to one side, we can now ask a further question: Assuming 
that whichever Content Relation one endorses has been satisfied, must the hearer 
correctly understand the mental content expressed by the speaker as a result of the 
communicative exchange (where this content must bear a particular relation to the 
speaker’s content), or must she instead understand this content in a way which is the 
same as (or similar to) the way in which the speaker understands the content she 
expresses? The way that we answer this question will present us with two options for 
specifications of the Understanding Requirement. 
 
Content Understanding: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the 
hearer correctly understands the content she grasps. 
 
Shared Understanding: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the 
hearer understands the content she grasps in a way which is the same as, or 
similar to, the way in which the speaker understands the content she 
expressed. 
 
On the Content Understanding construal, what is required for communicative success 
is that the hearer correctly understands the content that she grasps as a result of the 
exchange. Anyone who endorses this proposal will have to specify some degree of 
understanding which is sufficient for successful Content Understanding. Or, 
alternatively, claim that understanding succeeds to the degree that the content is 
understood. I think this seems like a prima facie plausible picture of the nature of 




The Shared Understanding version of the Understanding Requirement is a bit 
different. On this view, in addition to grasping the appropriate content, the hearer 
must understand this content in a way that is the same as (or similar to) the way in 
which the speaker understands the content she expressed. On Holism, as 
understanding tracks content, understanding a content in a similar way to the speaker 
will entail entertaining a similar content to the speaker. Furthermore, when a hearer 
grasps a content, she cannot but understand the content she grasps correctly. As such, 
providing SimConN is satisfied, Content Understanding and Shared Understanding 
will always be satisfied together on Holism. In contrast, Content Understanding and 
Shared Understanding can come apart when combined with social externalism. On 
social externalism, two subjects can understand the content communicated quite 
incorrectly and, importantly, they can understand it in different ways. The Shared 
Understanding Requirement demands, not that either subject understand the content 
correctly, but just that they understand it in the same (or similar) ways, even if they 
both understand it incorrectly. Given the above, Shared Understanding might seem 
like a strange view for a sociolectical theory to endorse. Why bother requiring that 
the hearer grasp the right content if she needn’t understand it? Why indeed! In the 
following chapter, I will argue that the Shared Understanding Requirement is, in fact, 
the correct version of the Understanding Requirement. This will cause serious 
problems for sociolectical views of content. 
 
5.2 Subject-sensitive vs. subject-insensitive models of understanding 
 
There is one last division amongst views of understanding which I will make in this 
chapter. This is a division amongst ‘subject-sensitive’ understanding and ‘subject-
insensitive’ understanding. These two kinds of understanding are not full theories of 
understanding, but kinds of theories of dispositional-understanding. In this section, I 
will distinguish these two kinds and give examples of specific theories of 






5.2.1 Subject-Sensitive understanding 
 
A theory of dispositional-understanding is subject-sensitive if it claims that 
understanding captures the fine-grainedness of a subject’s conceptions (and 
misconceptions). Subject-sensitive understanding is intended to capture what I will 
call the subject’s ‘cognitive perspective’ on the content of both her own thoughts and 
the utterances and thoughts of others. Cognitive perspective consists in how a subject 
is disposed to employ content in her cognitive economy, where this includes her 
perspective on: 
 
(a) the inferential relations between contents;  
(b) the conceptual relations which the comprised concepts bear to other 
concepts in her cognitive economy;  
(c) the way in which the objects which those concepts apply to are 
represented; and  
(d) the way in which the states of affairs which are represented by the content 
are represented. 
 
Where a subject has a certain cognitive perspective on a given content, I will say that 
she ‘cognizes’ that content to have certain properties.
154
 I say that subject-sensitive 
understanding captures a subject’s cognitive perspective on these properties and 
relations because, on some theories of content, the subject will be mistaken as to 
these properties and relations: her cognitive perspective (and, as such, her 
dispositions to employ content) will be incorrect. For example, on social externalism, 
a subject may be disposed to infer from X IS A CAT to X IS A REPTILE. In this case, her 
(subject-sensitive) understanding of her CAT and REPTILE concepts is incorrect. The 
inference that she is disposed to draw between these two contents (and which her 
subject-sensitive understanding captures) does not actually hold between them. On 
social externalism, concepts are individuated by the language community, and thus 
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the conceptual and representational properties of these concepts will depend on the 
language community rather than the individual subject. To discover the actual 
conceptual and representational properties of utterance and thought content, subjects 
must look to other members of their community, or to a dictionary. As such, the 
conceptual and representational properties of a subject’s thoughts are (on social 
externalism), in a sense, inaccessible from her cognitive perspective. Note that 
claiming that these properties are inaccessible from the subject’s cognitive 
perspective is not the same as claiming that a subject lacks privileged access to the 
content of her thoughts: it is the relations between concepts and contents which are 
inaccessible rather than the contents themselves. I wish to remain neutral on the 
question of whether social externalism is compatible with privileged access in this 
project.
155
 Burge seems to recognise this distinction as well. He writes, 
 
One should not assimilate ‘knowing what one’s thoughts are’ in the sense of 
basic self-knowledge, to ‘knowing what one’s thoughts are’ in the sense of 
being able to explicate them correctly – being able to delineate their 




Cognitive perspective is supposed to reflect the way the subject actually reasons, or 
is disposed to reason (even if she does so in a way which is strictly speaking 
irrational given the externally individuated contents of her thoughts). 
 
On idiolectical theories, by contrast, a subject’s cognitive perspective captures the 
inferential and conceptual relations which do in fact hold between her contents and 
concepts. So, if a subject is disposed to reason from X IS A CATS to X IS A REPTILES, 
this inference is appropriate given the way her concepts are individuated. Her CATS 
concept may the wrong concept to have – relative to the standards of her community 
– but, given the way that this concept is individuated, the inferences she is disposed 
to draw from contents involving CATS to other contents in her web of attitudes will be 
rational and correct – the content of her CATS concept is, in part, individuated by 
these very inferences. On Holism, there is no gap between the subject’s cognitive 
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perspective on the conceptual, inferential and representational properties of her 
concepts and contents, on the one hand, and their actual conceptual, inferential and 
representational properties on the other.
157
 This is another way of saying that, on 
Holism, a subject cannot misunderstand the contents of her own thoughts. 
 
5.2.2 Conceptual-role as subject-sensitive understanding 
 
One specific theory of dispositional-understanding which is a subject-sensitive 
theory would be an internalist conceptual-role theory of understanding (as opposed 
to content). On this theory, a subject’s dispositional understanding of a given concept 
is determined by the conceptual-role of that concept in her cognitive economy. We 
can use such a theory to characterise both self-directed and other-directed 
understanding. On this theory, a hearer’s act-understanding of a speaker is successful 
when the conceptual-role of the content grasped by the hearer satisfies the 
correctness conditions imposed by whichever of the Understanding Requirements is 
endorsed (either Content Understanding or Shared Understanding). The act of 
understanding itself, on the conceptual-role theory, would involve the hearer 
connecting the content grasped to her existing conceptual web in the right way 
(where, the ‘right’ way would be the way that the speaker connects it, or the way an 
expert would connect it, depending on one’s other commitments). How she connects 
this content to her existing conceptual web will depend on her dispositional-
understanding, which will itself be understood in terms of conceptual-role. Take the 
following example. Suppose a speaker utters (2), 
 
2) There is a pony in the barn 
 
Suppose further that the speaker is competent in her dispositional-understanding of 
the concepts which comprise this content such that the conceptual-role of the content 
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expressed by (2) in her idiolect is correct relative to the standards of her community. 
What would it be for a hearer to understand (2) on the present proposal?  
 
Firstly, she must assign an interpretation to (2) as an item of mental content, where 
doing so will require that she assign concepts to each of the component expressions 
as well as grasp the compositional structure of the content. She will, for example, 
map ‘pony’ to her PONY concept, and so forth. To satisfy a Subject-Sensitive 
Understanding Requirement, the conceptual-role of the concepts which comprise the 
recovered content must be the same as (or similar to) the conceptual-role of the 
speaker’s concepts (or, as above, the conceptual-role may need to be the same as, or 
similar to, an expert’s conceptual-role rather than the speaker’s). If conceptual-roles 
are similar in this way, then the content will participate in similar inferences in the 




I think that a version of this theory is the theory of understanding which should be 
adopted by the Holist. I will elaborate on it in Chapter 4. However, it should be 
stressed that this model of dispositional-understanding is available to most (if not all) 
theories of content – including both Holists and externalists alike. Recall that, in 
Chapter 1, I claimed that I wished to identify the determination base of linguistic or 
conceptual understanding with the determination base of mental content (that is, I 
claimed that they are both determined by conceptual-role). But, I also stressed that an 
externalist would wish to keep these two things separate. For the Holist, the subject’s 
cognitive perspective on the inferential, conceptual and representational properties of 
contents and concepts perfectly tracks the inferential, conceptual and representational 
properties of those contents and concepts: that is, cognitive perspective is determined 
by conceptual-role. The externalist will claim that what I am calling cognitive 
perspective (likewise conceptual-role) would simply characterise a subject’s 
epistemic grasp of her mental content, while that content is individuated 
independently of her understanding of it (i.e., by her physical or social environment). 
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But the fact that externalists wish to make this distinction does not, of course, 
preclude them from employing something like conceptual-role as a means of 
characterising linguistic understanding. In fact, it seems to be a natural option for 
them, given that they think that there is a cognitive gap between content and our 
grasp of it. The externalist may say that, although the hearer does indeed grasp the 
content of an utterance of (2) simply by deferring and possessing minimal 
competence, successful communication requires that the hearer have the correct 
epistemic handle on this content. Conceptual-role, thought of as a determiner of 
understanding but not of content, is one option for understanding this relationship. 
On this proposal, although content would be externally individuated, a subject’s 
understanding of that content (both self-directed and other-directed) would be an 
internalist matter. 
 
In fact, I think that many social externalists would be happy with this proposal. To 
return to the issue of conceptual mastery for a second, one reason that employing 
conceptual-role understanding would be useful to them would be the following. 
Given that social externalists allow that subjects can incorrectly understand the 
content of their own thoughts, they need to appeal to some kind of cognitive 
machinery in order to explain the sense in which a subject has made a mistake. It 
seems that this mistake is best characterised in terms of features which are internal to 
the subject: incorrect understanding is (partly) a cognitive mistake and can be highly 
idiosyncratic. As such, it seems natural to explain the phenomenon by appeal to 
machinery which exists within the subject. And, if we are already employing a 
conceptual-role theory as a theory of self-directed understanding, it seems 
economical to extend the account to explain other-directed understanding as well. 
 
This point about conceptual mastery applies independently of whether social 
externalism endorses conceptual-role as a theory of understanding. I think the fact, 
stressed in Chapter 1, that conceptual-role approaches are popular in linguistics (and 
other scientific disciplines) is at least prima facie motivation for thinking conceptual-
role is an attractive theory of linguistic understanding. However, the point is that the 
social externalist should appeal to some subject-sensitive machinery in order to 
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capture the sense in which the subject has made a cognitive error when she 
misunderstands her own thoughts. One could appeal to a different kind of subject-
sensitive machinery than conceptual-role. What is important is simply that this 
machinery is sensitive to the fine-grainedness of a subject’s misconceptions.  
 
Burge does sometimes talk about, “[T]he believer’s own construal of the words.”
159
 I 
am not sure whether he would be happy to invoke a subject-sensitive notion of 
understanding in order to explain partial grasp and I will not claim that he does so. 
But there is nothing in his exposition of social externalism that would conflict with a 
subject-sensitive – or any internalist – theory of linguistic understanding. Social 
externalism is, after all, an externalism about mental content; it is not an externalism 
about all things mental. In any case, in Chapter 3, I will argue that externalists indeed 
ought to appeal to subject-sensitive understanding in their account of communicative 
success. Before presenting this argument, I will need to present a conception of 
dispositional-understanding which my argument aims to discredit. This is the 
subject-insensitive conception. 
 
5.3 Subject-Insensitive understanding 
 
A theory of dispositional-understanding is subject-insensitive if it allows that the way 
in which a subject is said to understand an utterance or thought content need not be 
reflected in the way that that content actually functions in her cognitive economy. 
That is, the way that she understands a content might come apart from her cognitive 
perspective on (a)-(d) above. Given this, a subject may be said to correctly 
understand an utterance or thought even when her cognitive perspective on its 
content is incorrect. She can be said to understand an utterance or thought even when 
she is disposed to employ its content incorrectly in her cognitive economy. 
 
This approach might seem strange - for essentially it claims that a subject can 
understand an utterance or thought of an interlocutor correctly even though she 
possesses a large number of misconceptions as to its representational and inferential 
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properties. And what are misconceptions if not misunderstandings? Strange or not, 
this approach has been adopted in the literature. As I will explain in Chapter 3, it 
enjoys a prima facie strong motivation from the desire for a liberal view of 
communicative success: one which attributes a large amount of success to 
interlocutors. By way of further elucidating the subject-insensitive approach to 
understanding, I will present two examples of it: propositional models and a model 
based on an account of testimonial knowledge transmission proposed by Sandy 
Goldberg. 
 
5.3.1 Propositional conceptions 
 
Many take understanding of language in general to consist in knowledge of some 
kind. As Dummett writes, “Our usual ways of thinking about the mastery of a 
language, or of this and that element of it, are permeated by the conception that this 
mastery consists in knowledge. To understand an expression is to know its 
meaning.”
160 
Dummett, in this passage, is concerned primarily with what it is to 
master a language.
161
 However, it is plausible to think that if understanding a 
language is a matter of knowing what various expressions of the language mean, then 
understanding an utterance or thought of an interlocutor will involve this kind of 
knowledge as well. Indeed, there are plenty of authors who take understanding of the 




One way of cashing-out the claim that successful understanding consists in 
knowledge is as a propositional knowledge view of understanding.
163
 Alternatively, 
it might be that the analysis of linguistic understanding as knowledge is too strong. 
Pettit, for example, argues that there is such a thing as accidental understanding.
164
 
He tries to show this by presenting alleged Gettier cases of understanding. He claims 
that understanding, unlike knowledge, doesn’t fail in Gettier cases. As such, we 
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should accept that understanding is not a form of knowledge (unless we want to 
revise some cherished beliefs about the nature of knowledge).
165
 I will call any view 
which characterises understanding of others in terms of the possession of a particular 
propositional attitude, a ‘propositional conception’. In the remainder of this section, I 
will explore what a propositional knowledge conception might look like, but this 
exposition is largely equally applicable to other propositional conceptions (by, for 
example, replacing ‘knows’ with ‘truly believes’). These propositional conceptions 
are only subject-insensitive accounts of understanding if they are combined with 
sociolectical theories. Why this is so will become clear in what follows. 
 
On one kind of propositional knowledge conception of utterance understanding, for a 
speaker, S, to understand an utterance, u, is for S to know what u means (or what is 
said by the speaker with an utterance of u), where this consists in S possessing 
propositional knowledge of u’s meaning (or what is said by u). As mentioned above, 
the propositional knowledge view is best understood as a view about state-
understanding. One obvious candidate for the content of this propositional 
knowledge would be knowledge THAT U MEANS THAT M where M is some 
specification of u’s meaning as an item of mental content.
166
 For example, 
understanding an utterance of (3), 
 
3) There is milk in the fridge, 
 
would be a matter of knowing what item of mental content an utterance of (3) 
expresses. On a less demanding version of this proposal, all that might be required is 
the propositional knowledge that an utterance of (3) expresses the mental content, 
THAT THERE IS MILK IN THE FRIDGE. The reason that this proposal is a subject-
insensitive model of understanding if combined with social externalism is the 
following. On social externalism, knowing THAT U MEANS THAT M does not require 
that a subject has any understanding of the relevant mental content, M, over and 
above what is required in order to possess the concepts which comprise M in the first 
place. Recall that what is required to grasp this mental content might be very 
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 Pettit goes on to reject various other proposals in addition to the propositional knowledge view. 
166
 An alternative would be, THAT THE SPEAKER SAID THAT M BY UTTERING U. 
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minimal. To reiterate: one need only possess basic linguistic competence and the 
disposition to defer. On this proposal, grasping an utterance content is as easy as 
identifying the correct mental content which is expressed by it. But this content itself 
can be quite poorly understood and incorrectly employed in reasoning. As it stands, 
this account is probably too simple to be plausible; its purpose here is merely to 
illustrate what a subject-insensitive notion of other-directed understanding might 
look like.
167
 Understanding is subject-insensitive on this proposal because the 
propositional contents used to attribute understanding of an utterance to a subject 
have broad content, and thus may not themselves be understood correctly (in the 
subject-sensitive sense) by the subject. 
 
5.3.2 Goldberg’s Conception 
 
An explicitly subject-insensitive account of dispositional-understanding is proposed 
by Sandy Goldberg (2007). Goldberg’s is specifically an account of the conditions on 
testimonial knowledge transmission rather than mere communicative success. The 
account that I present below will be a Goldberg-style account of a condition on mere 
communicative success. Goldberg does not explicitly endorse it outside of a theory 
of testimony. For Goldberg, an act of understanding is a matter of mapping the 
lexical items of the content of the speaker’s utterance onto the appropriate items of 
mental content in the hearer’s idiolect.
168
 Understanding will be successful if the 
mapping is correct and reliably attained. However, for Goldberg, doing this 
successfully is something which is achieved merely by relying on deference to public 
linguistic norms. That is, the kind of disposition one needs is just the disposition to 
defer. And, because of this,  
 
[...] A hearer can count as having ‘understood’ testimony in the required 
sense even when she does not completely grasp all of the concepts in the 
                                                 
167
 Green points out one way in which these kinds of theories should be complicated. Merely knowing 
that the content of an utterance means that M is likely not sufficient for understanding. As Green 
explains, “Instead, understanding [a] sentence would require grasping its meaning in light of its 
compositional structure.”
  
(Green, 2010, 3) 
168
 Note that the issues under discussion here are orthogonal to the question of whether language 
understanding requires that subjects have knowledge (tacit or otherwise) of a semantic theory. For 
discussion of this issue see Matthews (2003).  
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Goldberg thinks that reliance on a public language is essential if one wants to secure 
communicative success in cases in which two speakers have little-to-no background 
information about each other’s beliefs. He thinks we need a picture of 
communicative success which ensures that hearers are said to understand speakers in 
the absence of this background knowledge.
170
 Goldberg argues that, without appeal 
to public linguistic norms, such correct representations will not be achievable. Or 
rather, that it would be, at best, miraculous that subjects who have little or no 
information on each other’s background beliefs would come to represent (and 
understand) the content of each other’s speech acts correctly without this appeal. He 
writes, “Without appeal to public linguistic norms, we have no satisfactory account 
of how hearers attain correct representations – and so, by extension, how they attain 
reliable comprehension – of the speech they observe.”
171
 A Holist might agree with 
him on this front at least: Holism posits no public language, and entails that subjects 
do not mean the same things as each other, nor do they ever fully understand each 
other. On Goldberg’s account, public linguistic norms guarantee that the hearer’s 
mapping of the speaker’s utterance onto an interpretation in her idiolect will be 
correct. He writes, 
 
On the assumption that there are public linguistic norms that govern the 
entries of both the speaker’s and the hearer’s respective idiolects, this 
sentence to sentence mapping will be guaranteed to be content-preserving 
[…]. Such a method would yield a very efficient and reliable comprehension 
process. […] Indeed, the process of understanding would then be (roughly) as 
reliable as is the process whereby the words used by another speaker are 
recovered from her utterance. This is because, once the words have been 
recovered by the speaker, the public linguistic norms take over, ensuring 




Goldberg thinks that it is public linguistic norms which determine, not just the 
content grasped by the hearer, but also the way in which she understands that 
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 Goldberg (2007) 104 
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 Ibid, 60 
171
 Ibid, 58–59 
172
 Ibid, 79–80, italics in original 
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content. Thus, utterance understanding is such that subjects can understand each 
other despite differences in their cognitive perspectives on the content 
communicated. Understanding, on Goldberg’s account, appears to be just the means 
by which the Content Relation is satisfied. But nothing more is required of the 
hearer. For Goldberg, subjects can easily perform successful acts of understanding 
providing they are disposed to rely on the language community. A subject’s 
understanding of expressions is itself dependent on this social determination. As 





One thing to note about these subject-insensitive approaches is that the kind of 
dispositional-understanding required for acts of other-directed understanding is 
different to the kind of dispositional-understanding involved in conceptual mastery. 
Act-understanding of an utterance (or thought) of an interlocutor is essentially a 
matter of identifying the appropriate mental content expressed, and having sufficient 
(if minimal) understanding of that content (perhaps along with an understanding of 
its compositional structure) to merit grasp. But a subject’s understanding of her own 
mental content cannot consist in the same thing that her grasping of the utterance 
consists in. The reason for this is that, in cases of utterance understanding, both the 
propositional conceptions and the Goldberg-style account attribute successful 
understanding even in cases where the mental content expressed by the observed 
utterance is only partially grasped (and even when the subject’s cognitive perspective 
on it is quite incorrect). But this cannot be the case with conceptual mastery: mastery 
(that is full, or rich, understanding) of a concept cannot be attributed to subjects in 
cases of partial grasp. For, on social externalism, to say that a concept is partially 
grasped is to say that it is not mastered. As such, one’s understanding of the concepts 
in one’s home-language must be given a different treatment to one’s understanding 
of the utterance or thought content of an interlocutor. On these approaches, even 
once other-directed understanding is explained, there is then a further question as to 
how the content grasped is itself understood (in the subject-sensitive sense). One still 
needs a theory of dispositional-understanding which explains conceptual mastery in 
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 Ibid, 119, italics in original 
95 
 
addition to one’s theory of other-directed understanding. For other-directed 
understanding, it is enough that the correct mental content is identified as the 
meaning, M, of the content expressed by the speaker. How M is itself understood by 
the subject is not relevant to the success of the communicative attempt. The subject-
insensitive approaches do not place any constraints on a subject’s dispositional-
understanding of her own thoughts. 
 
5.4 Four versions of the Understanding Requirement 
 
Given the above, in addition to the distinction between Content Understanding and 
Shared Understanding, we have the following distinction between kinds of 
Understanding Requirement which could be added to either the Same Content View 
or the Similar Content View. These two kinds of requirement endorse one of the 
following two theses. 
 
Subject-Sensitive Understanding (‘SS-Understanding’): The kind of 
understanding relevant to communicative success is understanding which 
tracks the cognitive perspective of the subject. 
 
Subject-Insensitive Understanding (‘SI-Understanding’): The kind of 
understanding relevant to communicative success is understanding which is 
individuated by the language community (and, as such, is not sensitive to the 
cognitive perspective of the subject). 
 
Here is a summary of the various distinctions introduced above. I began by 
distinguishing between dispositional-understanding and act-understanding. 
Dispositional-understanding concerns our standing ability to understand concepts 
and word-forms. It is dispositional-understanding which determines how we act-
understand a given concept or expression on an occasion of use. I then distinguished 
between self-directed understanding and other-directed understanding. Self-directed 
understanding concerns the mastery we have of the concepts involved in our own 
thoughts. Other-directed understanding concerns the understanding of other 
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interlocutors. Next I went on to introduce two important distinctions amongst 
theories of other-directed understanding which result in different specifications of the 
Understanding Requirement. The first distinction was between the Content 
Understanding Requirement, and the Shared Understanding Requirement. The 
Content Understanding Requirement states that the hearer must correctly understand 
the content that she grasps (where this will be either the same as, or similar to, the 
content expressed by the speaker). The Shared Understanding Requirement states 
that the hearer must understand the content she grasps in a way which is the same as, 
or similar to, the way in which the speaker understands the content she expressed. 
Lastly, I introduced a distinction between Subject-Sensitive Understanding and 
Subject-Insensitive Understanding. Subject-Sensitive Understanding is 
understanding which is sensitive to a subject’s cognitive perspective on the contents 
of her thoughts. Subject-Insensitive Understanding is understanding which does not 
track cognitive perspective. Rather, it is individuated by the language community. 
The distinctions presented give us several options for specifying the Understanding 
Requirement. These are as follows: 
 
 Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding Requirement 
 Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement 
 Subject-Insensitive Content Understanding Requirement 
 Subject-Insensitive Shared Understanding Requirement 
 
These can, of course, each be added to the Same Content View or the Similar 
Content View, and combined with various different views of mental content to 
provide a wide range of views of the conditions on communicative success (some of 
these views will probably be extremely implausible). Fortunately, we will not need to 
remember all of these combinations in the next chapter. In Chapter 3, I will argue 
that, regardless of your choice of theory of mental content, and regardless of your 
choice of Content Relation, your theory of communicative success must endorse the 




Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement: A communicative 
attempt will succeed only if the hearer’s SS-understanding of the content she 
grasps is similar to the speaker’s SS-understanding of the content she 
expressed. 
 
I will argue that only Holism (and theories like it) can plausibly endorse this 
requirement. 
 
So far in our picture of communicative success, we have two kinds of requirement: 
the Content Relation and the Understanding Requirement. Before moving on to my 
argument in the next chapter, there is one last issue to deal with. The purpose of this 
last section is simply to round up any additional features of communicative success 
and set them to one side. 
 
Section 6: Theory-Neutral conditions 
 
Plausibly, the Content Relation and the Understanding Requirement are not the only 
conditions on communicative success. However, they are the only conditions which 
have an impact on the plausibility of theories of mental content. Further conditions 
which do not impact upon theories of content I will call ‘Theory-Neutral’ conditions: 
these are conditions which could be accepted or rejected without there being any 
consequences for the plausibility of combining the account of communicative 
success with a particular theory of content – although their acceptance or rejection 
will still impact upon the plausibility of the theory of communicative success itself. 
An example would be the following. 
 
It also seems reasonable to suppose that a hearer must recognise (at least roughly) 
what kind of propositional attitude the speaker takes towards the content she 
expresses (or at least which attitude she purports to take towards that content – she 
might lie, or be engaged in some form of pretence). For example, if a speaker 
expresses (or purports to express) a belief in some content, P, the hearer ought to 
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recognise that the speaker believes the content she expresses. If, in this case, the 
hearer takes the speaker to desire that P, I think we should say that communication 
has failed.
 
The reason for saying so is that the hearer has failed to come to see the 
world as the speaker does: the speaker represents the world as one in which P is true, 
but the hearer might represent the world as one in which P (or some similar content) 
is not yet true – or, at least, as one in which the speaker believes that P is not yet true. 
Thus, even if the appropriate content itself is grasped, recognising the wrong attitude 
taken towards that content can result in the hearer failing to represent the world as 
the speaker does. Alternatively, one could endorse a weaker condition which simply 
states that a hearer must not recognise the wrong attitude, although she may fail to 
explicitly recognise which attitude the speaker takes towards her content. 
 
In this project, I will not consider all conditions which might be involved in a 
successful communicative exchange. I will simply leave open which Theory-Neutral 
conditions should be incorporated into a full account of communicative success. 
Recognising the speaker’s attitude will likely be one of them, but there may be 
others. For example, it may be thought that the intention to communicate is a 
necessary condition on communicative success, or that the hearer must recognise this 
intention. As mentioned above, a complete theory of communication will also 
specify the role of inference and pragmatics in communicative success.  
 
In the arguments which follow, I will sometimes consider the joint sufficiency of 
various Content Relations and Understanding Requirements. Where I am considering 
the sufficiency of (versions of) these conditions, I will be considering whether they 
would be jointly sufficient alongside whichever Theory-Neutral requirements would 
constitute an otherwise ‘good’ case of a communicative exchange. When presenting 
the sufficiency directions of these conditions, I will incorporate a clause which 





Section 7: Chapter Summary 
 
I began this chapter by introducing the Objection from Communication. This 
objection claimed that Holism cannot explain communicative success because it 
denies that subjects share thought content. An assumption behind this argument is 
that sharing content is necessary (or at least sometimes required) for communicative 
success. After presenting this objection, I took a step back to introduce the 
framework for understanding communication which I will be assuming within this 
project. It is from within this framework that I will defend Holism from the 
Objection from Communication. 
 
The model of communicative success which I am working with states that success is 
to be measured (in part) in terms of some relation between an initial contentful state 
in the speaker, and a terminal contentful state in the hearer; I called this the ‘Content 
Relation’. I explained that one popular view of the Content Relation is the Same 
Content View, which claims that this relation must be (or often be) one of identity. In 
response to the Objection from Communication, Holists have countered that 
similarity of content is (jointly) sufficient for communicative success. They endorse 
the Similar Content View. With these two broad pictures of communicative success 
in place, I moved on to considering a further intuitively plausible addition to a theory 
of communicative success: the Understanding Requirement. This is the thesis that 
communicative success requires that the hearer understands the speaker in some 
sense. I then went on to consider two dimensions along which this requirement can 
be sharpened. The first concerned the target of the hearer’s understanding. I 
suggested two options for understanding what this might be. The first is the Content 
Understanding Requirement. This thesis states that communicative success requires 
that the hearer correctly understand the content that she grasps as a result of the 
communicative exchange. The second is the Shared Understanding Requirement. 
This thesis states that the hearer must understand the content she grasps in a way 
which is the same as (or similar to) the way in which the speaker understands the 




The second dimension along which to sharpen the Understanding Requirement 
concerns the kind of dispositional-understanding required for acts of other-directed 
understanding. The two options here are Subject-Sensitive Understanding and 
Subject-Insensitive Understanding. A theory is a subject-sensitive theory of 
understanding if it allows understanding to track a subject’s cognitive perspective on 
the inferential, conceptual and representational properties of contents and concepts. 
In contrast, a subject-insensitive model of understanding is a model which does not 
capture a subject’s cognitive perspective on the inferential, conceptual and 
representational properties of concepts and contents. On this model, a subject can be 
said to correctly understand an utterance even when her cognitive perspective on that 
utterance is quite richly mistaken. 
 
In the next chapter, my aim is twofold. I wish to raise an objection to sociolectical 
views of content from communication. And, in doing so, I will motivate the Holist’s 
picture of communicative success. The argument demonstrates the central role of the 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement in communicative success. It 
is this kind of understanding which will form the backbone of my positive theory of 
communicative success. In Chapter 4 I will show that, because Holism claims that 
mental content tracks this kind of understanding, Holism (and theories like it) will be 




Chapter 3: Externalism and the problem of communication 
 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to demonstrate that sociolectical theories face 
a dilemma when it comes to providing an account of communicative success. In this 
chapter, I focus on presenting the problem for social externalism, but I think that a 
similar argument will apply to any theory of mental content which claims that 
understanding does not track mental content. In arguing for this, I will motivate the 
claim that views of understanding which track cognitive perspective must play a 
central role in communicative success. This is the second aim of this chapter. It will 
provide motivation from my positive account, which I present in Chapter 4. 
 
The argument for the dilemma proceeds in three steps. In the first two steps, I argue 
for the claim that social externalism should endorse the following thesis. 
 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative exchange will succeed 
iff (a), the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied and (b), the hearer’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed.  
 
I will suggest that the best way to incorporate this thesis into an account of 
communicative success is by adopting the Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding 
Requirement. This thesis was presented in Chapter 2. 
 
The first step of the argument aims to show that, on social externalism, it is 
necessary for communicative success that the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the 
content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
expressed. I call this, the ‘Argument from Miscommunication’. I present this 
argument in two stages. In the first stage, I present a sub-argument which attempts to 
demonstrate that, on social externalism, there are examples in which communicative 
success requires that the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is 
similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. In the 
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second stage, I argue that we can generalise from the examples to get the necessity 
claim. 
 
The second step of the argument for the dilemma aims to show that, alongside the 
Theory-Neutral conditions, it is sufficient for communicative success that the 
hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. I call this the ‘Argument from 
Successful Communication’. This argument also proceeds in two stages. In the first 
stage, I present a sub-argument which attempts to demonstrate that, on social 
externalism, there are examples in which it is enough for communicative success that 
the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed (assuming that the Theory-
Neutral conditions are also satisfied). In the second stage of this argument, I argue 
that we can generalise from the examples to get the sufficiency claim. 
 
If both the Argument from Miscommunication and the Argument from Successful 
Communication succeed, I will have shown that, on social externalism, similarity of 
cognitive perspective is both necessary and (jointly) sufficient for communicative 
success (alongside the Theory-Neutral conditions). In the third step of the argument, 
I argue that this result presents social externalism with a dilemma. This is because, if 
both arguments succeed, then no Content Relation is relevant to communicative 
success – neither identity nor similarity. However, if the social externalist attempts to 
reject my arguments, she must reject my diagnosis of the examples I present, and 
those like them. This leaves the social externalist with the following dilemma. Her 
choice is between (a), endorsing an account which gives plausible results as to which 
communicative exchanges are successful, but which renders the relationship between 
the mental content of the speaker and hearer irrelevant to communicative success or 
(b), endorsing an account which gives mental content a central role in facilitating 





The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I present some examples of the kinds 
of views which my argument is opposed to. In Section 2, I present the Argument 
from Miscommunication and defend it from objections. In Section 3, I present the 
Argument from Successful Communication and defend it from objections. In Section 
4, I present the dilemma for social externalism.  
 
Section 1: Traditional Views of communicative success 
 
My argument is opposed specifically to the combination of social externalism with 
any view of communicative success which rejects Similarity of Cognitive 
Perspective: 
 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative exchange will succeed 
iff (a), the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied and (b), the hearer’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed.  
 
I will call any such view a ‘Traditional View’ of communicative success. There are 
two kinds of Traditional View. The first kind claims that coordination of cognitive 
perspectives is never relevant to communicative success – I will call such views 
‘Fully-Traditional Views’. There are also views which allow that coordination of 
cognitive perspective is sometimes (but not always) relevant to communicative 
success. I will call any such view a ‘Semi-Traditional View’ of communicative 
success. Such views can include the combination of social externalism with any of 
the Content Relations (including the intermediary position which claims that shared 
content is sometimes, but not always, required for success); and with any of the 
versions of the Understanding Requirement presented in Chapter 2 except the 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement. We could run a version of the 
argument by appeal to Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding. However, authors 
may object to this characterisation of understanding. Thus, to avoid the question of 
whether Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding really is what understanding an 
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interlocutor consists in, I am going to run the argument by appeal to cognitive 
perspective instead. I stress that my arguments are not against the Content Relations 
themselves, but only against the combination of social externalism with the Content 
Relations. As we will see, although my argument demonstrates that social 
externalism should not endorse any Content Relation, a version of the argument can 
be used to show that Holism can sensibly endorse SimConN. 
 
In the following sub-sections, I will present two examples of views of 
communicative success which count as Traditional Views. These are views which 
reject the Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement, and instead combine 
one of the Content Relations with one of the other Understanding Requirements 
presented in Chapter 2. Both of the views presented are Fully-Traditional Views. 
 
1.1 The Liberal View of Communicative Success 
 
One kind of Traditional View is an account which combines social externalism with 
SamConN and with Necessity of Subject-Insensitive Understanding.
174
 I present 
these theses below. 
 
SamConN: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the content of the 
terminal state of the hearer is the same as the content of the initial state of the 
speaker. 
 
Necessity of Subject-Insensitive Understanding (SI-UnderstandingN): A 
communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer correctly SI-
Understands the content of the speaker’s utterance (where a hearer can 
achieve this correct understanding by reliance on public linguistic norms). 
 
Subject-insensitive understanding, recall, is a kind of understanding which is 
achieved purely by reliance on deference to a public language. That is, a hearer can 
‘correctly understand’ a speaker’s utterance merely by deferring to the language 
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community with respect to the meaning of the utterance and the corresponding 
content expressed by it. Understanding is simply a matter of providing a correct 
interpretation of the speaker’s utterance or thought content, where this interpretation 
will be correct when it satisfies the relevant Content Relation – SI-UnderstandingN is  
just the means by which SamConN is satisfied. A hearer can understand an utterance 
in this sense despite being quite mistaken as to the application-conditions of the 
terms involved in the utterance (and as to application-conditions of the corresponding 
concepts which these terms express). Given this particular combination of views, a 
Subject-Insensitive Understanding Requirement will be a Content Understanding 
Requirement and a Shared Understanding Requirement because both of these 
requirements are satisfied together when combined with social externalism and one 




If we combine these two conditions with the further Theory-Neutral conditions 
introduced in Chapter 2, we get the following view. I will call this the ‘Liberal View 
of Communicative Success’ (or ‘LVC’, for short). 
 
Liberal View of Communicative Success (LVC): A communicative attempt 
will succeed iff (a), the Theory Neutral Conditions are satisfied, (b) the 
content of the terminal state of the hearer is the same as the content of the 
initial state of the speaker, and (c), the hearer correctly SI-Understands the 
content of the speaker’s utterance (where a hearer can achieve this correct 
understanding by reliance on the public linguistic norms). 
 
This kind of account is based on an account presented in Goldberg (2007). Goldberg 
argues that sharing content is necessary for the exchange of knowledge through 
testimony, and thus opts for a version of LVC which endorses SamConN for the case 
of testimony. Further, he argues that a condition like SI-UndersningN is required for 
(reliably) satisfying SamConN.
176
 LVC is very similar to the account proposed by 
Goldberg (2007). However, Goldberg is primarily concerned with the epistemic 
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 Because LVC concerns mere communicative 
success rather than testimonial knowledge exchange, it is merely a ‘Goldberg-style’ 
account.
 
As such, my arguments in this chapter are not intended to apply to 
Goldberg’s account of testimonial knowledge exchange. I will return to the issue of 
testimony in Chapter 6. 
 
The reason that Goldberg opts for subject-insensitive understanding rather than the 
subject-sensitive model is because he wants an account of testimonial knowledge 
transmission which affords us a greater amount of object-level knowledge from 
communicative exchanges. Less liberal views would, he argues, instead have to 
claim that much of our testimonial knowledge is merely knowledge of the truth of 
the proposition attested to rather than object-level knowledge of the content of the 
proposition.
178
 LVC is supposed to be correspondingly liberal with respect to the 
amount of communicative exchanges which count as successful. Supposedly, success 
is easily achieved because of the role of SI-understanding in securing reliable 
comprehension. If some form of SS-understanding is endorsed instead, many fewer 
communicative exchanges (including those which attempt to transmit testimonial 
knowledge) will be successful. 
 
At this point, one might already think that LVC is implausible. That is, one may 
already believe that even a social externalist would wish to claim that subject-
sensitive understanding must play a role in communicative success – communicative 
success shouldn’t be that easy. In the next section, I will present a different kind of 
Traditional View, which endorses the Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding 
Requirement. 
 
1.2 The Conservative View of Communicative Success 
 
Another kind of Traditional View is one which endorses the combination the 
following theses: 
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SamConN: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the content of the 





Necessity of Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding: A communicative 
attempt will succeed only if the hearer possesses the correct cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps (where standards for correctness are set 
by the language community). 
 
If we combine these theses with the Theory-Neutral conditions, we can get the 
following view, which I will call the ‘Conservative View of Communicative 
Success’ (‘CVC’ for short): 
 
Conservative View of Communicative Success (‘CVC’): A communicative 
attempt will succeed iff (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied, (b) 
the content of the terminal state of the hearer is the same as the content of the 
initial state of the speaker, and (c) the hearer correctly SS-Understands the 
content of the speaker’s utterance to some specified degree (where this 
requires that the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content communicated 
is correct relative to standards set by her community). 
 
CVC is much more demanding than the LVC. On this view, a hearer cannot achieve 
correct comprehension of the speaker’s utterance or thought merely by deferring to 
experts. She can grasp the right content by deferring, but she will not count as having 
successfully communicated with the speaker unless she also possesses some degree 
of subject-sensitive understanding of the content she grasps.
180
 As such, 
communication will much more often fail on this account. 
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 There is also a weaker version of this view which endorses SimConN instead of SamConN. 
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 If one thinks of SI-UnderstandingN as just the means by why SamConN is satisfied, one might 
think that both SI-UnderstandingN and Necessity of Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding are 
needed in this account. 
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LVC and CVC (when combined with social externalism) are two examples of views 
which my argument is opposed to. But there will surely be further views which can 
be constructed out of the conditions presented in Chapter 2. The upshot of my 
argument in the following sections is that no Traditional View states sufficient 
conditions on communicative success. I will argue that communication will fail 
whenever there is a significant discrepancy between the speaker and hearer’s 
respective cognitive perspectives on the content communicated – and it is because of 
this discrepancy that communication fails. 
 
Section 2: The Argument from Miscommunication 
 
The Argument from Miscommunication is for the claim that social externalism 
should endorse the following thesis: 
 
Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative attempt 
will succeed only if the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
expressed. 
 
The Argument from Miscommunication is opposed to the combination of social 
externalism with any view which does not entail this thesis. This includes views 
which endorse any of the versions of the Understanding Requirement presented in 
Chapter 2 except the Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement. 
 
The argument proceeds in two stages. In the first stage of the argument, I simply 
wish to show that there are examples in which communicative success requires 
similarity between the cognitive perspectives of interlocutors (with respect to the 
content communicated). If the first stage succeeds, Fully-Traditional Views, which 
deny that coordination of cognitive perspectives is ever required for success, will not 
state sufficient conditions on communicative success. In the second stage of the 
argument, I will argue that we can generalise from these examples to get the 
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necessity claim. If this second stage succeeds then all Traditional Views (including 
the Semi-Traditional Views) will fail to state sufficient conditions on communicative 
success. 
 
2.1 The Argument from Miscommunication – Stage 1 
 
The following argument aims to show that similarity between the hearer’s cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps and the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the 
content she expressed is, at least in some cases, required for communicative success. 
 
Argument for sub-conclusion 
 
a1) On social externalism, there are examples in which communication fails and 
would succeed only if the hearer is put in a position to employ the 
communicated content in her cognitive economy in ways which enable her to 
attempt to satisfy the practical aim of the communicative attempt. 
a2) In these examples, the hearer would be put in such a position only if the 
hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the 
speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. 
aSC) Thus: On social externalism, there are examples in which communicative 
success requires that the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
expressed. 
 
2.2 Support for the premises 
 
Support for the premises, (a1) and (a2), comes from consideration of examples. In 
order for these examples to support my argument, it must be the case that (a), they 
are most plausibly described as instances of miscommunication; (b), the 
miscommunication is explained by the fact that the hearer is not left in a position to 
use the content communicated to try to satisfy the aims of the communicative attempt 
(rather than explained by violations of some other condition such as those which 
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comprise LVC or CVC), and (c), if the hearer is to be left in such a position, it is 
required that she and the speaker occupy similar cognitive perspectives on the 
content communicated. I will present three examples below. 
 
Example 1: ‘Red Lobster’ 
 
A speaker, Sally, has partial grasp of the concept CRUSTACEAN. Her cognitive 
perspective on this concept mostly conforms with that of the experts in her 
community. However, it is slightly incorrect: she believes that an object can only be 
a crustacean if it is blue in colour. Sally utters (1) to her friend, Herbert, with the 
intention of getting Herbert to bring her a particular kind of object that must be blue. 
 
(1) Bring me a crustacean. 
 
Herbert’s cognitive perspective on CRUSTACEAN conforms with community practice, 
and he doesn’t know that Sally has partial grasp of CRUSTACEAN. As such, he takes 
Sally to have requested a crustacean of any colour. Because of this, he is not in a 
position to use the content to try and satisfy Sally’s communicative aim. Wishing to 
do as she asks, he brings Sally a red lobster. Upon receiving the lobster, Sally is 
furious and reprimands Herbert for bringing her the wrong kind of object. 
 
Example 2: ‘Fortnight’ 
 
A speaker, Sophie, has partial grasp of the concept FORTNIGHT.
181
 Her cognitive 
perspective is such that she is disposed to apply the concept to a period of ten days. 
A hearer, Hamish, has a cognitive perspective on FORTNIGHT that is correct relative 
to the standards of his community: he applies FORTNIGHT to periods of fourteen days. 
He does not know of Sophie’s deviant cognitive perspective. Sophie utters (2) to 
Hamish, 
 
(2) Your job interview is in a fortnight. 
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Sophie utters (2) with the intention of informing Hamish of when his job interview 
is. She takes herself to have expressed that it is in ten days. Hamish grasps the 
correct content. But because of his dissimilar cognitive perspective, he takes himself 
to have grasped something which is different to what Sophie took herself to be 
expressing. As such, he is not in a position to use the content to satisfy Sophie’s 
communicative aim. He turns up four days late to the interview. 
 
Example 3: ‘Unlucky Child’ 
 
A child, Henry, who has been blind from birth, possesses standard understanding of 
the concept STEP. A speaker, Sabrina, although she has many true beliefs about steps, 
is mistaken as to their size. In particular, she believes that individual steps are each at 
least one hundred metres high and thus very dangerous. Henry is walking a mountain 
path. He passes Sabrina and asks her the following: 
 
(3) Is it safe to continue along this path? 
 
Sabrina responds with (4), with the intention of warning Henry that the path leads to 
a steep and tall drop. 
 
(4) This path leads to some steps. 
 
Due to his cognitive perspective on (4), Henry takes himself to come to believe that 
there are regular steps further along the path. As such, he cannot use the content he 
grasps in the way that Sabrina intended. He continues on his way and promptly 
tumbles to his death. 
 
2.2.1 Diagnosis of the examples 
 
I claim that these examples are instances of communication failure as a result of 
differences in cognitive perspective between speakers. As I will try to show, it is 
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required for success in the examples provided that the hearer be put in such a 
position. Premise (a1) claims that, in the examples, communication would have 
succeeded only if the hearer was left in a position to use the communicated content to 
try to satisfy the speaker’s practical aim. Premise (a2) claims that, in the examples, it 
is only if the hearer occupies a similar cognitive perspective to the speaker that she 
will be in such a position. In what follows, I will explain how the examples presented 
support my argument. 
 
Let’s consider premise (a1) first. There are a number of ways to resist this premise. 
One way is to claim that communication actually succeeds in the examples, and so 
they aren’t examples in which anything more is required for success. I will consider 
this objection later on. In the next section, I will consider an objection which claims 
that the examples I provided do not support my argument because communication 
fails for a different reason than is required for (a1) to be true. 
 
2.2.2 Premise (a1) - Objection 
 
Suppose an objector accepts that the various examples offered above are indeed 
examples of communication failure. One way to resist premise (a1) is to deny that 
the examples I have given actually support my argument. For my argument to be 
convincing, I must present examples which fail because cognitive perspectives are 
dissimilar. But an objector might try to claim that communication fails in the 
examples for some other reason. For example, they might claim that it fails because 
one of the conditions involved in a Fully-Traditional View, such as LVC or CVC, is 
violated. If this is so, the examples I give cannot be used to support my argument.  
 
I think it is clear that the hearers in the examples satisfy Necessity of Subject-
Sensitive Content Understanding: it is stipulated that they have correct understanding 
of the community concept, and the difference in cognitive perspectives is secured by 
giving the speaker a deviant understanding. One way to try to block the argument 
which might look promising, however, is to try and deny that SamConN is satisfied 
(and, with it, SI-UnderstandingN) – perhaps the speaker’s understanding is just too 
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deviant. The objector can try to claim that the speakers involved are not to be 
attributed partial grasp of a community concept but, rather, that they possess 
idiosyncratic concepts. As such, their utterances and thoughts are to be reinterpreted 
accordingly. Sally does not possess the concept, CRUSTACEAN; Sophie does not 
possess the concept FORTNIGHT; and Sabrina does not possess the concept STEP. 
Because of this, we should think that communication fails because SamConN is 
violated – for only the hearers are in possession of the community concept. 
 
I think this response to the argument would be completely disastrous for social 
externalism. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, one of the examples appealed 
to is actually an example which Burge himself treats as a case of partial grasp of a 
community concept, although he does not consider the issue of communicative 
success in particular. Burge uses the example of a subject who possesses the concept 
FORTNIGHT despite his dispositions to misapply the term to periods of ten days. 
Burge does think that misconceptions can be so severe that they call for attribution of 
an idiosyncratic concept to a subject rather than the community concept. For 
example, he writes,  
 
There are also examples of quite radical misunderstandings that sometimes 
generate reinterpretation. If a generally competent and reasonable speaker 
thinks that ‘orangutan’ applies to a fruit drink, we would be reluctant, and it 
would unquestionably be misleading, to take his words as revealing that he 
thinks he has been drinking orangutans for breakfast for the last few weeks. 
Such total misunderstanding often seems to block literalistic mental content 





But, directly following this passage, he suggests that the kind of incorrect 
understanding that a subject can possess can be really quite radical: 
 
(Contrary to philosophical lore, I am not convinced that such a man cannot 
correctly and literally be attributed a belief that an orangutan is a kind of fruit 
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However, perhaps all this shows is that Burge’s choice of example was ill-advised. 
Perhaps, in the cases just mentioned, the correct thing for the social externalist to say 
is that the subject does in fact possess an idiosyncratic concept and thus his 
utterances should be reinterpreted accordingly. 
 
Goldberg, too, appears to have an extremely liberal view as to the conditions under 
which a subject can count as correctly representing (that is, SI-understanding) a 
speaker’s utterance or thought content. For recall that on his account correct 
representation of an utterance is guaranteed by reliance on public linguistic norms. 
Thus it seems that nothing over minimal competence-plus-deference is required in 
order to understand an utterance (and, in doing so, grasp the correct content). Indeed, 
this liberality is supposed to be a motivation for Goldberg’s view in the epistemology 
of testimony. But, once again, perhaps all my examples show is that a Goldberg-style 
account, too, should introduce stronger requirements on concept possession (and 
understanding). 
 
Would introducing more demanding requirements on concept-possession enable the 
social externalist to avoid my argument? I think not. For Burge’s argument for social 
externalism to work, it must be the case that a subject can grasp concepts despite 
making genuine conceptual errors.
184
 But whenever there are these conceptual errors, 
we can exploit them to produce a case of communication failure due to differences in 
the way the concepts are deployed in the respective cognitive economies of the 
speaker and hearer. To avoid this result, a social externalist would have to claim that 
the conditions on possession of a concept are such that they exclude conceptual 
errors. But then the argument for social externalism no longer goes through, for we 
now have grounds to reinterpret a subject’s utterances in all cases which attribute 
conceptual errors to the subject. If this is so, a subject’s concepts are no longer 
dependent for their individuation on the practices of the community. Alf, for 
example, no longer possesses the community concept ARTHRITIS but, because of his 
conceptual error, possesses an idiosyncratic concept after all. In fact, things are even 
worse than this; for my argument does not even need to appeal to examples involving 
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conceptual errors – a simple empirical error would be enough. I think the first 
example, ‘Red Lobster’, might count as a case in which the speaker makes a mere 
empirical rather than a genuine conceptual error. It does not seem to be a conceptual 
truth that lobsters are any colour in particular. But then, to deny the example, the 
social externalist would have to claim that subjects who make mere empirical errors 
do not grasp the community concept. If they do this, there is simply no way to 
salvage social externalism: for now even when subjects make small mistakes, they 
are no longer to be attributed community concepts. 
 
Furthermore, even if the social externalist maintains this much more demanding 
notion of the conditions on conceptual grasp, this will essentially smuggle cognitive 
perspective into the account through a back door. For now, although cognitive 
perspective is not required as a further condition on communicative success, it is 
required as a condition on concept acquisition. This is an extremely demanding view 
of concept acquisition. And it is a far more demanding view of communicative 
success than that endorsed by even the more demanding Traditional Views such as 
CVC. Claiming that subjects must be disposed to employ their concepts correctly 
(that is, without conceptual, or even minor empirical, error) if they are to count as 
grasping them is essentially to claim that they must have the right cognitive 
perspective on each of their concepts – for we defined cognitive perspective in terms 
of how subjects are disposed to employ these concepts in their cognitive economy. 
And, given this requirement, all subjects who possess incorrect dispositions, 
including all those in the examples above, will fail to successfully communicate with 
those concepts. 
 
To summarize: claiming that the examples I have provided (and others like them) are 
examples in which the subjects in question do not possess the relevant concepts 
would be (a) to deny social externalism, (b) to concede that coordination of cognitive 
perspectives is required for communicative success (insofar as it is required for 
concept possession) and (c) to endorse an extremely demanding view of 




2.2.3 Premise (a1) - Explaining communication failure 
 
Claiming that communication fails due to violation of SamConN does not appear to 
be a good strategy for resisting the argument. Another way to resist my argument 
would be to claim that communication hasn’t failed after all in the examples. In this 
section, I will try to motivate the claim that, in the examples, communication does 
indeed fail. And, further, that it fails due to the fact that the hearer is not left in a 
position to employ the content she grasps in an attempt to satisfy the communicative 
aim of the speaker.  
 
What motivates this claim is consideration of the reasons for which the speakers 
attempted to communicate with each of the hearers in the examples. In each of the 
examples, the speakers attempted to communicate for a very particular practical 
purpose. I mean to understand ‘practical purpose’ in quite a liberal way here. The 
speakers attempted to communicate with the hearers because they wanted to prompt 
the hearers to do something: either to recognise something about the world, to reason 
in a particular way, or to perform a particular action (as a result of some process of 
reasoning). In communicating, the speakers were trying to get the hearers to grasp a 
content which they could employ in satisfying these practical purposes. But, in each 
example, the hearers could not even attempt to use the content grasped to satisfy this 
aim of communication. In ‘Red Lobster’, the speaker attempted to communicate with 
the intention of procuring a particular kind of object. But the hearer identified a 
different set of objects from the speaker as the objects of discussion; as such, he was 
not in a position to try to retrieve the object that the speaker took herself to desire. In 
‘Fortnight’, the speaker attempted to communicate with the intention of getting the 
hearer to turn up at his job interview on the right day. But the hearer could not use 
the content grasped in such a way that would lead to him turning up on time. In 
‘Unlucky Child’, the speaker attempted to communicate with the intention of 
warning the hearer that the path ahead was dangerous. But the hearer could not 
recognise that he had been warned as a result of the communicative exchange and 
consequently tumbled to his death. In each case, there was a specific aim of the 
communicative attempt and, in each case, something prevented the hearers from 
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being able to try to satisfy this aim. To claim that communication succeeds in the 
examples is to disregard these aims. This would be to claim one of two things. 
Firstly, one could claim that the reasons that speakers in the examples wanted to 
communicate successfully was for some other purpose; but it is unclear what other 
reason the speakers would have been communicating for such that these exchanges 
should be counted as successes. For example, when Sophie utters ‘Your job 
interview is in a fortnight’ to Hamish, it is not clear what further aims she could have 
other than to inform Hamish that his job interview is in ten days so that he might 
make it there on time. Alternatively, the objector could agree that the speakers 
attempted to communicate for the reasons I identified, but claim that the 
communicative aims of speakers are not relevant to adjudicating communicative 
success and failure. However, it would be bizarre to claim that the reasons for which 
the speakers in the examples attempted to communicate are irrelevant to whether the 
exchanges should be judged successful or not. 
 
If we accept my proposed explanation of why communication fails in the examples, I 
think we should accept that, in the examples, communicative success requires that 
the hearer is placed in a position to use the content he grasps to attempt to satisfy the 
practical aims of the communicative attempt. Other than these practical aims, there 
were no other reasons for which each speaker attempted to communicate. Thus, if 
anything is required for success, it should be that the hearer is placed in a position to 
use the content to satisfy these practical aims. Note that I am not claiming that 
successful communication in the examples requires the coordination of action.
185
 I 
am merely claiming that it requires that the hearer is put in a position to attempt to 
act in accordance with the speakers’ wishes if they chose to. All I mean by this is that 
the hearer should be able to employ the communicated content in her cognitive 
economy in a way which the speaker would deem appropriate, and which could 
result in her attempting to perform the desired action. The hearer should recognise 
similar conceptual connections and inferential relations as the speaker. Otherwise she 
will not be disposed to reason with the communicated content in the same way that 
the speaker does. And, as such, she will not be disposed to employ it in a way that 
                                                 
185
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would lead to the satisfaction of the speaker’s aim. For example, for the exchange in 
‘Fortnight’ to succeed, it is merely required that Hamish is in a position to employ 
the content he grasps in an attempt to make it to his job interview. He should 
recognise what Sophie was trying to tell him and be in a position to use this 
information in his reasoning such that he can attempt to get to the interview in ten 
days. He may, after the successful communicative attempt, still not make it. He 
might decide that he doesn’t want the job; or he may get hit by a bus on his way to 
the interview. What is required for success, I claim, is that he can use the content to 
try to get to the interview. Successful coordination of action is, I think, a symptom of 
communicative success, but it is in no way constitutive of it, nor does it reliably 
indicate it. A hearer might be in a position to use the content she grasps as the 
speaker intended, and yet she may still fail to comply with the speaker’s aims for any 
number of reasons. Similarly, a hearer can accidentally act as the speaker desired 
even when she is not capable of deliberately employing the content she grasps in an 
attempt to do so. For example, in ‘Fortnight’, suppose Hamish, after 
miscommunicating, incorrectly thinks that his interview is in fourteen days. He may 
still succeed in turning up to the interview in ten days if, for example, he forgets 
what day it is. In such a case, even if he does accidentally satisfy the speaker’s aim of 
communication, he does not use the content to satisfy this aim. 
 
2.2.4 Premise (a2) 
 
Suppose we have established (a), that my examples are indeed examples in which 
communication fails and (b), in the examples, success requires that the hearer is put 
in a position to use the content she grasps to attempt to comply with the speaker’s 
communicative aims. That leaves premise (a2): that the hearer will be placed in such 
a position only if she possesses a similar cognitive perspective to that of the speaker. 
I think this premise should be relatively uncontroversial. Cognitive perspective, 
recall, is defined in terms of a subject’s dispositions to employ content in her 
cognitive economy. As such, two subjects will possess similar cognitive perspectives 
on a content if and only if they are disposed to employ that content in similar ways. 
Similarly, two subjects will possess dissimilar cognitive perspectives on a content if 
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and only if they are disposed to employ that content in dissimilar ways. Above, I 
claimed that all it is for a hearer to be in a position to employ the content she grasps 
in the appropriate way is for her to be disposed to employ it in her cognitive 
economy in ways similar to how the speaker would. As such, it is only if they 
possess similar cognitive perspectives that the hearer will be in the appropriate 
position. If the hearer possesses a dissimilar cognitive perspective to the speaker, she 
will be disposed to employ the content she grasps in different ways, and thus will not 
be in a position to employ it as the speaker does. If she can’t use the content as the 
speaker intended, then she cannot (deliberately) use the content to satisfy the 
particular aim for which the speaker communicated. It is only if she is disposed to 
employ the communicated content in her cognitive economy in a similar way to how 
the speaker would that she will be able to use the content to satisfy the speaker’s 
communicative aims. Nothing else will put her in such a position. If she, for 
example, grasps the right content but does not cognize this content as the speaker 
does, she will not employ it as the speaker intended it to be employed. As the 
examples demonstrate, even if she cognizes it correctly, she still will not be disposed 
to employ it as the speaker would unless the speaker also cognizes it correctly (and 
thus possesses a similar cognitive perspective). 
 
If the examples above are convincing, we will have it that coordination of cognitive 
perspectives is (at least sometimes) required for communicative success. One 
consequence of the success of the first stage is that the Fully-Traditional Views (for 
example, CVC and LVC) do not state sufficient conditions on communicative 
success. I now want to move on to the second stage of the argument and suggest that 
all examples are going to be like examples (1)-(3) above. For all communicative 
exchanges, it is only if cognitive perspectives are similar that communication will 
succeed. If this second stage succeeds, the upshot is that no Traditional View states 







2.3 Argument from Miscommunication – Stage 2 
 
Stage 1 of the argument purported to show that there are examples in which 
similarity of cognitive perspectives (on the content communicated) between 
interlocutors is required for communicative success. In the following sub-sections, I 
will give reasons for thinking we can generalise from the examples to conclude that 
similarity of cognitive perspective is necessary for communicative success. I think 
that the examples I have provided have some intuitive clout. But, in what follows, I 
will offer further reasons for thinking that all examples will be like the ones 
presented above. I will present additional examples intended to cover a wide range of 
different kinds of communicative exchanges, and I will offer some general 
considerations which I think are motivated by features which are common to all of 
the examples presented here (and which should apply to all communicative 
exchanges). The considerations which weigh in favour of the necessity claim come 
largely from further considering why it is that we wish to communicate with each 
other. The reason that we should consider the coordination of cognitive perspectives 
to be essential to accounts of communicative success is that communication always 
has certain practical aims – we always communicate for some particular reason, even 
if it is just to get the hearer to recognise how we take the world to be. And hearers 
cannot use content to try to satisfy these aims unless they possess a similar cognitive 
perspective to the speaker. What are our practical aims, and what would enable us to 
satisfy them? To help answer these questions, I will consider an objection to the 





An objector might try denying that communication fails when cognitive perspectives 
are dissimilar. Indeed, a defender of a Fully-Traditional View may even think that in 
the examples presented above communication did not fail.
186
 They may insist that 
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 An objector can, of course, agree that communication fails due to dissimilarities in cognitive 
perspectives in the examples above but resist my claim that coordination of cognitive perspectives is 
necessary for communicative success. This approach can be taken by Semi-Traditional Views. 
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communication succeeds just fine. Perhaps something does go wrong but, if so, this 
is independent of communicative success. What goes wrong may indeed be 
explained by appeal to the differences in cognitive perspectives between subjects: if 
subjects possess dissimilar cognitive perspectives, this may prevent them from 
having the opportunity to use the (successfully) communicated content in the way 
intended by the speaker. But, so the objection might go, this is a separate issue from 




In response, I think we should consider why we want to communicate 
successfully.
187
 Amongst other things, we want to discover how our interlocutors 
take the world to be and to convey to them how we take the world to be. In doing so, 
we will enable each other to better navigate the world. As it stands, this is something 
that defenders of the various Traditional Views would agree with. Goldberg, for 
example, advocates SamConN and SI-UnderstandingN precisely to ensure that the 
hearer, when successful, represents the world in exactly the same way as the speaker. 
Both sides of the debate should agree that communicative success is a matter of the 
speaker causing the hearer to come to see how she (the speaker) takes things to be.
188
 
However, there are (at least) two ways to understand what this consists in. 
 
On certain of the Traditional Views, ‘coming to see how the speaker takes the world 
to be’ is a matter of the hearer correctly representing, or understanding, the content 
of the speaker’s utterance or thought, where this is accomplished by grasping the 
correct content and understanding this content in a way which is correct in some 
way. On LVC, for example, this is a matter of grasping the correct content through 
SI-understanding. On CVC this is a matter of the hearer SS-understanding the 
content correctly. On both these views, the emphasis is on correct representation 
(and understanding) of content. On the other hand, ‘coming to see how the speaker 
represents the world’ might instead be a matter of the hearer grasping the speaker’s 
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  Or, at least, how she claims she takes things to be – she might lie. 
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cognitive perspective on the content of her utterance: this would be for her to grasp 
how the speaker is disposed to reason with that content, and to grasp the way in 
which the speaker takes her concepts to represent the objects to which they apply. 
The question I must answer is: why should we prefer a view of communication upon 
which it is always the successful conveyance of our cognitive perspective which is 
important? I will here offer several further considerations in favour of this position. 
 
Firstly, it is more plausible that it is a speaker’s cognitive perspective on a given 
content that she is trying to convey. After all, it is only her cognitive perspective on 
the inferential and representational properties of the content that she can cognize. 
The actual inferential and representational properties of that content are opaque to 
her. Thus, it is her cognitive perspective that she takes herself to be conveying. In 
cases of partial grasp, she may not even assent to the content of her attitudes and 
utterances when what they actually represent is revealed to her. For example, recall 
Sophie from ‘Fortnight’, who is disposed to apply the concept FORTNIGHT to a period 
of ten days. Suppose she asserts, 
 
(5) The party is in a fortnight. 
  
It is surely more plausible that she is trying to communicate that the party is in ten 
days, rather than that it is in fourteen. This is what she takes herself to be conveying, 
and it is what she wants the hearer to grasp. If she is made aware of her incorrect 
grasp of FORTNIGHT, she will claim that she wasn’t trying to communicate that the 
party was in fourteen days. It seems strange to insist that it is the content of our 
utterances or thoughts that we are trying to convey when we don’t fully grasp what 
that content is. It will be of no use to us to convey this content if we don’t grasp what 
it is that we have conveyed. This brings us to a second consideration: it is the 
conveyance of the subject’s cognitive perspective on the content communicated that 
is of practical use to her when it comes to navigating the world. 
 
We don’t just want to receive information for its own sake; we want to be able to put 
our wisdom to work, to be able to employ it effectively in our reasoning and actions. 
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All the examples, (1)-(3), above were examples in which the hearers, in some sense, 
failed to learn something about the world as a result of the mismatch in cognitive 
perspectives between interlocutors. Herbert failed to learn what kind of object he was 
supposed to be retrieving; Hamish failed to learn when his job interview was; and 
Henry failed to learn that he was strolling towards his untimely death. It is only if 
their cognitive perspectives had been calibrated with the speakers’ that these hearers 
would have been able to put the information gained to good use – and this would be 
so even though they misunderstood the contents which they grasped. 
 
I now turn to a third consideration for favouring my position. One further reason that 
we communicate with others is to find out information about the attitudes of our 
interlocutors so that we can predict and make sense of their actions. But, when it 
comes to predicting someone’s actions, it is only grasping her cognitive perspective 
which is of use to us, and this, again, is not something which is necessarily captured 
by the content of her utterances and thoughts. For example, as an extension of the 
‘Fortnight’ example, suppose Sophie utters (6) to Hamish. 
 
(6) I will meet you at the party in a fortnight 
 
If Hamish wants to know how Sophie will act, it is Sophie’s cognitive perspective on 
(6) that is useful to grasp. Correctly grasping the content of (6) alone will lead 
Hamish to predict that Sophie will meet him at a party in fourteen days. But this isn’t 
what Sophie is going to do. To correctly anticipate how Sophie will act, Hamish 
needs to know that Sophie’s cognitive perspective on FORTNIGHT is idiosyncratic in a 
particular way. 
 
A fourth consideration in favour my position is the following. In cases in which a 
speaker is aware that her audience possesses a divergent cognitive perspective to her 
own, she will not be content to merely satisfy the conditions which comprise certain 
of the Traditional Views. In such cases, she will offer further information which will 
increase coordination of cognitive perspectives between her and her audience so that 
the hearer will be put in a position to satisfy her communicative aim. Let’s first 
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consider LVC. Once again, consider Sophie and Hamish from ‘Fortnight’. Suppose 
Sophie utters (7) to a third interlocutor, Kate.  
 
(7) Is the party in a fortnight? 
 
Suppose that Kate knows of Sophie’s non-standard cognitive perspective on 
FORTNIGHT and that she believes that the party is indeed in a fortnight. If all that 
matters to communicative success (in addition to the Theory-Neutral conditions) is 
that SamConN and SI-UnderstandingN are satisfied, there would be nothing 
inappropriate about Kate answering Sophie by uttering (8), 
 
(8) Yes, the party is in a fortnight. 
 
The conditions which comprise LVC will be satisfied and communication between 
the two will allegedly have been successful. However, if Kate is aware of Sophie’s 
misconception, she will not answer with (8). Rather, she will feel the need to offer 
further information. For example, she may utter (9), 
 
(9) Yes, but a fortnight is two weeks long. 
 
I submit that the most plausible explanation for why she does this is to improve 
communication. That is, she believes that communication will fail unless she offers 
this further information that will coordinate Sophie’s cognitive perspective with her 
own. Indeed, it seems that Kate would be blameworthy qua interlocutor if she didn’t 
offer this further information. The defender of LVC must maintain that she offers 
this information for some other reason which is not relevant to communicative 
success: that Kate was indeed trying to avert some mishap, but that this mishap was 
not one of communication failure. This seems extremely implausible – what other 
kind of mishap could she have been trying to avert? I think it is plausible that 
cooperative speakers will always behave this way and that speakers would always be 
blameworthy for not doing so. Thus, at the very least, the burden rests on the 
defenders of Traditional Views to suggest some alternative explanation for why 
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speakers do this, or to come up with examples in which cooperative speakers do not 
do this. 
 
What of CVC? The above example does not work against it. This is because CVC 
can still claim that Kate offers this information so that Sophie’s cognitive perspective 
is rendered correct, but not necessarily so that it is rendered similar to her own. 
However, we can set up a similar example to thwart CVC as well. Suppose Sophie is 
talking to Hamish (who, recall, has correct cognitive perspective on FORTNIGHT, but 
does not know that Sophie’s cognitive perspective is incorrect). Suppose Hamish 
asks Sophie, 
 
(10) Is the party in a fortnight? 
 
Sophie believes that the party is in ten days, and thus responds by uttering ‘Yes’. 
However, suppose a third party, Mary, overhears the exchange, and is aware of the 
difference between Hamish and Sophie’s cognitive perspectives on FORTNIGHT. 
Mary will tell Hamish that Sophie thinks that a fortnight is ten days long and, as 
such, that she was trying to tell him that the party is in ten days and not that it is in 
fourteen. I submit that the reason that Mary does this is to improve communication 
between Sophie and Hamish. Hamish would justifiably be angry with Mary if she did 
not offer this information. But if all that is required for communicative success is that 
the hearer grasp the correct content and correctly SS-understand this content, then 
there would have to be a different explanation of why Mary informs Hamish of 
Sophie’s deviant cognitive perspective. Again, I think the only plausible explanation 
of Mary’s actions is that she wanted to avert communication failure between Sophie 
and Hamish and, further, that cooperative subjects will always behave this way. At 
the very least, Traditional Views owe us an alternative explanation, or a 
counterexample. 
 
So far, I have focused on cases in which subjects either, in some sense, failed to learn 
something about the world, failed to learn something about their interlocutors, or 
offered further information in order to avert this kind of failure. More accurately, we 
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should say that, in the first two cases, the hearers failed to recognise that they had 
learned these things as, strictly speaking, they mostly succeeded in forming the right 
beliefs based on what they were told; they were just unable to attain the appropriate 
cognitive perspective on the content they grasped. Note that satisfying the conditions 
which comprise certain of the Traditional Views alone won’t even guarantee that the 
hearer is put in a position to learn what the speaker took themselves to be saying if 
the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content was non-standard: one may fully 
grasp the (broad) content of a speaker’s utterance and still not grasp what it is that 
the speaker took herself to be communicating. It is never enough to correctly 
represent the content of the speaker’s utterance, or even to correctly SS-understand 
it; we need to grasp the speaker’s cognitive perspective on that content, otherwise the 
content grasped will be useless to us – we cannot act on it or reason with it 
effectively because we do not comprehend how it was intended to be cognized and 
employed. Why would we value successful communication if the information gained 
wasn’t guaranteed to be of use to us in the ways described above? 
 
Finding out about the world, and finding out about the attitudes of interlocutors are 
just two examples of communicative goals for which similarity of cognitive 
perspective is required. There are surely many other communicative goals we could 
consider in support of the argument. My claim is that all of these goals will be 
thwarted unless cognitive perspectives are similar across communication partners. 
Consider, for example, that a speaker cannot (deliberately) make a hearer laugh 
unless the hearer has similar cognitive perspective on the content of the speaker’s 
joke; nor can she insult the hearer or lie to her, if the hearer’s cognitive perspective 
on the content of her insults and lies is different from the speaker’s. It also seems 
plausible that a hearer will fail to pick up on the intended pragmatic implicatures of 
an utterance unless her cognitive perspective on the literal meaning of the utterance 
that the speaker was trying to convey is similar to the speaker’s. As an example of 
this last point, consider that if you ask me if Jones is a good philosopher, and I 
respond with ‘Jones is an efficient administrator’, you will only pick up on the fact 
that I am trying to implicate that Jones is a bad philosopher if your cognitive 
perspective on ‘administrator’ is similar to mine. If your cognitive perspective on 
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‘administrator’ is such that you apply the term to good reasoners, for example, then 
you will fail to grasp the intended implicature. 
 
In the above, I have tried to offer further support for thinking that we can generalise 
from the examples given. The argument I have provided is not a knock-down 
argument. Rather, I have presented an array of examples intended to cover a wide 
range of cases and offered reasons for thinking that all examples of communicative 
exchanges will be like these. A defender of the Semi-Traditional Views can, of 
course, agree with my diagnoses of the individual examples and still try to resist my 
move to the necessity claim. However, I think the burden of proof is now on these 
views to provide counterexamples to the necessity claim. Underlying my argument is 
the idea that communication always has a particular practical aim, and it is only if we 
occupy a similar cognitive perspective to our interlocutors that we will be in a 
position to attempt to satisfy the practical aims of communication. If the defenders of 
Traditional Views continue to maintain that the exchanges presented (or others like 
them) really are cases of communicative success, then I think the kind of success that 
these views afford us doesn’t look like something we should be interested in 
achieving. A more interesting class of exchanges, which we might call ‘valuable 
successful communication’, are those which are of use to us when it comes to 
(amongst other things) determining how our interlocutors take the world to be, 
predicting how they will reason and act, and determining how to fulfil or thwart their 
desires. A hearer who can coordinate her cognitive perspective with that of her 
interlocutor is always in a better position to navigate the world – and the subjects 
within it – than a hearer who merely grasps the correct content of those utterances, or 
who merely SS-understands correctly. 
 
2.4 The role of cognitive perspective 
 
If my argument has been successful thus far, I have demonstrated that, on social 
externalism, it is necessary for communicative success that the hearer’s cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective 
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on the content she expressed. Given this, I think the social externalist should add the 
following condition to those which comprise the Traditional Views. 
 
Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative attempt 
will succeed only if the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
expressed. 
 
I will have much more to say, both about the precise role that cognitive perspective 
plays in communicative success and about the nature of the similarity involved, in 
Chapter 4. As we will see, the way in which cognitive perspective is best employed 
is actually more complicated than this statement above. The position which I will 
eventually defend is one which claims that communication succeeds simpliciter to 
the degree that cognitive perspectives are similar, rather than one which claims that 
some particular degree of similarity of cognitive perspective is necessary for 
communicative success. However, I will also claim that, relative to any particular 
aim of communication, a threshold of relevant similarity will be set by the context. It 
is this second facet of the view which the arguments of this chapter support. For now 
though, this rough sketch will suffice. 
 
Note that if a social externalist is to endorse Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive 
Perspective, this will drastically alter the Traditional Views which the thesis is added 
to. For example, this would require giving up the liberality of LVC, for the view is 
no longer liberal with respect to the amount of communicative exchanges which 
count as successful. One of the distinctive characteristics of LVC was that it allows 
for communicative success even in cases where subjects have minimal or highly 
dissimilar grasp of the concepts involved in the communicated content. But, as I have 
tried to show, this kind of liberality is inappropriate: it judges certain exchanges to be 
successful when they are unsuccessful. It should also be noted that CVC would 
become extremely demanding. This is because, in maintaining SS-Content 
Understanding, it already required that the hearer’s cognitive perspective be correct. 
But because it now requires that the speaker’s cognitive perspective is similar to the 
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hearer’s, it will also require that both the speaker and hearer have correct cognitive 
perspectives. 
 
Of course, adding Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective to the various 
conditions which comprise Traditional Views is not the only option for the social 
externalist. One option that might look sensible is to, for example, replace whichever 
Understanding Requirement is endorsed with the Subject-Sensitive Shared 
Understanding Requirement. This is the approach which I think the social externalist 
should endorse. However, I have not yet shown that SI-Understanding and Subject-
Sensitive Content Understanding are not needed in an account of communicative 
success; thus, it is not yet clear that these conditions should be replaced. At best, I 
have shown that neither are (jointly) sufficient alongside the various other conditions 
which comprise the respective views of which they are a part. One consequence of 
my argument in the next section will be that these conditions, alongside the Content 
Relations, are also not necessary for communicative success on the assumption of 
social externalism. 
 
Section 3: The Argument from Successful Communication 
 
The Argument from Successful Communication is for the claim that social 
externalism should endorse the following thesis. 
 
Sufficiency of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative attempt 
will succeed if (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied, and (b) the 
hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the 
speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. 
 
Like the Argument from Miscommunication, this argument also proceeds in two 
stages. In the first stage of the argument, I simply wish to show that there are 
examples in which (assuming satisfaction of the Theory-Neutral Conditions) 
communication succeeds when cognitive perspectives are similar across 
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interlocutors. This will be so even in the absence of the satisfaction of the kinds of 
conditions distinctive of the Traditional Views. As such, none of SimConN, 
SamConN,
189
 SI-Understanding or SS-Content Understanding are necessary for 
communicative success. In the second stage of the argument, I will argue that we can 
generalise from these examples to get the sufficiency claim. If this second stage 
succeeds, the upshot will be that the conditions distinctive of Fully-Traditional 
Views are never required for communicative success. 
 
3.1 The Argument from Successful Communication 
 
The following argument purports to show that there are examples of communicative 
exchanges in which, assuming that the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied, 
similarity of cognitive perspective is all that is needed to secure communicative 
success. 
 
Argument for sub-conclusion 
 
b1) On social externalism, there are examples in which (assuming satisfaction of 
the Theory-Neutral conditions) communication succeeds if the hearer is put 
in a position to employ the content she grasps in her cognitive economy in 
ways which enable her to attempt to satisfy the practical aim of the 
communicative attempt. 
b2) In these examples, if the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she 
expressed then the hearer will be left in such a position. 
bSC) Thus: (Assuming satisfaction of the Theory-Neutral conditions) On social 
externalism, there are examples in which it is enough for communicative 
success that the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is 
similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. 
 
3.2 Support for the premises 
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Much as before, support for the premises, (b1) and (b2), will come from examples. 
These are supposed to be cases in which (a) communication succeeds, (b) it is 
enough for communicative success that the hearer is put in a position to employ the 
content she grasps in her cognitive economy such that she can attempt to satisfy the 
aims of the communicative attempt (alongside satisfaction of the Theory-Neutral 
conditions), and (c) for the hearer to be put in such a position, it is enough that 
cognitive perspectives are coordinated. I will here present three examples. 
 
Example 1: ‘Biscuit’ 
 
Consider two separate language communities, one on Earth and one on Twin Earth. 
On Earth, the concept, BISCUIT, applies only to small baked goods which become 
softer when stale. On Twin Earth the concept, THISCUIT, which is also expressed with 
the word-form, ‘biscuit’, applies in a somewhat different way. It applies only to 
small baked goods which become harder when stale. As such, although the two 
concepts have some similarities, they are markedly different: there is not even an 
overlap in their extensions. These two communities, being Twin-communities, are 
identical except for this fact. Now consider two subjects: Sasha on Earth, and Harry 
on Twin Earth.
190
 Sasha has the same cognitive perspective on BISCUIT as Harry does 
on THISCUIT. Both apply ‘biscuit’ only to small baked goods which become softer 
when stale. (Harry has incorrect cognitive perspective relative to his community, 
whereas Sasha does not.) Now suppose that the Earthling speaker, Sasha, travels 
(somehow, and without her knowledge) from Earth to Twin Earth and finds herself 
sitting by a coffee table opposite Harry. There are two plates in front of her. One is a 
plate of custard creams and the other is a plate of Jaffa Cakes. Sasha utters (11), 
 
(11) Please pass me a biscuit. 
 
Harry, upon hearing (11), picks up the plate of custard creams and passes it to Sasha. 
Due to his cognitive perspective on (11), Harry took Sasha to have requested an item 
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from the plate containing small baked goods which become softer when stale. And 
he was able to comply with her request as a result. 
 
Example 2: ‘Fortnight 2’ 
 
Let’s consider another Twin-scenario. On Earth, the concept FORTNIGHT applies to a 
time period that is fourteen days long. On Twin-Earth, the counterpart concept, 
THORTNIGHT applies to a time period which is ten days long. Now imagine two 
subjects, Sonya on Earth and Heath on Twin Earth. Sonya has the same cognitive 
perspective on FORTNIGHT as Heath does on THORTNIGHT. Both subjects are disposed 
to apply the term ‘fortnight’ to a time period which is fourteen days long (only Sonya 
possesses the correct cognitive perspective on her concept relative to her language 
community). Now imagine that Sonya (somehow, and without her knowledge) 
travels to Twin Earth. There she meets Heath and utters (12), 
 
(12) Meet me at the abandoned church in a fortnight. 
 
Given that the two occupy similar cognitive perspectives, Heath will take himself to 
come to believe something very similar to what Sonya took herself to have 
expressed. As such, Sonya will succeed in the aim for which she communicated: to 
inform Heath (or, to get Heath to take himself to come to believe) that he should 
meet her at the abandoned church in fourteen days. And, assuming Heath actually 
wants to comply with Sonya’s request and is able to, they can succeed in 
coordinating their actions as a result of this exchange. 
 
Example 3: ‘Lucky Child’ 
 
The last two examples appealed to what were quite significant differences in content 
between the speaker and hearer. This third example involves an exchange in which 
there are potentially vast differences of content between the speaker and hearer. In 
the example, I present a speaker who appears to learn a language which appears to be 
exactly like English, but who does so purely by luck in an environment that is 
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isolated from all language communities. This example is somewhat similar to 
Davidson’s ‘Swampman’, although I do not intend to use it for the same purpose. It 
also has an advantage over Davidson’s example in that, although it is highly 
artificial, it does not require us to stretch our credulity as to the possibility of 
massively complex objects being transformed by bolts of lightning (in Davidson’s 
example, lightning transforms a tree in to a human).
191
 Imagine the following 
scenario. 
 
A wealthy scientist constructs a large laboratory which contains a life-size model 
village. He populates the village with androids whose external surfaces superficially 
perfectly resemble human beings. Importantly, inside they are nothing like human 
beings: they run on very simple programs which do not, and are not intended to, 
model human cognition. Specifically, the androids are merely programmed to emit 
sounds and perform movements completely at random. The sounds can be made up 
of any number and combination of phonemes from spoken English. The movements 
that they can perform are limited to the range of movements possible for a human 
body. In a house in the laboratory village, the scientist places a newborn human child 
and, through use of video and audio surveillance, observes what happens. In most of 
the experiments the scientist doesn’t get very interesting results. However, he repeats 
the experiment with further infant subjects over and over again. By sheer luck, in one 
of the experiments, the random movements performed, and sounds emitted, by the 
robots perfectly resemble that of two new and responsible English-speaking parents 
and, by continued luck, the androids appear to raise the child in a manner that 
perfectly resembles the way that humans would raise a human infant. As a result of 
the random inputs from the androids, the child begins to produce noises that sound 
just like English. By sheer chance, within a few years the child perfectly resembles a 
normal English speaker. In particular, her brain functions exactly as a normal girl of 
her age. After ten years of remarkably good luck, the scientist releases the child into 
a real town full of real humans. The child – let’s call her Sue – approaches a boy, 
Hercule, standing by a barn and, pointing to the barn utters (13), 
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(13) There is a horse in the barn. 
 
Let us suppose that Hercule possesses a highly similar cognitive perspective on his 
HORSE concept to the cognitive perspective that Sue occupies with respect to her own 
concept, HORSES. However, relative to the standards set by his community, Hercule’s 
HORSE concept is quite incorrect. Let us suppose he thinks that horses are really just 
two humans in a costume. Sue also employs ‘horse’ in this way. According to a 
social externalist, the exchange cannot have satisfied SamConN or SimConN (nor 
has it satisfied SI-Understanding-N or SS-Content Understanding). Sue is not part of 
any language community, let alone the one of which Hercule is a member. As such, 
Hercule cannot grasp the correct content. Nonetheless, supposing that the two 
subjects cognize the distinct contents in similar ways, Hercule will take himself to 
grasp something that is very similar to what Sue took herself to be expressing. He 
will employ (13) in his reasoning in ways that Sue would deem appropriate. For 
example, they may both employ it in (what they take to be) the same inferences: 
‘That is a horse, so that is alive’, ‘That is a horse so that is a pair of animals’, ‘That is 
a horse so that is two humans’, etc. The two can go on to at least appear to have a 
non-defective conversation about the horse, although, according to the Fully-
Traditional Views, they are repeatedly failing. 
 
3.2.1 Diagnosis of the Examples 
 
I claim that the above examples are examples of communicative success due to 
similarities in the cognitive perspectives of interlocutors (alongside satisfaction of 
the Theory-Neutral conditions). It is enough for communicative success in the 
examples that cognitive perspectives are coordinated. Premise (b1) claims that 
communication succeeds in the examples, and it is enough for success that the hearer 
is put in a position to employ the content she grasps in her cognitive economy such 
that she can attempt to satisfy the aim for which the speaker communicated 
(assuming the Theory-Neutral conditions are also satisfied). Premise (b2) claims that, 
in the examples, if cognitive perspectives are coordinated then the hearer will be put 
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in such a position. In what follows, I will describe how the examples provided 
support my argument. 
 
3.2.2 Premise (b1) 
 
The reasons why we should think that the examples involve communicative success 
are similar to the reasons for positing miscommunication in my Argument from 
Miscommunication. That is, motivation comes from considering why the various 
speakers in the examples attempted to communicate. Once again, in each case, the 
speakers attempted to communicate for a very particular purpose. They attempted to 
communicate with the hearers because they wanted to prompt the hearers to do 
something: either to reason in a particular way, or to perform a particular action (as a 
result of some act of reasoning). In each case, the hearers could attempt to do these 
things as a result of each communicative exchange. Importantly, it is not clear that 
there were any other purposes for which the speakers attempted to communicate such 
that these exchanges should be considered failures.  
 
In ‘Biscuit’, Sasha’s communicative goal was to get Harry to pass her the plate of 
custard creams, and this she achieved. Harry seems to have perfectly-well grasped 
what Sasha took herself to be requesting and was able to attempt to comply with her 
request as a result. There seems to be nothing more that could improve 
communication between the interlocutors. Given that Sasha and Harry’s cognitive 
perspectives were similar (and assuming Harry has the means and inclination to 
comply with Sasha’s requests), Harry would never have passed Sasha anything other 
than what she expected (in particular, he would never hand her a Jaffa Cake, for his 
cognitive perspective on THISCUIT is such that he is not disposed to apply ‘Biscuit’ to 
Jaffa Cakes). In fact, if he did understand the content he grasped correctly, he would 
not have been able to attempt to satisfy Sasha’s communicative aim – he would have 
taken her to be making a different request and would have passed her the Jaffa Cakes 
instead. Thus, satisfaction of the requirements which comprise the certain of the 




In ‘Fortnight 2’, Sonya communicated with the intention of arranging a meeting with 
Heath. And, as a result of the exchange, Heath was perfectly able to try and do as 
Sonya asked even though he grasped the wrong content and misunderstood what he 
grasped. It is not clear what more we could ask of the interlocutors such that 
communication would be improved. There seems to be nothing defective about the 
communicative exchange. Imagine, for example, that Sonya learns of the difference 
between her and Heath. Suppose that when Heath arrives at the church she 
apologetically informs him that their previous communicative exchange had actually 
failed. Heath would surely be confused. After all, he made it to the church by using 
the information gained in their previous exchange. What more could she want? And 
what grounds could she have for considering the exchange a failure? 
 
In ‘Lucky Child’, Sue attempted to communicate with the intention of informing 
Hercule of some information about the world. Although Hercule did not grasp a 
similar content, it seems that there still is a sense in which he grasped what it was 
that the speaker was trying to tell him. Hercule was able to recognise the information 
that Sue was trying to convey because he occupied a similar cognitive perspective. It 
seems like the two of them could have a whole conversation which would not be 
defective except for the fact that it violates the conditions which comprise certain of 
the Traditional Views. This is brought out when we compare the imagined scenario 
to a Twin scenario in which a molecule for molecule duplicate of Sue was raised by 
real humans whose behavioural output was exactly similar to the behavioural output 
of the androids, but who were actually members of a language community rather 
than living in a semantically isolated laboratory. The verbal behaviour of the child 
raised by androids would be exactly like the verbal behaviour of the child raised by 
humans and their cognitive perspectives might be near identical. And yet, according 
to Fully-Traditional Views, only the latter child would be capable of communicating 
with the humans she meets upon leaving the village. But the only difference between 
these two scenarios is that in the former, SamConN, SimConN and the relevant 
Understanding Requirements are not satisfied, whilst in the latter (the Twin-scenario) 
these conditions can be satisfied. Thus, we have no grounds other than a prior 
commitment to these conditions for thinking that they are required for success in this 
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example: whether they are satisfied or not, it will make no practical difference to the 
interlocutors’ interactions, and it is not obvious why non-practical differences should 
be considered relevant to the success of their exchange. 
 
Note also that, just as it was untenable for an objector to claim that SamConN was 
not satisfied in the examples used to support the Argument from Miscommunication, 
it also won’t do to try and claim that SimConN or SamConN are in fact satisfied in 
the examples which support the Argument from Successful Communication. Firstly, 
it is part of Burge’s argument that subjects cannot possess concepts from outside 
their own language community. Actual-Alf, in Burge’s thought experiment, is said to 
be incapable of possessing the counterfactual concept THARTHRITIS due to the fact 
that he is not a member of the counterfactual community. It is necessary to Burge’s 
argument that Alf possesses the actual concept ARTHRITIS due to his connection with 
the actual language community. And the examples above all involved purported 
examples of communicative success between communities with different concepts. 
So there is no way that the examples could satisfy SamConN. Secondly, and more 
importantly, there is no reason to think that the concepts involved are significantly 
similar: in all examples, there was not even an overlap in extensions. Depending on 
how liberal one’s view of concept possession is, examples can be constructed which 
involve concepts as disparate as orang-utans and fruit drinks. 
 
3.2.3 Premise (b2) 
 
Just as before, I think premise (b2) should be uncontroversial. It just says that, in the 
examples, coordination of cognitive perspectives is sufficient to put the hearer in a 
position to employ the content appropriately in her cognitive economy. I think 
defence of this premise is already covered by my defence of premise (a2) of the 
Argument from Miscommunication. What I said earlier was that cognitive 
perspective is defined in terms of a subject’s dispositions to employ content in her 
cognitive economy. Subjects possess similar cognitive perspectives if and only if 
they are disposed to employ a content (or contents) in similar ways. But, as I 
explained above, all it is for a hearer to be in a position to employ the content she 
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grasps in her cognitive economy such that she can attempt to satisfy the speaker’s 
communicative aim is for her to be disposed to employ the content as the speaker 
would employ the content she expressed. As such, if the hearer’s cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s cognitive perspective 
on the content she expressed, then the speaker and hearer will be disposed to employ 
these contents in similar ways. And if this is so, the hearer will be in a position to 
employ the content she grasps as the speaker intended it to be employed in 
attempting to satisfy the practical aim of the communicative attempt. 
 
3.3 Argument from Successful Communication – Stage 2 
 
If the argument is successful thus far, we have it that, on social externalism, there are 
examples in which similarity of cognitive perspective (plus satisfaction of the 
Theory-Neutral conditions) is enough for communicative success. As such, none of 
the conditions which comprise the Fully-Traditional Views (aside from the Theory-
Neutral conditions) are necessary for communicative success. I now want to suggest 
that we can generalise from these examples to get the claim that, alongside the 
Theory-Neutral conditions, it is sufficient for communicative success that the 
hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. The reason for this is that any 
exchange in which subjects succeed in occupying similar cognitive perspectives will 
be an exchange in which the hearer is placed in a position to employ the content she 
grasps such that she can attempt to satisfy the practical aims of the communicative 
attempt. And, crucially, there are no other kinds of aims for which we communicate. 
 
 
3.3.1 Guarding against objections 
 
The considerations which weighed in favour of believing that we can generalise from 
the examples given in support of the Argument from Miscommunication are similar 
to the considerations which weigh in favour of generalising from the present 
examples. I think, if one is convinced by the first argument, one is also likely to be 
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convinced by the present argument. In my defence of the Argument from 
Miscommunication, I argued that communication always has certain practical aims. 
What I will claim in support of the present argument is that communication has only 
practical aims, and hearers will be in a position to satisfy these aims so long as they 
occupy a cognitive perspective which is similar to the speaker’s. To try to claim that 
communication does not succeed when cognitive perspectives are similar, an 
objector would have to say something like ‘Communication failed. What went right 
happened after communication had failed and is to be explained by the similarities in 
cognitive perspective between subjects.’ But this kind of response seems even more 
unsatisfactory than the inverse response suggested as an objection to my Argument 
from Miscommunication. It seems that the only thing that would motivate treating 
examples like the ones presented as cases of communication failure would be a prior 
commitment to the conditions which comprise the Traditional Views (when 
combined with social externalism). But the plausibility of these conditions is exactly 
what is at issue. What is brought out in ‘Lucky Child’ is that we can set up examples 
such that the only difference between situations in which communication succeeds 
and situations in which communication fails on Traditional Views is the satisfaction 
of the various Content Relations and Understanding Requirements. In particular, 
satisfaction of these conditions makes no difference to whether hearers are in a 
position to attempt to satisfy the particular aim of the communicative attempt. But 
what reason do we have to accept these additional theses if it makes no further 
difference to the situation to have them present or absent? In comparison, whether 
Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective is satisfied or not does have a very 
significant impact on the situation: speakers and hearers will interact in different 
ways depending on whether this condition is satisfied or not.  
 
One thing to stress about the present argument is that, although I set up the examples 
such that the hearers would always fail to satisfy Subject-Sensitive Content 
Understanding, the view that I am arguing for claims that neither subject in a 
communicative exchange need have the correct cognitive perspective on the content 
communicated in order for communication to succeed. Providing the cognitive 
perspectives of two subjects are non-standard in the same way (or similar ways), 
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subjects can communicate successfully, even if both subjects have incorrect 
cognitive perspectives. For example, to adapt ‘Fortnight 2’, suppose that, just as 
before, on Earth the concept FORTNIGHT applies to a time period that is fourteen days 
long and, on Twin-Earth, the counterpart concept, THORTNIGHT applies to a time 
period which is ten days long. But now imagine that Sonya on Earth and Heath on 
Twin Earth both take ‘fortnight’ to apply to a period of time which is four and a half 
days long. Thus, their cognitive perspectives are both incorrect relative to the 
standards of their respective communities. Nonetheless, given that their cognitive 
perspectives are relevantly similar, I claim they will be able to successfully 
communicate with utterances that involve the expression ‘fortnight’. If Sasha tells 
Heath to meet her somewhere in a fortnight, he will try to turn up in four and a half 
days (assuming he wants to); and this exactly what she is trying to get him to do 
when she attempts to communicate. 
 
Another thing to stress is that I think there is good reason to believe that examples 
like the ones I have presented will not be rare occurrences even on social 
externalism. Although I set up the examples using Twin Earth, this feature of the 
examples is not essential. I set things up this way to signal the fact that the Earth and 
Twin Earth environments were near identical and thus minimise noise. But this 
particular kind of example could be set up on Earth. For example, suppose that, in 
England, biscuits are legally classified as small baked goods that turn softer when 
stale. But in Scotland, biscuits are legally classified as those that turn harder when 
stale. Supposing Sasha is English and Harry is Scottish, all Sasha would have to do is 
catch a train to Scotland in order to place herself and Harry in violation of the 
various conditions which make up certain of the Traditional Views when she utters 
sentence tokens which contain the word-form ‘biscuit.’ This kind of situation – in 
which subjects travel through different language communities – must be a fact of our 
everyday lives if social externalism is true. For surely distinct language communities 
which use the same word-forms to express different concepts exist even within the 
same countries and towns. Ludlow (1995) argues to this effect. He argues that the so-
called ‘slow-switching’ cases introduced by Boghossian (1989) will be very 
common. Slow-switching cases are cases in which a subject (without her knowledge) 
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travels to a new language community which uses a familiar word-form to express a 
different concept, and undergoes a gradual change in concepts as she adapts to the 
new environment. When she first arrives in the new community she still expresses 
her old concept with the word-form but, after she has been in the community for a 
while, it becomes the case that she expresses the new community’s concept. Some 
think that such cases will be rare:
192
 we don’t, after all, often find ourselves 
transported to Twin Earth. Ludlow, however, thinks such shifts will be routine. He 
writes, “We routinely move between social groups and institutions, and in many 
cases shifts in the content of our thoughts will not be detected by us. […] Nor are 
these cases even limited to obvious cases of movement. It may occur when we 
routinely cross campus to talk to colleagues in physics or psychology, or even when 
we pay routine visits to our favourite restaurant.”
193
 If this is right, we should 
frequently find ourselves violating the conditions which comprise the Traditional 
Views. And yet, in cases where we occupy a similar cognitive perspective to our 
interlocutor, we will not struggle to get by in these different language communities. 
 
What is wrong with Traditional Views is that they posit additional constraints on 
communicative success which will always be irrelevant to the practical reasons for 
which we communicate. In fact, as we saw above, in some cases these additional 
constraints actually thwarted subjects in achieving their communicative goals. But it 
is just not clear that we communicate for any other reason. Communication appears 
to have purely practical aims, and so long as interlocutors are disposed to employ 
content in similar ways, they will be able to satisfy these practical aims. As such, just 
as communicative success, on the Traditional Views, doesn’t seem to be worth 
achieving, communication failure, on these views, should not be something we 
should be interested in trying to avoid either. Both communicative success and 
failure, on Traditional Views, seem to inhabit some kind of theoretical shadow-world 
which is wholly divorced from our interests and interactions. 
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3.4 The Objection from Communication 
 
In my Argument from Miscommunication, I demonstrated that, at the very least, one 
should add Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective to the conditions which 
comprise Traditional Views. However, what the Argument from Successful 
Communication has shown is that the various conditions which make-up Traditional 
Views (aside from the Theory-Neutral conditions) are not merely insufficient for 
communicative success: they aren’t necessary either. In fact, we have seen that it is 
never required (or sufficient) for communicative success that subjects share content, 
or understand that content correctly. If my second argument succeeds, I think we will 
have good grounds to reject the Objection from Communication levelled against 
Holism in the previous chapter. That argument, recall, included the premise that 
sameness of content is necessary for communicative success – and a weaker version 
claimed that it is sometimes required. However, my Argument from Successful 
Communication has demonstrated that even a social externalist (and, I think, all other 
sociolectical theories) should think that sharing content is never required for 
communicative success. If even views which posit shared content should claim 
sharing content is never required (or, indeed, sufficient) for communicative success, 
then there is little reason for thinking that a Holist should have to endorse a Same 
Content View. Even if my argument can be resisted, I have, at the very least, called 
into question the theoretical utility of claiming that communicative success requires 
shared content. It is not just that Holism can get by without endorsing such the 
requirement but, rather, even sociolectical theories should reject the requirement. In 
the next chapter, I will bolster my defence of Holism by setting out an attractive 
theory of communicative success which the view can endorse. I think the 
combination of my argument in this chapter and the plausibility of my positive view 
should be enough to defeat the Objection from Communication. Indeed, Holism is 
not just defensible in this regard: if my arguments succeed, its theory of 






3.5 From cognitive perspective to understanding 
 
If we combine the conclusions of the two arguments presented above, we get the 
following thesis. 
 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: A communicative exchange will succeed 
iff (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied, and (b) the hearer’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 
cognitive perspective on the content she expressed. 
 
I think we should incorporate Similarity of Cognitive Perspective into the account as 
a Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement. That is: we should replace 
SI-UnderstandingN and Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding. A social 
externalist need not do this. They could accept my argument and yet still maintain 
that an Understanding Requirement which is stated in terms of similarity of cognitive 
perspective is not really an understanding requirement. The trouble with this is that 
their view would then be that understanding is not necessary or (jointly) sufficient 
for communicative success. This sounds significantly more implausible than the 
claim that the correct view of other-directed understanding is the Subject-Sensitive 
Shared Understanding. This is perhaps merely a terminological issue. In what 
follows, I will assume that a social externalist, if she accepts my arguments, will 
endorse the Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement, rather than 
eschewing talk of understanding altogether in favour of talk of cognitive perspective. 
 
Given this, I propose that the social externalist characterise communicative success 
along the following lines: 
 
Subject Sensitive Shared Understanding View: A communicative attempt will 
succeed iff (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied and (b), the 
hearer’s SS-understanding of the content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s 




Once again, I think that the precise way in which Subject-Sensitive Shared 
Understanding should be employed in an account of communicative success is not as 
straightforward as this. To reiterate: in Chapter 4 I will present an account according 
to which communicative success is measured along two kinds of scale – one which 
measures success simpliciter and one which measures success relative to a context. 
 
3.6 Cognitive perspective and subjective rationality 
 
At this point, it is worth comparing my argument to a separate argument aimed 
against social externalism. Social externalism is charged with failing to capture the 
subject’s rational perspective – as a result of this, it appears unable to explain why 
subjects act based on their beliefs and desires. Wikforss argues that some 
externalists, Burge included,
 194
 wish to uphold Frege’s principle, which she states as 
follows: “If it is possible for S to believe that p while doubting q, p and q have a 
different content.”
195
 Externalists who appeal to such a principle do so in order to 
capture the rational perspective of the subject. But Wikforss argues that social 
externalism is incompatible with this principle because of its commitment to partial 
grasp.
 196
 She explains, 
 
If S does not understand the content of her own thoughts, then the fact that 
she takes a different attitude towards p than towards q cannot in itself show 
that the contents are different. That Bert takes a different attitude towards 
“Arthritis is arthritis” than to “Arthritis is a rheumatoid disease of the joints 
only” is explained by appealing to the idea that he fails to see that the two 
thoughts have the same content, not, as Frege’s principle would have it, by 




The problem for social externalism, identified by Wikforss, is that the assumption of 
incomplete understanding renders subjects irrational, just not knowingly so. The 
problem is that, because of the assumption of incomplete understanding, the subject 
cannot discern the logical relations between the contents of her thoughts a priori. She 
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needs to do some empirical investigation to work this out. Most authors will allow 
that subjects are sometimes less than rational. The problem for social externalism is 
that, given that the subject cannot grasp the logical properties of her thoughts a 
priori, she will often draw very simple invalid inferences; or she will fail to draw 
simple valid ones; and she will not be able to correct herself through reflection alone 
even with respect to these very simple mistakes. As Wikforss explains, the resultant 
picture is one on which, “The individual reasons in ways unknown to her and there is 





My two arguments in this chapter bear some similarities to this kind of objection. 
The argument from rationality charges that content, on social externalism, does not 
adequately capture the subject’s rational perspective. Specifically, it cannot explain 
the role of content in capturing the way that an individual subject is disposed to 
reason: it attributes irrationality in cases where we have no reason to think that a 
subject should be deemed less than rational. The present argument also appeals to the 
fact that, on social externalism, subjects are often mistaken as to the logical 
relationships between their thoughts: a subject’s cognitive perspective on the logical 
and representational properties of her thought contents often comes apart from the 
socially-determined logical and representational properties of those contents and it is 
this which causes problems for the social externalist’s account of communicative 
success. We might restate the issue in terms of rationality as follows. Social 
externalism, in effect, cannot explain the coordination of rationality between 
subjects. When communication has been successful, a rational subject should not 
reason from the communicated content in a way that the speaker would deem 
irrational (for example, the hearer should not, upon successfully heeding a warning, 
immediately walk off a cliff). And, conversely, when communication has failed, we 
should not expect even a rational hearer to be able to reason from the communicated 
content in a way which will allow her to reliably comply with the speaker’s 
communicative aims (for example, we would not expect her to turn up at the 
abandoned church unless it was by sheer luck). 
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I have been careful not to state my argument in terms of the rationality of the subject, 
because I do not need to claim anything so strong. The point pressed in my argument 
is not that social externalism cannot capture subjective rationality (although I think 
Wikforss is correct); nor, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, is the issue one of privileged 
access. One further thing to note is that, for the arguments to work, I do not even 
need to claim that social externalism fails to capture a subject’s conceptions. For 
example, my view is compatible with a ‘minimal conception’ of the subject’s point 
of view. This view is suggested by Goldberg (2002). According to this view, we need 
not provide a non-trivial characterization of an agent’s conceptions.
199
 Goldberg 
presents the view as follows: 
 
Let a characterization of an agent’s conception be trivial iff it satisfies the 
following: 
 
(Triv) The characterization of the conception expressed by a speaker’s 
use of an expression E employs (= uses or mentions) that very 




On this view, Alf, for example, conceives of arthritis just as arthritis. Thus, he shares 
this conception with others in his community who possess differing partial grasp. But 
the issue I am pressing is orthogonal to this problem as well: even if Goldberg is 
right that subjects’ conceptions can be minimal, this will not help a social externalist 
to avoid my arguments. For I merely need to appeal to similarities and differences in 
the dispositions of subjects to deploy concepts. And two subjects can share minimal 
conceptions whilst still differing as to these dispositions. For example, this fact 
would be manifest in the dispositional differences between Alf (prior to correction) 
and his doctor, even if they are properly said to conceive of ARTHRITIS in the same 
way. Equally, subjects can possess very similar dispositions whilst differing in their 
minimal conceptions. What I am calling ‘cognitive perspective’ certainly looks like a 
good candidate for what captures a subject’s conceptions. But I do not need to claim 
this in order to make my argument.  
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We can grant that the social externalist can handle these issues – that she can explain 
subjective rationality, privileged access and the subject’s conceptions – and yet the 
problem still remains. The point is that, because socially-individuated content does 
not capture the way that a subject is disposed to reason (rationally or otherwise), it 
cannot adequately explain communicative success and failure. For, as I have tried to 
argue, what is important to communicative success is precisely a coordination of 
interlocutors’ dispositions to reason with a content; but it is a distinctive claim of 
social externalism that content, on the one hand, and our dispositions to employ that 
content, on the other, can, and often do, come apart. 
 
Section 4: A dilemma for social externalism 
 
I have argued that Similarity of Cognitive Perspective states necessary and sufficient 
conditions on communicative success. However, I think that, whether the argument 
is accepted or not, the social externalist is now in a very difficult position. They face 
the following dilemma. On the first horn, suppose they accept the thrust of my two 
arguments and allow that their account of communicative success need appeal only 
to the conditions which comprise Similarity of Cognitive Perspective. The result of 
this is that their account no longer appeals to any Content Relation. That is, neither 
SamConN nor SimConN (nor any intermediary position) is needed in their account 
of communicative success. It is not just that these conditions aren’t necessary, but 
that both sameness of content and similarity of content are never required for 
communicative success on social externalism. This means that the relation between 
the content of the initial state of the speaker and the terminal state of the hearer is 
irrelevant to communicate success on their view. Any old relation can hold between 
these contents and it just won’t make a difference to whether communication 
succeeds. If the social externalist accepts this horn then we can add communication 
to the list of phenomena which mental content is supposed to explain but which 
social externalism must claim it does not explain. It would then join the ranks of 
rationality, mental causation and privileged access as embarrassments to social 
externalism. Of course, social externalists will think that they have responses to at 
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least some of these issues. But many of their internalist rivals simply do not face 
these problems in the first place.  
 
If the social externalist tries to resist my arguments, she will find herself on the 
second horn of the dilemma. There are different degrees to which the social 
externalist can reject the arguments. Suppose she tries to maintain one of the Fully-
Traditional Views, such as LVC or CVC, and claim that similarity of cognitive 
perspective is irrelevant to communicative success. This would be to land herself 
with an objectionably poor theory of communicative success. The resultant account 
surely does not accord with our pretheoretical judgments as to the success of 
exchanges, nor with plausible principles as to the aims of communicative attempts. 
This option, I think, would simply divorce communicative success from the practical 
aims of communication. And, as I have stressed above, it is not clear what other aims 
communication might have. There are, of course, intermediary positions that the 
social externalist could try to occupy. They could, for example, allow that 
coordination of cognitive perspectives is sometimes but not always required (and 
sometimes, but not always, jointly sufficient). This would be to try and defend one of 
the Semi-Traditional Views. There are two problems with doing this, however. The 
first is that, although I have not shown this conclusively above, I have given good 
reason to believe that any case in which cognitive perspectives are not coordinated 
will be a situation in which the hearer is not in a position to satisfy the only purpose 
for which the speaker communicated. Thus, a theory which tries to claim that some 
communicative attempts succeed in the absence of coordination of cognitive 
perspectives will likely give some implausible diagnoses as to the success and failure 
of communicative attempts. The other problem is that, even if a motivation can be 
found for doing this in some cases, the resultant view appears rather disjointed: it 
claims that sometimes a Content Relation must be satisfied, sometimes it need not be; 
sometimes cognitive perspectives must be coordinated, sometimes they need not be, 
etc. These last options might not seem so bad if competing theories of content were 
also committed to similarly problematic accounts. However, as I will show in the 
next chapter, Holism is excellently placed to offer an account of communicative 
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success which both respects the considerations which motivate my arguments and 
gives mental content a central role in facilitating communicative success.  
 
It should be noted that, although the arguments presented in this chapter proceeded 
on the assumption of social externalism, similar arguments can be constructed for all 
theories of content. This would simply require altering the way in which the 
examples are presented. Crucially for our purposes, the consequences of the 
arguments will differ depending on which theory of content is assumed. Successfully 
arguing for Similarity of Cognitive Perspective, on social externalism, entails that the 
Content Relation is never relevant to communicative success. But arguing for 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective, on Holism, entails a version of SimConN. This 
is because, on Holism, content perfectly tracks cognitive perspective (and Subject-
Sensitive Understanding). I think it is interesting that it is in pursuit of a communal 
language that social externalists allow mental content and understanding to come 
apart. But it is because they allow this that they face the dilemma. The shared 
language which looks like it should be so good at facilitating communicative success 
is actually the feature of their view which creates the problems they face when 
attempting to explain communication. 
 
Section 5: Chapter Summary 
 
There were two main purposes of this chapter. One was to motivate the claim that 
similarity of cognitive perspective must play a central role in an account of 
communicative success. The other was to show that motivating this claim allows us 
to pose a dilemma for social externalism (and other sociolectical theories like it). I 
began by summarising the kinds of view that my arguments stand in opposition to. 
These views I labelled ‘Traditional Views’. Traditional Views are views which deny 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective. I gave two examples of these kinds of views: the 
Liberal View of Communicative Success and the Conservative View of 
Communicative Success. There are also Traditional Views which allow that 
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coordination of cognitive perspectives in sometimes (but not always) relevant to 
success. 
 
I then began my argument. The argument proceeded in three steps. In the first step, I 
argued that it was necessary for communicative success that the hearer’s cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps be similar to the speaker’s cognitive 
perspective on the content she expressed. I called this, the Argument from 
Miscommunication. In the second step, I argued that it is sufficient for 
communicative success that (alongside satisfaction of the Theory-Neutral conditions) 
the hearer and speaker occupy similar cognitive perspectives. I called this the 
Argument from Successful Communication. One consequence of this second 
argument is that, on social externalism, sharing content is never required for 
communicative success. As such, we lose motivation for the Objection from 
Communication levelled against Holism in Chapter 2. In the third step of the 
argument, I claimed that the arguments presented in the first two steps, taken 
together, present social externalism with a dilemma. If the arguments are successful, 
the result is that the Content Relation is never relevant to communicative success on 
social externalism: which relation holds between the content expressed by the 
speaker and the content grasped by the hearer makes no difference to the success or 
failure of a communicative attempt. If the social externalist attempts to resist my 
arguments, she will be forced to adopt an unattractive picture of communicative 
success which fails to respect both our pretheoretic intuitions and some plausible 
principles about the practical aims of communicative success. 
 
In the next chapter, I will present my positive theory of communicative success. We 
will see that, although social externalism should not appeal to SimConN, Holism can 
provide an extremely attractive theory of communicative success based on this 
condition. The aim of this chapter was not just to present social externalism with a 
dilemma, but to demonstrate the central role of cognitive perspective, and the 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement based on it, in facilitating 
communicative success. The account of communicative success that I propose in the 
following chapter will not face either horn of the dilemma which faces sociolectical 
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theories: it will provide a picture of communicative success which both respects the 
intuitions brought out in the examples as to the role of cognitive perspective in 





Chapter 4: A Holist account of communicative success 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the views of communicative success available 
to the social externalist are surprisingly implausible: either they render the 
relationship between the content grasped by the hearer and expressed by the speaker 
irrelevant to communicative success or they force us to accept implausible diagnoses 
as to the success and failure of communicative attempts. I urged that what is 
important to communicative success is the coordination of cognitive perspectives. I 
suggested that the best way for the social externalist to incorporate cognitive 
perspective into her account of communicative success would be to employ it as a 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement. This result is good for the 
Holist for two reasons. Firstly, objections to Holism from communication are 
premised on the claim that sharing content is necessary for communicative success 
(or at least sometimes required). If even sociolectical theories should not appeal to 
shared content in their theory of communicative success, then it is not clear why this 
should be demanded of Holism. As such, the objection loses its bite. Secondly, the 
kind of understanding which, I argued, is in fact required for communicative success 
is determined by the exact same base as that which determines mental content on the 
Holist theory. That is, subjective-sensitive understanding can be understood as being 
determined by conceptual-role. As we will see, this means that, unlike social 
externalism, Holism can appeal directly to content in its explanation of 
communicative success without giving implausible diagnoses as to which 
communicative attempts count as successful and which do not. As such, the Holist’s 
theory of communicative success, far from being defective, is actually considerably 
more attractive than any theory of communication available to the social externalist. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out my positive Holist view of communicative 
success. I will call this the ‘Holist View of Communicative Success’. When I 
presented conceptual-role as a subject-sensitive theory of understanding in Chapter 2, 
I explained that it needn’t be thought of as a kind of narrow content or as playing a 
content-individuating role. However, it can be thought of in precisely this way. And, 
as I will demonstrate, if thought of as such it provides us with an attractive picture of 
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communicative success which allows mental content to take centre stage. In what 
follows, I will be employing conceptual-role as a theory of content and a theory of 
(dispositional) understanding. However, much of what I say about conceptual-role 
can also be endorsed by the social externalist who accepts the first horn of the 
dilemma presented in Chapter 3. Rather than endorsing conceptual-role semantics as 
a theory of both mental content and understanding, they should adopt it as merely a 
theory of understanding.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I will differentiate the account of 
conceptual-role as a theory of content individuation from the account of conceptual-
role as a mere theory of understanding. In Section 2, I will begin to present my 
positive account. The positive account is a version of the Similar Content View 
introduced in Chapter 2. Its central thesis is that communication between subjects 
succeeds to the degree that content is similar across those subjects. However, I will 
also introduce a notion of success relative to a context which is employed to assess 
whether a communicative attempt succeeds to the degree required by the particular 
communicative aims of interlocutors. In Section 3, I will present and respond to an 
objection from Fodor and Lepore. This is the objection that the Holist cannot provide 
a criterion for similarity of meaning. In section 4, I will explain how my response to 
Fodor and Lepore motivates a complication of the account such that it recognises 
more subtle similarities and differences between contents which are relevant to 
communicative success. In section 5, I will describe how my view relates to various 
theses about concept acquisition and conceptual structure. In Section 6, I will set out 
the theses which comprise the Holist View of Communicative Success. 
 
Section 1: Theories of content individuation vs. theories of understanding 
 
In Chapter 2, I characterised subject-sensitive understanding (‘SS-understanding’) in 
terms of a subject’s cognitive perspective on the conceptual, inferential and 
representational properties of her concepts and contents. I claimed that a conceptual-
role theory of understanding would be a subject-sensitive theory. On certain theories 
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of content such as social externalism (and other sociolectical theories), a subject’s 
cognitive perspective on these properties and relations can be incorrect: it may 
diverge from the actual conceptual, inferential and representational properties of her 
contents and concepts as individuated by the public language. A social externalist 
may employ a conceptual-role theory in her account of communicative success by 
endorsing a Subject-Sensitive Understanding Requirement – although they should, of 
course, do this without allowing conceptual-role to play a content-individuating role. 
However, one can also use it to construct a theory of narrow content. In Chapter 1, I 
surveyed various ways in which authors have done this and presented my preferred 
version of the theory: Holism. The theory which I defend in this project claims that 
mental content and other-directed understanding are both determined by conceptual-
role. This approach mirrors the approach taken by the social externalist’s Liberal 
View of Communicative Success (LVC) from the previous chapter. Holism and LVC 
both claim that mental content and other-directed understanding are determined by 
the same factor, they just disagree as to what this factor is: LVC claimed that the 
determining factor was the language community, whereas Holism claims that it is 
(internal) conceptual-role. The structure of an account of communicative success 
upon which conceptual-role is considered to be content-individuating is much the 
same as the structure of the account of communicative success which takes 
conceptual-role to merely determine SS-understanding. It is the latter account which 
I think a social externalist should endorse. However, there are some differences 
between the two approaches. I turn to these now. 
 
An externalist who appeals to SS-understanding in their account of communicative 
success might try to maintain that it is (wide) mental content, and not SS-
understanding (and, with it, cognitive perspective), that captures the rationality of the 
subject. On Holism, by contrast, the cognitive perspective captured by SS-
understanding (and by content) will properly characterise the rational perspective of 
the subject. The conceptual, inferential and representational properties that a subject 
cognizes her contents and concepts to have just are the conceptual, inferential and 
representational properties of her contents and concepts: the subjective dimension of 
rationality exhausts rationality. A further difference is that, on Holism, a subject’s 
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own mental content, on the one hand, and that subject’s understanding of her own 
mental content (in the SS-understanding sense), on the other, can no longer come 
apart in the way characteristic of the theory which combines social externalism with 
SS-understanding. On Holism, a subject’s SS-understanding perfectly tracks her own 
mental content. With these differences in mind, I now turn to presenting my positive 
account. I will begin presenting this account in Section 2. As the chapter unfolds, the 
basic theses which comprise the account will be developed, and a final statement of 
the view will be presented in Section 6. A social externalist who wishes to appeal to 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding in their account of communicative success 
can endorse a version of the account that I present providing they simply drop the 
claim that conceptual-role determines mental content. As stressed in the previous 
chapter, the cost of doing so is that the social externalist must then claim that the 
relationship between the mental content of the speaker and hearer is irrelevant to 
communicative success. 
 
Section 2: Holism and communicative success 
 
2.1 Holism, the Content Relation, and the Understanding Requirement 
 
As will be familiar from Chapter 1, holism about utterance or thought content is the 
view that the content of a thought (or meaning of an expression) is determined by 
that content’s (expression’s) conceptual relations to all other contents (expressions) 
in a subject’s conceptual web (language). The version of the view which I am 
defending in this project is characterised by the following three theses: 
 
A) Content internalism: for any subject, the content of her thoughts and concepts 
is individuated solely by factors intrinsic to that subject. 
B) Conceptual-role semantics: the content of a thought or concept for a subject is 
fully determined (or constituted) by that content or concept’s conceptual-role 
in the subject’s cognitive economy. Conceptual-role is determined by a 
content or concept’s causal relations to other contents or concepts in that 
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subject’s cognitive economy, and includes relations to sensory inputs, 
behavioural outputs, imaginings, memories, etc. 
C) Holism about conceptual-role: the content of a thought or concept for a 
subject is determined (or constituted) by that content or concept’s causal 
relations to all other contents or concepts in that subject’s cognitive economy 
(including its relations to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, imaginings, 
memories etc.).  
 
On the present approach, the relationship between conceptual-role, SS-
Understanding and mental content is such that both mental content and a subject’s 
understanding of that content are determined by conceptual-role. Because of this, 
mental content and SS-understanding perfectly track each other such that mental 
content is similar just when SS-understanding is similar, and to the very same degree. 
This will be so both when comparing two contents across subjects and when 
comparing two contents within a single subject. Mental content and SS-
understanding are just two sides of the same coin: a hearer will entertain a similar 
content to a speaker just when that hearer understands the content she entertains in a 
similar way to how the speaker understands the distinct content that she (the speaker) 
entertains. 
 
On Holism, any change in a subject’s SS-understanding will determine a change in 
her mental content. However, there are different ways in which SS-understanding 
can affect a subject’s conceptual web. This is because, in addition to SS-
understanding her own thoughts and utterances, a subject can also attempt to SS-
understand another interlocutor’s thoughts and utterances. The former kind of 
understanding I call ‘self-directed SS-understanding’. The latter kind of 
understanding I call ‘other-directed SS-understanding’. This distinction will be 
familiar from Chapter 2. Acts of other-directed SS-understanding are performed by a 
subject in order to form hypotheses about what her interlocutors might mean by their 
utterances and thoughts, but such hypotheses need not affect how that subject 
understands her own thoughts to the same degree that her own self-directed SS-
understanding does so. These other-directed acts of SS-understanding will usually 
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affect a subject’s own conceptual web very slightly. This is simply a consequence of 
the Instability Thesis which, recall, states that any change, however minute, in a 
subject’s conceptual web will result in a change in all concepts and contents within 
that web. The result is that forming new beliefs about the utterances and thoughts of 
others will alter one’s own conceptual web and thus will alter all concepts within it. 
But these changes will usually be rather minor. For example, if a subject, A, forms 
the new belief THAT DOGS ARE ROBOTSA, this will significantly affect the subject’s 
own DOGA concept (if, for example, she previously believed that dogs are animals 
and that animals are not robots, etc.). For example, she will now be disposed to make 
an inference from X IS A DOGA to X IS A ROBOTA. Contrastingly, forming the belief that 
someone else believes THAT DOGS ARE ROBOTSA will not affect her own DOGA concept 
to the same extent: it will not significantly alter the conceptual-role of her DOGA 
concept. In the second case, the subject will not be disposed to infer from X IS A DOGA 
to X IS A ROBOTA. 
 
As already noted, a Holist account of communicative success should not adopt 
Necessity of Sameness of Content as part of their view. Sharing content would, 
strictly speaking, be sufficient for communicative success on Holism (assuming 
satisfaction of any further conditions on success). This is because satisfaction of 
SamConN will entail satisfaction of the various similarity-based conditions which I 
will outline below. Nonetheless, the necessary condition stated in SamConN is never, 
even in principle, satisfied on Holism and thus would be an untenable thesis for the 
theory (and, as I have suggested, all theories) to endorse.
201
 As such, Holism should 
adopt some version of the weaker thesis, Necessity of Similarity of Content, 
introduced in Chapter 2 as a competing specification of the Content Relation. 
 
Necessity of Similarity of Content (SimConN) – A communicative attempt 
will succeed only if the content of the terminal state of the hearer is similar to 
the content of the initial state of the speaker. 
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As such, the Holist’s view is a Similar Content View of communicative success. In 
addition to SimConN, we also must include an Understanding Requirement. Here, of 
course, I will adopt the Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding approach from 
Chapter 2. On this view, understanding is similar when cognitive perspectives are 
similar. Acts of understanding will be successful when the hearer’s Subject-Sensitive 
Understanding is similar to the speaker’s as a result of the communicative exchange. 
 
The act of understanding itself, on this picture, is the process whereby the hearer 
assigns an interpretation to the speaker’s utterance as an item of mental content. This 
process will involve the hearer mapping the lexical items which comprise the 
speaker’s utterance onto concepts in her own idiolect, where these concepts will 
compose to form a content which is her (the hearer’s) mental representation of the 
speaker’s utterance. How she represents this content will be determined by her 
dispositional understanding, which is itself to be understood in terms of conceptual-
role: the way that a hearer is disposed to understand a given utterance is determined 
by the conceptual-role of the concepts which form her representation of the speaker’s 
utterance. In addition to this, understanding will require that the hearer grasps the 
compositional structure of the speaker’s utterance; this determines how concepts are 
combined to form a sentential content with a particular conceptual-role. The 
conceptual-role of the content grasped by the hearer will also be affected by how the 
hearer computes any pragmatic implicatures intended by the speaker, and how she 
enriches, or alters, the content based on contextual information. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, for simplicity, I largely set aside the role of pragmatic processes in 
communicative exchanges. The following is an initial attempt at a characterisation of 
the hearer’s process of act-understanding of her interlocutor. 
 
Act Understanding: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the 
hearer’s act of understanding is such that the hearer selects an interpretation 
of the content expressed by the speaker by (a) mapping the lexical items 
which comprise the speaker’s utterance onto concepts in her own idiolect, (b) 
combining these to form a content based on her grasp of the utterance’s 
compositional structure, and (c) taking into account relevant background and 
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contextual information which determine pragmatic implicatures and 
enrichments of the content. 
 
When combined with SimConN, the result of a successful act of understanding will 
be that the content that the hearer grasps is similar to the content expressed by the 
speaker in the two subjects’ respective cognitive economies. That is, the two contents 
will have similar conceptual-roles: they will participate in similar inferences and the 
concepts which comprise them will bear similar conceptual relations to other 
concepts in each subject’s respective conceptual webs. On the present proposal, Act 
Understanding is a means of satisfying SimConN.
202
 We can incorporate it into our 
statement of this condition to give the following view of communicative success: 
 
Similar Content Via Understanding – A communicative attempt will succeed 
only if (a) the content of the terminal state of the hearer is similar to the 
content of the initial state of the speaker and (b) the content of this terminal 
state is arrived at via a process of Act Understanding. 
 
This thesis is stronger than our initial statement of the SimConN because it specifies 
that content must be recovered in a particular way: via an act of understanding which 
involves a mapping of the content expressed by the speaker into the hearer’s idiolect. 
It rules out cases in which the hearer grasps the right content but by accident, or by 
some act of God.  
 
There are at least two ways in which a hearer can achieve a successful mapping. In 
cases where the speaker and hearer are in (rough) agreement as to the correct way to 
understand a given expression, this mapping will be straightforward. However, two 
subjects can communicate despite possessing divergent understandings of the correct 
way to interpret an expression providing that the hearer is aware of this difference 
between them. In such a case, the hearer will hold a kind of mental ‘file’ on her 
interlocutor’s understanding of a given expression. This will allow her to understand 
the speaker’s divergent conception by mapping it onto items in her own idiolect 
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which capture this alternative conception. This will require the hearer to map the 
lexical items which comprise the speaker’s utterance onto concepts in the hearer’s 
idiolect which she might not ordinarily express using the same word-forms. These 
mental files that a hearer can hold on a speaker’s understanding of an expression, I 





When a speaker, S, hypothesises that a hearer, H, understands a word-form, p, 
differently to the way that S herself would understand p, I will say that S holds a 
profile on H’s understanding of p (or, on the content of p for H). In many 
communicative exchanges, it is not necessary to hold profiles on the content of our 
interlocutors’ understandings of their thoughts and utterances. This is because, 
oftentimes, the differences in content are very minute, or simply irrelevant to the 
communicative goal at hand (more on this below). However, as will become clear, 
the ability to hold profiles on the SS-understanding of other interlocutors can be 
crucial to communicative success. The existence of profiling should be 
uncontroversial even to non-Holists. Some of Burge’s remarks indicate that he thinks 
that profiling is sometimes involved in communication. For example, he writes, after 
considering a number of cases in which speakers suffer from errors in their 
understanding of a concept: 
 
Both sorts of cases illustrate that in reporting a single attitude content, we 
typically suggest (implicate, perhaps) that the subject has a range of other 
attitudes that are normally associated with it. Some of these may provide 
reasons for it. In both sorts of cases, it is usually important to keep track of, 
and often to make explicit, the nature and extent of the subject’s deviance. 
Otherwise, predictions and evaluations of his thought and action, based on 




We have seen in the previous chapter that failure to recognise a subject’s deviant 
conceptions can indeed lead to such predictions going awry. Because of the role that 
                                                 
203
 Burge (1979) 91 
162 
 
profiles can play in facilitating communicative success between two subjects who 
disagree substantially as to the meaning of a given word-form, a hearer can grasp a 
similar content to that of a speaker who has a deviant understanding providing she 
possesses a profile on the speaker’s understanding. Given the role of profiles in 
communicative success, there are two ways in which a hearer might grasp the right 
(the similar) content. It must be the case that either (a), the content grasped by the 
hearer is similar to the content of the initial state of the speaker because they each 
possess similar self-directed SS-understanding. Or (b), in cases in which the hearer 
and speaker differ significantly as to their self-directed SS-understanding of what is 
communicated, the hearer must hold a profile on the speaker’s SS-understanding of 
the content expressed. This consists in other-directed SS-understanding which is 
similar in conceptual-role to that of the speaker’s self-directed SS-understanding of 
the particular word-forms. 
 
In cases in which the hearer does not have reason to think that the speaker has an 
especially idiosyncratic understanding of the content expressed, she will map the 
expressions which comprise the speaker’s utterance directly into concepts of her own 
idiolect which she would express with the same word-forms. For example, if the 
speaker’s utterance contains a token of the word-form ‘cat’, the hearer will map this 
directly onto her CATH concept. In such cases, the hearer’s other-directed 
understanding is just the same as (or highly similar to) her own self-directed 
understanding of whichever content she would express with the same word-forms. In 
cases in which the hearer holds a profile on the speaker’s understanding of the 
content expressed, the hearer will map the lexical items which comprise the 
speaker’s utterance into this profile instead, where the profile will contain a 
specification (in the hearer’s idiolect) of the way in which the speaker understands 
the word-forms involved in the utterance. For example, if the hearer believes that the 
speaker applies ‘cat’ to overstuffed pieces of furniture, she will map ‘cat’ onto 
OVERSTUFFED PIECE OF FURNITUREH instead of CATH . This practice will be quite 
commonplace. To take a less artificial example, consider that a large number of 
English speakers believe that the expression ‘nonplussed’ means the same thing as 
‘unimpressed’, when – at least according to experts – it really means the same thing 
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as ‘confused’. If a hearer who is aware of its proper meaning converses with a 
speaker who she knows to possess the common misconception, she will map the 
speaker’s use of ‘nonplussed’ onto her (the hearer’s) UNIMPRESSEDH concept rather 
than to her own NONPLUSSEDH concept, where this latter concept has a similar 
conceptual-role to her (the hearer’s) CONFUSEDH concept. Sometimes a hearer will be 
able to work out that this is the proper way to interpret a speaker even without 
possessing prior beliefs as to the way that speaker uses the word. She might be able 
to work this out just from the context. For example, suppose a stranger utters (1), 
 
(1) Olympic gymnast McKayla Maroney is known for looking nonplussed. 
 
If the hearer has relevant knowledge about the subject named in the utterance 
(namely, that there is a famous photo of her looking disappointed with her silver 
medal), she will be able to work out that the more likely proper interpretation of the 
speaker’s utterance would map ‘nonplussed’ to UNIMPRESSEDH and not to 
NONPLUSSEDH (or CONFUSEDH). Given this mapping, the conceptual-role (and thus the 
content) of NONPLUSSEDS in the speaker and UNIMPRESSEDH in the hearer will be 
similar, and communication can succeed.  
 
There are a couple of things which should be noted about profiles before moving on 
to developing the Holist’s account of communicative success. The first is that, in the 
vast majority of cases, it will be not be necessary to hold profiles on our 
interlocutors’ understanding of particular word-forms. Rather, we operate with the 
default assumption that understanding is similar unless we have reason to believe 
otherwise. This assumption is reasonable given that we all learn language in a similar 
environment from those who train us to use language in a way which largely 
conforms with community practice. And, as Rapaport and Jorgensen have argued, 
the more we communicate, the more similar our general linguistic practices will 
become. The second thing to note is that the possession of profiles on a speaker’s 
understanding of a word-form might more often be the result of a series of exchanges 
rather than something which precedes the first exchange with that speaker. 
Oftentimes – especially when speaking to people we have not met before – we will 
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not hold special profiles on what they mean by a word-form. Rather, we enter into 
new conversations with the default assumption of similarity in play until we are 
given reason to suspect deviance on the part of our interlocutor. Recall from Chapter 
2 the process of negotiation described by Rapaport. Negotiation begins when we are 
confronted with a deviant or unexpected response from an interlocutor. It can result 
in us coming to an agreement as to how to understand a given word-form; but it can 
also result in the holding of more accurate profiles on the understanding of our 
interlocutors when disagreement cannot be resolved. That is, through our continued 
attempts to communicate, we can improve our other-directed understanding of 
speakers with deviant understandings of particular word-forms. We may also realise 
well after a conversation has taken place that a particular profile should be held on an 
interlocutor and thus reinterpret previous exchanges in light of this. 
 
By way of a further dig at would-be defenders of LVC, it is not clear that they can 
account for the role of profiles in communicative success in the same way that they 
account for other-directed understanding of content which is correctly understood (in 
the subject-insensitive sense). Consider that, on social externalism, where a subject 
possesses a quite idiosyncratic concept (that is, one that calls for attribution of an 
idiosyncratic concept instead of the community concept), we will surely 
misunderstand her if we rely on SI-understanding (that is, if we rely on 
understanding which is individuated by appeal to public linguistic norms). The 
content that the public language would assign to her utterance will involve 
community concepts and not her own idiosyncratic concepts. Suppose that a hearer 
knows of the speaker’s misconception. In such a case, there is an obvious sense in 
which the hearer can understand her interlocutor only by disregarding the public 
linguistic norms. For example, suppose the idiosyncratic speaker means (or behaves 
as if she means) something like ORANGE JUICE by her utterance of ‘Orang-utan’, and 
suppose that the hearer knows this. When the speaker utters ‘I drank an Orang-utan 
at breakfast’, a hearer’s SI-understanding of the utterance will result in her assigning 
an incorrect interpretation of the content of the belief that the speaker intended to 
express. The hearer can only understand the speaker by mapping ‘Orang-utan’ to her 
(the hearer’s) ORANGE JUICE concept. Thus, LVC must appeal to a different kind of 
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utterance understanding for cases in which communicative success requires the 
profiling of others. But now they may need to appeal to a different kind of 
understanding for one or more of the following three cases: (a) self-directed 
understanding of one’s own concepts (that is, conceptual mastery as set out in 
Chapter 2), (b) other-directed understanding of a subject with grasp of a community 
concept, and (c) other-directed understanding of a subject who possesses an 
idiosyncratic concept.
204
 Contrastingly, Holism appeals to the same kind of 
understanding (that is, it appeals just to conceptual-role) to account for all three of 
these phenomena. 
 
To summarise the account so far: successful communication requires (a) that the 
hearer grasp a similar content to that expressed by the speaker and (b) that she 
recover this content via an act of SS-understanding. This act involves the mapping of 
the lexical items which comprise the speaker’s utterance into concepts in the hearer’s 
idiolect (it will also require that the hearer grasps the compositional structure of the 
speaker’s utterance, that content grasped is appropriately pragmatically enriched in 
accordance with contextual information, and that the hearer recognise any pragmatic 
implicatures intended by the speaker). The act of understanding will succeed when 
the conceptual-role of the content in the hearer’s idiolect is, as a result of the 
mapping, similar to the conceptual-role of the content in the speaker’s idiolect. This 
will be so when the two interlocutors share similar dispositional understandings of 
the respective contents grasped and expressed. There are two ways in which a hearer 
can achieve a successful mapping. In cases where the speaker’s self-directed SS-
understanding of the content expressed and hearer’s self-directed SS-understanding 
of the content grasped are similar, the hearer can directly map the lexical items which 
comprise the communicated content into her own idiolect. In cases in which the 
hearer supposes the speaker to have a divergent self-directed SS-understanding to her 
own, she will map the content into a profile she holds on the way in which the 
speaker understands the word-forms which comprise the utterance. If this profile 
(that is, her dispositional other-directed SS-understanding) contains concepts with a 
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similar conceptual-role to the speaker’s self-directed SS-understanding of the content 
expressed, communication can succeed. 
 
This basic version of the Similar Content View so far appeals to some unspecified 
notion of conceptual similarity. Two contents can be more or less similar to each 
other. As such, the Similar Content View needs to state how much similarity is 
required for communicative success. There are a number of ways in which an 
account of communicative success can be constructed out of this basic picture 
depending on how we cash-out this appeal to similarity. One way would be to claim 
that there is some threshold of similarity beyond which communication succeeds. 
Another way would be to claim that, as similarity of content (and understanding) 
comes in degrees, so too does communicative success. In fact, I think the most 
attractive account of communicative success is one which appeals to a mixture of 
these two approaches. In Section 2.3, I present these three approaches.  In addition to 
the question of the structure of the Similar Content View, there is also a question as 
to what conceptual similarity consists in on the Holist’s view. In Section 3, I provide 
a criterion for similarity of meaning which the Holist can appeal to in her account. 
 
2.3 Three kinds of Similar Content View 
 
2.3.1 A threshold view 
 
On a threshold version of a Similar Content View, a version of SimConN can be 
employed as a necessary condition on communicative success. It would look 
something like the following: 
 
Similar Content Threshold: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the 
degree of similarity between the content of the terminal state of the hearer 
and the content of the initial state of the speaker exceeds n degrees. 
 
As it is stated, the threshold view suffers from the problem of determining where 
exactly the threshold lies. It is surely the case that the threshold would be vague but, 
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even granting this, how are we to decide where the correct place to mark the fuzzy 
boundary between success and failure lies? A further issue with the view – one 
which may have struck the reader when considering LVC in the previous chapter – is 
that communicative success does not appear to be best understood as a binary notion. 
Typically, we do not treat communication as something which either succeeds or 
fails. But, rather, it is something that we can do more or less well, and something we 
can improve through successive attempts. Furthermore, it seems that different 
contexts can be more or less demanding when it comes to assessing whether an 
exchange was successful. A more plausible version of the threshold view – which is 
available to Holism, but not LVC – would be a view which makes degree n context-
sensitive such that the position of the threshold is, in part, reliant on the context of 
utterance: specifically, it will be reliant on the particular communicative aims of 
interlocutors. However, although this view avoids positing any arbitrary boundaries, 
as it is stated above, it still does not respect the apparent gradability of content, 
understanding and success. As such, the Holist might prefer a view which claims that 
communicative success itself comes in degrees. I turn to this view now. 
 
2.3.2 A degrees of success view 
 
On a degrees of success view, it is no longer appropriate to characterise the Content 
Relation as stating a necessary (or jointly sufficient) condition on communicative 
success (although, there may be a minimal necessary condition, entailed by the view, 
that requires some degree of similarity of content between subjects). On this picture 
content similarity plays a different role. It offers us a picture upon which 
communicative success itself comes in degrees. A low degree of similarity of content 
between two interlocutors would facilitate a low degree of communicative success; a 
high degree of conceptual similarity would facilitate a high degree of communicative 
success; but there is no such thing as the degree of similarity of content necessary (or 




Similar Content Degrees: Communication succeeds to the degree, n, that the 
content of the terminal state in the hearer (grasped via an act of SS-
understanding) is similar to the initial state of the speaker. 
 
This view looks preferable to the threshold view because it avoids any worries about 
arbitrary boundaries. On the degrees of success view, we can make sense of the idea 
that, in some cases, we may be said to have been somewhat successful in our 
communicative attempts, even though the elimination of further misunderstanding 
would have resulted in us being even more successful. 
 
One consequence of the degrees of success view is that, unlike the threshold view, 
we never strictly speaking fully succeed in communicating. This is because we can 
never fully share content. Rather, as we communicate, we asymptotically increase 
our understanding of each others’ conceptual webs. Fortunately, our inability to 
perfectly communicate simply does not matter for our communicative goals. Recall 
from Chapter 2 that, as Rapaport stresses, minor misunderstandings can simply be 
ignored. In fact, as I will explain later in this project, in some contexts even quite 
major misunderstandings might not prevent the fulfilment of a particular 
communicative aim. Where misunderstanding affects communicative success, it can 
often be identified and resolved through negotiation to a point where it no longer 
hinders our communicative aims. It seems that completely mutual, or even very 
highly similar, understanding would be supererogatory to our communicative aims. 
 
2.3.3 A combination view 
 
There is something plausible about both Similar Content Degrees and the context-
sensitive version of Similar Content Threshold. As such, I think the best way to 
understand communicative success is to combine the two views above. This is the 
approach which I will advocate. On this combination view, the degrees of success 
aspect would measure communicative success simpliciter. In addition, the threshold 
would then be employed to measure whether a communicative attempt was 
sufficiently successful relative to a particular purpose of the attempt. So, given a 
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particular context, an attempt might not require a very high degree of success 
simpliciter. As such, it would count as a low degree of success simpliciter, but might 
yet be considered highly successful relative to the threshold required by the 
particular context. Similarly, an exchange might involve a high degree of success 
simpliciter and yet still fail to count as success for a particular purpose if the context 
is particularly demanding. It is also possible that the same exchange could be 
considered a success with respect to one purpose of communication and a failure 
with respect to another despite occupying only one point on the success simpliciter 
scale. The basic idea is that, the greater the degree of success simpliciter, the fewer 
contexts there are in which things can go wrong. As success is just measured in terms 
of conceptual similarity, the same thing goes for concepts and conceptual webs: the 
more similar two subjects’ concepts (or conceptual webs) are, the fewer contexts 
there are in which communication can fail between them. 
 
In my presentation of the view so far, I have been helping myself to the notion of 
conceptual similarity. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a serious 
question as to whether a Holist can make sense of the notion of conceptual similarity 
on her view. Fodor and Lepore object that the Holist cannot provide a criterion for 
similarity of meaning. And, if this is so, my account of communicative success will 
be a non-starter. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present Fodor and Lepore’s 
objection and offer a response. In doing so, I will introduce a further way in which 
the account so far presented must be complicated. I will argue that this complication 
should be welcomed. 
 
Section 3: Conceptual similarity  
 
Fodor and Lepore argue that the Holist cannot provide criteria for similarity of 
meaning between concepts without presupposing some notion of meaning identity. 
The problem can be set up as a dilemma for the Holist: either she must appeal to 
some unexplained notion of meaning similarity, in which case her account is 
mysterious, or she must fall back on the notion of content identity and hence abandon 
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her Holism. This is a relatively old problem for the Holist; it was first presented by 
Fodor and Lepore (1992). Since then it has been pressed by Fodor, sometimes with 
Lepore, in a number of places.
205
 In what follows, I will first set out the problem; I 
will then outline some responses in the literature (from Paul Churchland and Tim 
Schroeder) and explain why they are not available to the Holist. Finally, I will offer 
my own response. 
 
3.1 The Objection 
 
In their (1991) Fodor and Lepore (henceforth, ‘FL’) take themselves to have 
established that holists must abandon the content identity thesis. I present this as 
follows: 
 
Content Identity: For any two non-identical speakers, S1 and S2, there is 




As I explained in Chapter 1, there are holists who argue that they can maintain 
Content Identity, but my own version of Holism willingly abandons it. In fact, as I 
have argued, it is in part because Holism abandons Content Identity that it enjoys 
such a plausible view of communication. Most authors – holist or otherwise – who 
give up on Content Identity think that any potential costs incurred can be avoided by 
simply replacing this notion with a notion of content similarity.
207
 Those who 
endorse Holism will adopt the following thesis: 
 
Content Similarity: Although no two concepts possessed by non-identical 
speakers, S1 and S2, are identical, any two concepts, C1 in S1 and C2 in S2, 
can be compared for similarity. 
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FL (1992) present an objection to the claim that holists can endorse Content 
Similarity. Their objection is that there is no workable definition of conceptual 
similarity available to the Holist.
208
 They argue that any explication of conceptual 
similarity must presuppose a robust notion of conceptual identity – that is, a notion 
which is defined for more than just the case of identical networks – and Holism 
denies that there is such a thing. 
 
To introduce the problem, FL consider that license for optimism regarding the task of 
developing a notion of conceptual similarity might come from the fact that we 
frequently and unproblematically talk of similarities and differences between the 
beliefs of two non-identical subjects. They then consider that one might explain what 
it is for two speakers to have similar concepts in a way analogous to how one 
explains what it is for two speakers to have similar beliefs. However, as FL 
demonstrate, the conceptual similarity case is not analogous to our everyday 
understanding of belief similarity. One can tease two objections out of FL’s critique 
of the analogy. The first is that the belief similarity model is actually a model of what 
it is for two subjects to possess similar belief sets, rather than a model of what it is 
for two subjects to possess particular beliefs which are similar. FL write: 
 
No doubt, one does know (sort of) what it is like to more or less believe the 
same things as the President does; it’s to share many of the President’s 
beliefs. For example, the President believes P, Q, R, and S, and I believe P, Q, 
and R; so my beliefs are similar to his. An alternative, compatible reading is: 
the President believes P and Q very strongly and I believe them equally 
strongly or almost as strongly, so again my beliefs are similar to his. But 
neither of these ways of construing belief similarity helps with the present 
problem. The present problem is not to make sense of believe-most-of-P, -Q, 
-R, -and-S or of more-or-less-strongly-believing-P; it’s to make sense of 




As such, this belief similarity model, even if the Holist could appeal to it, would not 
actually do the job they want it to. The belief similarity model explains what it is for 
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two sets of beliefs to be similar, where this involves identifying how many of two 
subjects’ beliefs are shared. The model does not tell you how similar two individual 
beliefs are. But, it is something more like this latter task that the Holist wishes to 
accomplish. The Holist does not want a criterion for establishing whether two sets of 
concepts (or contents) are similar. She wants a criterion of similarity for determining 
whether any two individual concepts (or contents) are similar. The same thing goes 
for comparing similarities between individual beliefs: if I want to know how similar 
two beliefs are, I am interested in how similar their contents are. The second, related, 
problem with the analogy which FL point out is that this notion of belief similarity 
presupposes some notion of belief identity. It is because we share one or more of the 
same beliefs that our belief (sets) can be said to be similar in the manner described 
above. As FL explain, “[P]recisely because these colloquial senses of belief 
similarity presuppose a notion of belief identity, they don’t allow us to dispense with 
a notion of belief identity in favour of a notion of belief similarity.”
210
 Unfortunately 
for the Holist, replacing talk of conceptual identity with talk of conceptual similarity 
is precisely what she wishes to do and, as such, the belief similarity model presented 
here will not illuminate the task at hand. The Holist needs a different kind of 
explanation of conceptual similarity which does not depend on an antecedently 
understood notion of conceptual identity, and which will provide criteria for 
determining whether two individual concepts are similar (rather than whether two 
sets of concepts are similar). 
 
However, FL suggest that no alternative will be forthcoming. They claim that, just as 
the belief (set) model requires appeal to a notion of belief identity, so will conceptual 
similarity require appeal to conceptual identity. Their reasoning runs as follows. For 
any concept, A1, we can ask whether it is similar to a second concept A2. The Holist 
might answer by saying that A1 and A2 stand in similar conceptual relations to other 
concepts in their respective conceptual webs. But by what criteria are these 
conceptual relations similar? One way to explicate this similarity would be along the 
lines of the belief model above. For example, we might say that concept A1 in 
network N1 is similar to concept A2 in network N2 if A1 and A2 are related to a 
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similar set of concepts. If A1 is related to B and C; and A2 is related to B, C and D; 
then we might say that A1 and A2 are similar concepts. Along the same lines, if A3, 
in a further network, N3, is related only to concept D, then we might say that A1 is 
more similar to A2 than it is to A3. This suggestion is illustrated in the diagram 
below (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1:  
 
 
The problem with this suggestion is just like the problem with the belief set model: 
we have presupposed that we can identify concepts B, C, and D across the three non-
identical networks. That is, we have posited conceptual identity. But, as FL rightly 
point out, the labelling of these nodes across the three networks is illicit. For, in 
applying these labels, we have presupposed that we can identify where each concept 
is positioned in each of the networks before comparing these concepts’ similarities. 
What we should have is three arbitrarily labelled networks. But, as illustrated in 







Precisely what is in question is how we are to work out what relations the concepts in 
N2 and N3 bear to concepts in N1 and so we cannot just help ourselves to these 
relations to begin with. It should be stressed that any positing of conceptual identity 
(outside of identical networks) would be problematic for the Holist because it is 
simply not consistent with her view. Adding a concept to the conceptual network 
alters the content of all concepts in the network. For example, when D in Figure 1 is 
added to N2, this changes the concepts labelled ‘A2’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ such that these 
three concepts cannot be of the same type as those which comprise network N1. This 
is simply a consequence of the Instability Thesis. 
 
FL seem to think that there is no way to avoid positing some kind of semantic 
identity relations in an attempt to provide a criterion of similarity of meaning and, as 
such, the Holist must accept conceptual similarity as a primitive relation. For 
example, claiming that concepts A1 and A2 participate in similar inferences just 
presents us with another version of the problem: by what criteria are these inferences 
similar? It cannot be that similar inferences are those which have similar premises 
and similar conclusions for then we are right back where we started.
211
 FL think that 
any attempt to provide criteria for similarity of meaning will encounter some version 
of this problem. Their claim, I think, is not just that providing such criteria would be 
hard, but that it is not possible. They write,  
 
[I]t seems sort of plausible that you can’t have a robust notion of similar such 
and suches unless you have a correspondingly robust notion of identical such 
and suches. The problem isn’t, notice, that if holism is true, then the 
conditions for belief identity are hard to meet; it’s that, if holism is true, then 
the notion of “tokens of the same belief type” is defined only for the case in 
which every belief is shared. Holism provides no notion of belief-type 
identity that’s defined for any other case and no hint of how to construct one. 
But if there is no construal of the claim that two beliefs are tokens of the 
same type in cases where belief systems fail to overlap completely, how in 
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In a later section, I will demonstrate why FL’s objection fails. First, however, I will 
describe two responses from the literature. The first of these will be Paul 
Churchland’s (1998) response. The second response is from Tim Schroeder (2007). 
As we will see, even if these responses achieve what their authors set out to do, 
neither will be adequate for the Holist’s purposes. 
 
3.2 Churchland’s response 
 
Probably the most prominent response in the literature is from Paul Churchland 
(1996, 1998)
213
. Churchland defends a holistic conceptual-role theory which he calls 
‘State Space Semantics’ (1986). Churchland is working from within a connectionist 
theory of mind. As such, the vocabulary uses to present the theory is quite a 
departure from the terms in which I presented conceptual-role semantics in Chapter 
1. Fortunately, for my purposes, a brief introduction to Churchland’s theory will 
suffice: Churchland may or may not succeed in providing a response to FL, but it is 
easy to see that it is not a response which is available to my Holist. The reason for 
this is that Churchland eventually adopts a two-factor theory of content in order to 
meet FL’s challenge. Holism is a purely internalist theory and, as such, cannot appeal 
to relations to the environment in its criterion of meaning similarity.  
 
Churchland thinks content can be explained in terms of neural activation patterns. 
State Space Semantics employs the notion of a ‘state space’ as a system of 
representation that can be used to model these activation patterns. Patterns of neural 
activation (in response to, for example, the presentation of an object to the system) 
are represented as regions in state space. Concepts, on Churchland’s theory, are to be 
identified in terms of positions in state space.
214
 A state space is just a geometric 
representation of a connectionist network (or some subsection of a connectionist 
network). This state space itself comprises a number of dimensions which represent 
properties of the object represented. Churchland writes, 
 
                                                 
213
 The debate between FL and Churchland spans a number of papers: Churchland (1991); FL (1992); 
Churchland (1993); FL (1993); Churchland (1996); Churchland (1998); FL (1999). 
214
 Churchland (1986) 280 
176 
 
On neural network models of cognition, the primary unit of representation, 
and the primary vehicle of semantic content, is the overall pattern of 
simultaneous activation levels across the assembled neurons of a given 
population, such as the cells in layer four of the primary visual cortex, or the 
output cells of the motor cortex, or the “cells” in a given layer of some 
artificial network model. Such patterns are often referred to as activation 
vectors. […]. A specific activation pattern can […] be simply and usefully 
characterised as a specific point in a proprietary space, an n-dimensional 
space with a proprietary axis for the variable activation level of each of the n 
neurons in the representing population. Any single point in that space will 
represent, by way of its unique set of n coordinate values, the simultaneous 





Given this picture of concepts, conceptual similarity can be measured by comparing 
positions in state space for similarity. Conceptual similarity is a matter of similarity 
of neural activation patterns represented by these positions. Where patterns are more 
similar, we can say that there is a high degree of conceptual similarity. According to 
Churchland, comparing the positions of objects in state-space across subjects will 
give us an accurate measure of how similar one subject’s concept is to another 
subject’s corresponding concept. 
 
Churchland’s theory predates FL’s objection to holistic theories of content. However, 
Churchland intends the account to provide a robust notion of conceptual similarity 
which genuinely holistic theories of meaning can endorse. Unfortunately, it should 
be clear to see why Churchland’s account, as it is stated above, fails to do this. And, 
indeed, FL, and later Churchland, recognise the shortcomings of this early version of 
the account. The problem is that Churchland’s account represents conceptual 
similarity in terms of similarity of position in state space, but it does not give us any 
account of what it would be for two state spaces to be tokens of the same type (or of 
similar types). As FL put it, 
 
[W]hat Churchland has on offer is the idea that two concepts are similar 
insofar as they occupy (relatively) similar positions in the same state space. 
The question thus presents itself: When are S1 and S2 the same state space? 
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When, for example, is your semantic space a token of the same semantic 




FL suggest that a necessary condition on the identity of two state spaces would be 
identity of their dimensions. So, once again, we are faced with a familiar question: 
when are two dimensions of state space the same (or similar)?
217
 Once again, an 
attempt at providing a criterion for similarity of meaning has presupposed meaning 
identity. In the case of Churchland’s account, the problem is that understanding 
similarity of meaning as similarity of points relative to dimensions of state space 
requires a way of identifying when two state-spaces are tokens of the same type. We 
must presuppose that the two state-spaces have been identified as representing a 
particular concept, or as having the same (or similar) dimensions. However, if one 
wants to meet FL’s challenge, one cannot just help oneself to labels in this way, for 
part of what is at issue is the correct way to label the dimensions across the two state 
spaces in the first place. 
 
Churchland recognises FL’s concern and amends his theory accordingly. It had 
previously been thought by FL that concepts, on Churchland’s view, are dependent 
for their individuation only on their relations to dimensions of the state space. 
Churchland (1998) suggests that he can provide a means of labelling dimensions 
such that they can be compared across different networks by appeal to relations 
between concepts and the external world. Churchland writes, 
 
A point in activation space acquires a specific semantic content not as a 
function of its position relative to the constituting axes of that space, but 
rather as a function of (1) its spatial position relative to all of the other 
contentful points within that space; and (2) its causal relations to stable and 
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As such, Churchland explicitly acknowledges that his theory counts as a two-factor 
approach to content-individuation.219 Content is determined, not just by its relations 
to dimensions in state space, but also to its relations to the external environment. 
 
The externalist aspect of a two-factor theory can be employed as a means of 
identifying tokens of the same concept types across networks. Tiffany (1999) goes 
further and suggests that we treat Churchland’s theory as a theory of the vehicle of 
content, or its mode of presentation, rather than of content itself.
220
 Tiffany suggests 
that a traditional one-factor externalist theory should be employed to take care of 
content-individuation. Churchland’s theory would then be a measure of similarity in 
mode of presentation rather than similarity of content. Interestingly, Churchland does 
not employ the second factor in either of these ways. Churchland thinks that his 
version of the two-factor response enables us to identify similar state spaces without 
presupposing any identities between dimensions.
221
 Two contents in two non-
identical networks do not get to be tokens of the same type merely in virtue of being 
causally related to the same macro-features of the environment. As such, Churchland 
does not take the external factor in his theory to necessarily provide a criterion of 
content identity. Because of this, his theory, if successful, would provide a response 
to FL’s objection: it would demonstrate that there can be a robust criterion of 
meaning similarity which does not presuppose meaning identity. 
 
Perhaps State Space Semantics can be defended. Although, it is worth noting that FL 
and others still have a number of misgivings about Churchland’s account even after 
his admission that concept-world relations play a substantial role in anchoring the 
semantic network.
222
 For my purposes, all that is important is that Churchland’s 
account, even if it could be successful by its own lights, will not provide a solution 
for my Holist. The reason for this is that, in his response to FL, Churchland makes an 
explicit appeal to environmental factors in individuating content. And this is 
something that, as a committed internalist, my Holist cannot appeal to. The enduring 
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worry for the Holist then is that, so far, the only means of comparing similarity in 
concepts across networks have involved either (a), appeal to sameness of content or 
(b), an appeal to externalist concept-world links which otherwise anchor the network. 
Neither of these approaches is available to the Holist for the reasons outlined above. 
Next, I turn to another kind of solution which does not involve either (a) or (b). 
Unfortunately, as we will see, this approach, too, will not be of use to Holism. 
 
3.3 Schroeder’s response 
 
The second response I will consider is from Tim Schroeder (2007). Schroeder offers 
a measure of conceptual similarity in terms of similarity of extension. He sets out his 
account as follows. He first offers two definitions regarding the union and 
intersection of the extensions (at a given world) of distinct concept tokens: 
 
C ∩ C* w : For two token concepts C and C*, let the intersection of their 
extensions in world w be C ∩ C* w. 
 
C U C* w : For two token concepts C and C*, let the union of their 




Schroeder thinks that because, for example, the extension (in the actual world) of one 
subject’s concept RIPE is finite, and likewise for a second subject’s RIPE*, we can 
provide a measure of the similarity of the two subjects’ concepts by dividing the size 
of the intersection of their actual extension by the size of the union of their actual 
extension. He calls this the ‘Simple Similarity Measure’: 
 
Simple Similarity Measure: The similarity of actual-world concepts C and C* 
is a value between 0 and 1, given by Cardinality (C ∩ C*) actual/ Cardinality 




Schroeder offers the following example of this measure in action: 
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If you and I were both to consider only fifty objects to be ripe, and I were to 
agree with you about forty of them but disagree about ten, then we would 
agree on forty out of the sixty objects considered ripe by either of us, and our 
concepts would be 0.67 similar for purposes of determining the 




Of course, a comparison of the actual extensions of two concepts is not a good guide 
to how similar those concepts are: their extensions may vary wildly, or not at all, at 
other possible worlds. As such, Schroeder then modifies the Simple Similarity 
Measure to give a measure which will take into account differences of opinion that 
subjects might have with respect to application of their concepts across further 
possible worlds. However, in order for a version of the Simple Similarity Measure to 
work, he recognises that the measure must deal in a finite number of possible cases. 
To achieve this, he introduces a procedure which presents him with a finitely large 
set of possible worlds which are supposed to include all possibilities relevant to 
assessing similarities between the extensions of the concepts we possess (given 
which world is the actual world).
226
 This set he calls ‘Recombination’. As Schroeder 
puts it, the set contains, for example, “every physically possible object that might 
have any bearing on distinguishing your concept RIPE* from my concept RIPE.”
227
 
Recombination does not contain all possible worlds, only those that are alleged to be 
relevant to determining the similarities and differences between our actual concepts. 
Schroeder eventually ends up with a measure which he calls ‘Proportion’. Proportion 
is a measure of the similarity of the extensions of two concepts in all worlds in 
Recombination. The basic idea is simple: if two subjects perfectly agree on which 
possible objects in Recombination fall under the extension of their concepts, C and 
C*, then the Proportion for their concepts C and C* will be 1.
228
 If they disagree 
completely, the Proportion will be 0. If they disagree only slightly, Proportion might 
be something like 0.95, which we might judge to be a sufficiently high score to count 
the two concepts as similar enough for certain purposes.
229
 The details of Schroeder’s 
account, and whether it succeeds as an adequate measure of similarity of extension, 
are not of primary concern here. What I am interested in is whether it could provide a 
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measure of similarity which would be attractive to a Holist trying to meet FL’s 
challenge. I think it is clear that it will not. 
 
Schroeder’s account is not intended as a solution to the problem faced by Holism in 
particular, but as a solution to what he sees as a far more general problem for any 
theory of content.
230
 He thinks that even theories such as social and physical 
externalism will want to allow that certain of our concepts are not shared, and that 
the existence of such concepts calls out for a measure of their similarity. Speakers 
legitimately disagree as to the application of various of their concepts and are often 
not disposed to defer to experts.
231
 Examples he gives include the concepts expressed 
by ‘ripe’, ‘latte’, ‘seat’, and ‘light truck’.
232
 A measure of similarity is needed, 
according to Schroeder, for the purposes of explaining things such as agreement, 
disagreement and communication when it is objects picked out by concepts like these 
which are under discussion. Schroeder thinks that, when it comes to explaining these 
phenomena, what matters is not, at least primarily, how we conceive of the various 
objects under discussion. Rather, what matters is whether or not we are thinking 
about more of less the same set of objects. 
 
As such, Schroeder thinks that what is wrong with Churchland’s account is that, even 
if it worked, it would not measure the right thing. He criticises Churchland for 
providing an account, not of similarity of content, but of the similarity of the way we 
think about things: “What Churchland proposes to measure is not the extent to which 
you and I are thinking about the same things; he proposes to measure the extent to 
which you and I think about things in the same way.”
233
 This criticism echoes 
Tiffany’s complaint that State Space Semantics is better understood as a theory of the 
vehicle of content, rather than of content itself. Schroeder thinks that a criterion for 
similarity of meaning ought to be concerned with the extension of terms. Or, at the 
very least, a measure of similarity of extension is required in order to adequately 
explain certain interpersonal phenomena (perhaps alongside accounts of the 
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similarity of other aspects of content).
 234
 As such, Schroeder thinks his measure 
ought to ignore more subtle differences between concepts. He writes: 
 
For the purposes of determining whether agreement, disagreement and the 
like are possible, what is important is not that we think of things in (roughly) 
the same way, but that we think of (roughly) the same things. A useful 
measure of concept similarity will not measure similarities in inner 
conceptual structure, but similarities in the way actual and possible objects 





It is possible that Schroeder’s measure works perfectly well as a measure of 
similarity of extension. I will not argue one way or another in this regard. What is 
important for our purposes is that, because of the fact that it ignores these more fine-
grained differences in ‘inner conceptual structure’, it will not be of use to the Holist. 
The problem with Schroeder’s approach is that the measure of similarity he proposes 
is simply not sensitive enough to capture the fine-grainedness of conceptual-role – 
and, as Schroeder has emphasised – nor is it intended to. As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter 5, on Holism, plenty of distinct concepts can be co-extensive. And, indeed, 
plenty of seriously dissimilar concepts will have an empty extension. As such, even 
if Schroeder’s account is successful, it will be of no use to my Holist. On Holism, 
similarity (and even identity) of extension is, at best, only a rough guide to how 
similar two subjects’ concepts are. 
 
3.4 A solution for Holism 
 
Churchland’s account provides an extremely fine-grained measure of conceptual 
similarity, but it relies on concept-world relations which are unavailable to Holism. 
Schroeder’s account does not appeal to the external world as an individuating factor 
(his account is supposed to be compatible with multiple different ways of 
individuating content), but its measure of similarity is far too coarse-grained to be of 
use to the Holist. Thus Holism is still threatened by the dilemma presented by FL’s 
objection: either content similarity is a mysterious primitive, or it must be explained, 
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non-holistically, in terms of a robust notion of content identity. What I aim to show 
in what follows is that we can provide criteria for content similarity without 
appealing to this robust notion of conceptual identity (or identity of inference, or 
whatever) which FL seem to think will be required by any account. That is, the 
model on which to understand content similarity is a little different to our colloquial 
understanding of belief similarity introduced above (although, as we will see, it is not 
that different). 
 
So far, we have it that two identical networks will be identical with respect to 
content. The problems come when we have to compare two concepts, A1 and A2 in 
non-identical networks N1 and N2. Before presenting my solution, it will be helpful 
to take a detour through a solution which is not available to the Holist, but which can 
be tweaked to provide a Holist solution. FL remark that there is a traditional 
empiricist way of understanding network semantics such that A1 and A2 can be 
located in two non-identical networks.
236
 On this approach, certain nodes in the 
network are anchored to entities outside of the network such that these nodes are 
non-holistically defined. On this empiricist picture, these nodes are the ones that 
represent observational properties and are tied, perhaps by causal relations, to the 
external objects or properties which they represent. These nodes make up a periphery 
of observational vocabulary from which all other items in the network can be 
constructed. Any non-observation node in the network can be located by its relations 
to these observation nodes – either by standing in direct relations to them, or by 
standing in relations to further non-observation nodes which stand in direct relations 
to observation nodes and so forth. This Quinean picture serves to anchor the 
semantic network such that certain nodes can be type-identified across non-identical 
networks by their relations to external objects and properties. This approach is not so 
different from the route that Churchland eventually opts for, except that Churchland 
would reject the empiricist thesis that complex concepts can be built up out of purely 
observational concepts. On Churchland’s view, non-observation nodes are also 
directly located by their causal connections to macro-features of the environment 
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(and, as mentioned above, Churchland thinks that such connections need not serve to 




Something like the belief similarity model introduced above is applicable to the 
Quinean network model. To take a simple example, we can say that contents A1 and 
A2 in non-identical networks N1 and N2 are similar if A1 stands in relation to 
observational nodes O1, O2, and O3; and A2 stands in relations to observational 
nodes O1 and O2. This picture works because we can antecedently identify O1, O2 
and O3 non-semantically, without mere appeal to their position in the semantic 
network. O1, O2 and O3 are picked-out by their causal relations (for example) to real 
world objects and properties. As FL explain, 
 
The old (empiricist) version of network semantics had a story about the 
identification of the dimensions  by reference to which it did its 
taxonomising; they were to express observable properties, and an externalist 
(for example, causal) theory of some kind was used to explicate the relation 
between observable properties and terms in the observation vocabulary. In 
particular, that relation was assumed to be specifiable independent of the 




My solution to the problem will be somewhat empiricist in nature (although, as I will 
explain below, there are versions of it which are less empiricist). Providing an 
account which is available to the Holist will involve some slight alterations to the 
Quinean picture. The picture currently involves an externalist element of content 
determination which is not available to my Holist. It is also not thoroughly holistic in 
nature for the same reason that the belief similarity model rejected above was not 
holistic in nature: it allows that certain nodes can be type-identified across non-
identical networks. I wish to remove both these elements of the picture. Firstly, I will 
remove all reference to external observational properties as having a meaning-fixing 
(and network anchoring) role. This will remove the externalist element of the picture, 
but it will also put us right back in our original predicament. Fortunately, I think we 
can replace these observational properties with something internal which will have a 
similar – though not identical – effect. The difference, I think, is that these ‘anchors’ 
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will not be employed to provide a means of locating type-identical contents across 
non-identical networks. Rather, they will merely allow us to identify similar contents 
in a way which does not presuppose either conceptual identity or primitive 
conceptual similarity. As we will see, conceptual networks can be ‘anchored’ 
internally by appeal to certain of the non-semantic properties which affect the causal-
roles of the concepts which constitute the network. We can then compare concepts 
across networks by looking to see both (a), if they possess similar non-semantic 
properties and (b), if they stand in similar relations to further concepts which possess 
similar non-semantic properties, and so forth. 
 
Perhaps FL are right that we cannot give an illuminating or non-circular definition of 
‘similarity of content’ using only resources from within the semantic network. 
However, I do not see why any holist is obliged to do this any more than an atomist 
like Fodor is obliged to give criteria for sameness of content using only semantic 
resources. FL’s complaint is that explaining similarity of content in semantic terms 
requires appeal to a notion of identity of content. But there is no reason why we 
should be forced to give our explanation in purely semantic terms. The holist’s 
semantic network is not some free-floating system of arbitrary symbols. Rather, it is 
a system which is embedded in, and intimately connected with, a massively complex 
system of sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, stored memories, occurrent 
imaginings, experienced emotions etc. I will refer to these phenomena as ‘non-
linguistic elements of the network’. This is just for ease of exposition. One could also 
think of them as being distinct from (but connected to) the network (This construal 
might be especially plausible for sensory inputs, behavioural outputs and the like). 
Which way one thinks of them will not affect my argument. Furthermore, certain of 
them might contain linguistic elements: one can remember or imagine conversations, 
for example. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the position that I am defending is the thesis that content is 
determined (or, perhaps, constituted) by causal-role. In particular, we are considering 
the causal-role of a particular kind of representational mental entity – the concepts – 
which inhabit brains. The causal-role of a given concept will depend on the causal-
186 
 
role of all other concepts in the semantic network such that if there is a change in the 
causal-role of one concept, there must be a change in the causal-role of all concepts 
in the network. However, each concept occupies a unique place in the conceptual 
web and, as such, each concept has a unique set of causal properties which 
determines how it is related to the other concepts in the conceptual network, how it 
combines with these concepts to form sentential contents, and how it interacts with 
non-linguistic elements of the network, etc. For example, in a given semantic 
network, N, the causal roles of the concepts DOGN and HAIRDRYERN will depend on 
the causal roles of all other concepts in the network. However, the two concepts 
possess different causal properties. DOGN, for example, will be causally related to 
ANIMALN in a way which HAIRDRYERN is not. HAIRDRYERN will be causally related to 
mental images as of hairdryers in a way that DOGN is not. The causal relations that 
these concepts stand in to each other are complex. To say that one concept stands in a 
particular causal relation to another concept is not to say that the first concept causes 
the second. Rather, it is to say that the two stand in a particular relationship which, at 
its most basic level, is to be explained by a complicated system of causal 
interactions. To say that conceptual-roles have a causal basis is essentially just to 
adopt a form of naturalism about content. This is so in much the same way that a 
philosopher who claims that consciousness can be fully explained in terms of causal 
interactions between neurons (and perhaps, most basically, between atoms and such) 
is a naturalist about consciousness. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Hudson (2007) 
suggests that the correct way to understand the causal structure of the relations 
between concepts in human brains is an empirical issue which linguists and 
neurolinguists, rather than philosophers, are best placed to study. 
 
Given this picture, I think what we should do to solve the present problem is define 
conceptual similarity in terms of overlapping sets of these causal properties and 
relations. And, crucially, these causal properties and relations will be things which 
we can identify across different subjects: just because concepts in a network are 
holistically related, it does not follow that they have no non-holistically identifiable 
properties; and it is these properties which we can use to ‘anchor’ the network. To 







My proposal is that we can work out which concepts in N1 are more of less similar to 
those in N2 by investigating the concepts’ causal properties and relations. For 
example, suppose that concept A1 has causal properties, p1, p2 and p3. We can then 
look to see which, if any, concepts in N2 have any of these causal properties. 
Similarly, if P in N2 has more of these properties in common with A1 in N1 than 
with X in N3, we can say that P is more similar to A1 than to X. 
 
One thing to stress about the present approach is that the aim is not to type-identify 
concepts across networks by appeal to some privileged class of causal properties 
(This was what the empiricist picture introduced above tried to do). Every distinct 
concept will have a different set of causal properties as a simple consequence of the 
Instability Thesis. Only concepts in identical networks will have the very same set of 
causal properties and so only concepts which inhabit identical networks can be type-
identical. Rather, the aim is to compare how (merely) similar a given concept in one 
network is to a second concept in a second (or the same) network. And to do this, we 
look to see which, if any, causal properties they share (or, alternatively, whether they 
possess any causal properties which are similar). As I will explain below, and in 
Chapter 5, we can be interested in different kinds of similarities between two 
concepts depending on our purposes. 
 
But is my appeal to causal properties and relations really explanatory? Are they not 
just causal relations between two concepts? If this is the case, how do we identify 
causal properties in the first place? FL might complain that my appeal to similar 
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causal properties and relations is not any more illuminating than the appeal to similar 
inferential role, or similar state space, rejected above. Fortunately, unlike the mere 
appeal to inferential role etc., I think we can offer an illuminating account of the role 
of causal properties and relations in locating similar concepts. As already 
emphasised, in Chapter 1, Holism was not stated as a thesis which claims that a 
conceptual network is merely a collection of interrelated linguistic symbols. In fact, 
were this the case, it would not be clear that we would be studying anything like a 
language at all. As such, the kinds of causal properties and relations that we have to 
work with are not just those properties and relations which pertain to relationships 
between linguistic concepts. Central to the understanding of language as a conceptual 
network is recognition of the network’s relations to the rest of the cognitive system: 
its relations to proximal stimuli, behavioural outputs, pictorial (or otherwise non-
linguistic) representations, memories, imaginings and so forth. Crucially, these 
phenomena can be non-holistically identified and can be compared across subjects. 
And so can the causal relations between these phenomena and the various concepts 
which make up a conceptual network. The idea is that, in addition to its relations to 
other concepts, a concept also bears all kinds of relations to non-linguistic elements 
of the network. And we can use these elements to ‘anchor’ the holistic network. 
 
To take another (much simplified) example, suppose that in N1 (or connected to N1) 
we find some proximal stimulus, S, and some behavioural output, O. Then suppose 
we find that some causal relationship holds between S and a concept A1; and 
suppose that some distinct causal relationship holds between O and A1. We can then 
look for a concept in N2 which is related in the same (or similar) ways to the same 
(or a similar) proximal stimulus and behavioural output in N2. That is, we find S and 
O in N2 and look to see if some concept is related to them just as A1 is in N1 (or we 











What is crucial to this proposal then is that we can compare these non-linguistic 
elements of the network (in this case S and O) across two subjects. But this should 
not be problematic. Surely things such as our non-linguistic representations, 
imaginings, proximal stimuli and behavioural outputs are indeed qualitatively similar 
(and possibly type-identical). After all, we all have human brains, and human eyes, 
human hands etc., which respond to inputs in similar ways. When I experience a 
representation as of a horse, for example, there is something going on in my brain 
which is qualitatively similar to the thing that goes on in your brain when you 
experience a representation as of a horse. And, if this is so, we can appeal to a no-
longer illicit notion of identity in order to define this similarity: representations as of 
horses, for example, share many of their intrinsic properties. 
 
Note that the present proposal appeals to some kind of identity, but at a different, 
non-semantic, level. I think there are two options for understanding which level this 
is. The first option is this: if we can type-identify things such as proximal stimuli, or 
non-linguistic representations, or behavioural outputs across systems (again, not by 
their relations to external objects, but by their internal characteristics), then we can 
use these types to compare sets of causal properties and relations across networks. 
But we needn’t appeal to identity here if we don’t want to. Suppose we claim that 
your representations as of horses and mine are not tokens of the same type, but are 
merely similar. We might say instead that yours are representations-as-of-horses and 
mine are representations-as-of-horses*. If this is the case, we can say that they are 
similar in virtue or sharing certain of the same, more basic, properties (just as we can 
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say that two horses are similar in virtue of sharing certain of the same properties even 
if we were to deny that they are members of the same type). If we believe in 
property- or object-types at all, there should be no regress here.
239
 I think that to 
claim that things such as representations as of horses (or, alternatively, of more basic 
properties of these representations) cannot be compared across systems is to deny 
some form of internalism. That is, the issue here would not be holism, for these 
properties are not holistically determined. Rather, the question would be whether 
such items can be type-identified without appeal to external objects. But there is no 
reason to suppose that the task of type-identifying these internal properties is any 
more difficult than the task of type-identifying any other collection of objects that 
have fewer than all of their properties in common. Nor would this task be any more 
mysterious.  
 
At this point, FL might complain that this story may work for concepts which are 
more easily understood in terms of their obvious perceptible qualities, but what of 
our more complex or abstract concepts? Surely it is far less plausible that we could 
locate these by appeal to their connections to non-linguistic elements of the network. 
For example, it is not obvious how we could locate the concept DEMOCRACY by 
appeal to its relations to proximal stimuli or behavioural outputs.
240
 Fortunately, I 
don’t think we need to. For, once we have identified two similar concepts, A1 and P, 
in conceptual networks N1 and N2, we can then start comparing further concepts in 
these two networks in terms of their relations to A1 and P (as well as their relations 
to any other concepts we have located). That is, concepts are not located merely in 
terms of their relations to non-linguistic elements of the network, but also in terms of 
their relations to further concepts which have been antecedently located in this way. 
For example, suppose we have labelled a concept ‘RIDEABLE1’, in network N1. And 
suppose we have noted that it is related in particular ways to concepts which we have 
labelled ‘HORSE1’, ‘CAR1’, ‘PLANE1’, which in turn are related to certain non-
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 Many authors who do not believe in such things as property- or object-types will believe in 
objective similarity relations between objects and/or properties which can be used to play much the 
same role in my argument. Here I have in mind Resemblance Nominalists such as Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2002). Such authors may also be less impressed by FL’s objection that similarity is mysterious in the 
first place. 
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 In fact, I think concepts like DEMOCRACY will be related to non-linguistic elements of the network 
– for example, memories of using the expression, or of voting. 
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linguistic elements of N1 (for example, representations as of horses, cars, and planes, 
respectively). To find out if there is a similar concept to RIDEABLE1 in a second 
network, N2, we can first identify whether there are any concepts which are similar 
to HORSE1, CAR1, and PLANE1 by determining whether there are any concepts in N2 
which are related to the same (or similar) non-linguistic elements as HORSE1, CAR1, 
PLANE1 are related to (We might call these newly-located concepts HORSE2, CAR2, 
and PLANE2). We can then look to see if there is a concept in N2 which is related to 
these three concepts in ways which are similar to how RIDEABLE1 is related to the 
relevant concepts in N1. If we do find such a concept, we might label it ‘RIDEABLE2’ 
to indicate that it plays a similar causal-role in N2 to the role that RIDEABLE1 plays in 





This diagram shows how two concepts, RIDEABLE1 and RIDEABLE2 can be classified 
as similar across two different networks without direct appeal to their connections to 
non-linguistic elements of their respective networks. Rather, they are located by 
observing their relations to further concepts which are themselves related to non-
linguistic elements of the network. These further concepts have been identified as 





 CAR1 and CAR2, for example, stand in relations to the same non-
linguistic elements of the network, p1 and p2. CAR1 and CAR2 are highly similar, but 
they are not the same concept. This is because there is a difference between their 
respective networks: HORSE1 in N1 is directly connected to an additional non-
semantic element of the network, p7, which is not present in N2. As such, all 
concepts in N1 differ slightly in content to all concepts in N2. Nonetheless, 
RIDEABLE1 and RIDEABLE2 can be classified as similar due to the fact that they stand 
in particular relations to antecedently located similar concepts. 
 
We can compare the networks in Figure 4 to a third network, N3, for similarity. N3 is 





N3 looks like N1, except that it has an additional property, p8, connected to its 
PLANE3 concept. As such, we should want to say that N3 is more similar to N1 than it 
is to N2. I think it is also plausible, given the nature of semantic networks, that two 
networks might be equally dissimilar from a third network, and yet be dissimilar in 
different ways. To see this, consider network N4 in Figure 6. 
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 As noted above, one could construct the diagram such that the properties, p1 – p7, are themselves 
merely similar and are located by appeal to further, more basic properties which they share – this 






N4 and N1 both have one additional non-linguistic element of the network compared 
to N2, but each contains a different additional element: N4 contains p8 but not p7 
and N1 contains p7 but not p8. As such, it looks like there is a sense in which N4 and 
N1 might be deemed equally dissimilar from N2. Similarly, we might think that the 
concept RIDEABLE2 is equally dissimilar from RIDEABLE1 as it is from RIDABLE4 even 
though these concepts are dissimilar in different ways. 
 
One thing to stress about these diagrams is that the concepts represented by them are 
nothing like a typical human’s concepts. ‘CAR1’ for example, is nothing like a typical 
human’s CAR concept. The labels are simply there to make the diagram more 
accessible. The diagrams represent extremely simple networks which, due to their 
size, are significantly semantically impoverished. A real live CAR concept would bear 
an enormous number of connections to an enormous number of concepts and non-
linguistic elements of the network. Even so, a human conceptual network is just a 
more complicated version of the networks represented in the diagrams. 
 
To summarize the account so far, my proposal is that we can compare two concepts 
for similarity by observing which causal properties and relations they share. These 
causal properties and relations are what structure the network. To compare the causal 
properties of two different concepts, we must first locate them by observing their 
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relations to less abstract concepts. We can then use the simpler concepts to anchor 
our comparisons of more complex concepts in terms of these simpler concepts. To 
anchor the simpler concepts, we look to see if they stand in similar relations to non-
semantic elements of the network. These non-semantic elements are things such as 
proximal stimuli, behavioural outputs, memories, imaginings, etc. Crucially, these 
elements will be things that we can compare for similarity across networks as they 
will share certain non-semantic properties. Once we have located a simple concept in 
one network, and a similar simple concept in a second network, we can then look to 
see which more abstract concepts are related to these concepts in similar ways across 
the two webs. As all concepts bear relations to a large number of other concepts, they 
can be assessed for similarity in different respects, as well as assessed for average 
similarity. As will become clear in the following sections, recognising this might 
prompt us to complicate the picture of communicative success presented above. 
However, as I will argue, this complication should be welcomed by the Holist as it 
allows her theory to capture the intricacies of human communication in a way which 
certain of her competitors cannot. 
 
Section 4: Conceptual structure and communicative success 
 
As I suggested above, when it comes to explaining communicative success, the 
context of communication will place demands on how similar the content grasped by 
the hearer and expressed by the speaker must be. However, given the above 
comparisons of concepts in networks N1-N4, I think we might want to say something 
more about the demands placed on similarity of conceptual-role by the context of 
communication. For example, perhaps in certain contexts it will matter that 
RIDEABLE1 is dissimilar from RIDEABLE2 in a particular way such that only a hearer 
who possessed RIDEABLE4 (rather than RIDEABLE1) could communicate successfully 
with a speaker who possessed RIDEABLE2, relative to the context set by the particular 
communicative aim of the interlocutors. If this is the case, we should measure not 
just how similar two conceptual-roles are, but how similar they are in certain respects 
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relevant to the context of communication. I will call the various respects in which 
concepts can vary ‘dimensions of conceptual variability’. 
 
The same applies to comparisons of the sentential contents which contain these 
concepts. Consider, for example, two exchanges in which a speaker expresses her 
belief that P to two different hearers who each grasp similar contents, P* and P’, 
respectively. Suppose that P* and P’ are equally dissimilar to P, but are dissimilar in 
different ways, just as is the case with the concepts from Networks N1 and N4 above. 
This might be so if, for example, each hearer misunderstands a different component 
concept, but each misunderstands this concept to the same degree. In such a case, it 
might be that communication can succeed (relative to the context of communication) 
between the speaker and only one of the hearers, but not the other. This will be so 
even though both exchanges occupy the same point on the success simpliciter scale 
and even though the context is the same for each exchange. This is just to say that 
certain similarities between concepts and contents along certain dimensions of 
conceptual variability, although they contribute towards success simpliciter, are 
simply not relevant to certain of our practical aims of communication. 
 
Examples like the previous which involve exchanges in which two contents are 
equally dissimilar from a third content (but in different ways) are not examples of 
exchanges which would occur in practice, although they are theoretically possible. 
This is simply because semantic networks are huge and complicated, and finding two 
which balanced each other in the manner described above would be like finding two 
snowflakes which perfectly mirrored each other. However, such examples serve to 
demonstrate how, when it comes to communicating towards some particular end, 
what matters might be not just average similarity of conceptual-role, but certain 
similarities along particular dimensions of conceptual variability which are relevant 
in the particular context. Given this, we might want to complicate the initial 
measures of similarity presented above. To further motivate this move, consider that 
it looks like we can construct examples with the following structure. The context of 
communication can set a bar on the success simpliciter scale which is met by two 
exchanges, but we might still want to say that only one of these exchanges is actually 
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a success relative to that context. That is: one exchange actually is more successful 
than the other, but there is no indication of this greater success on any scale. To see 
how this could happen, consider the following. A speaker expresses her belief that PS, 
and PS comprises several concepts, including CS and DS. Hearer1 grasps content PH1 
which comprises concepts CH1 and DH1. CH1 is extremely similar to CS but DH1 is not that 
similar to Ds. Hearer2 grasps content PH2 which comprises concepts CH2 and DH2. DH2 is 
extremely similar to DS but CH2 is not that similar to Cs. Now suppose that PH1 and PH2 
are equally dissimilar from PS, although they are dissimilar in the different ways 
described above. As they are equally dissimilar, they will occupy the same point on 
the success simpliciter scale and, as the context is the same in both cases, the point 
on the success simpliciter scale which they must surpass for the exchange to qualify 
as communicative success will be the same. However, suppose that only similarity to 
concept CS is relevant for the particular communicative aim. In this case, only hearer1 
grasps a concept which is similar enough to CS for success, and the difference 
between DS and DH1, although large, is not relevant to success given the context. It 
seems like in this exchange DH1 drags the average success down even though it is not 
relevant. Conversely, in the second exchange, DH2 brings the average up, even though 
it is not relevant in the given context. The problem with the simpler measure of 
communicative success, then, is that it only takes into account the average similarity 
between two contents or concepts, and this allows similarity along dimensions of 
conceptual variability which are irrelevant to a given context to have equal weight in 
the measure of success and downplays the importance of aspects which should be 
given greater weight. We might even be able to construct examples upon which one 
exchange scores higher on the success simpliciter scale, even though commonsense 
indicates that it should be judged as less successful than a second exchange which 
ranks lower relative to the very same context of communication.  
 
If such examples can be constructed, then we should introduce a measure of 
similarity which takes into account the fact that certain dimensions of conceptual 
variability can be more important relative to a context of communication than others. 
The way to represent this, I think, is to fracture the initial two scales such that 
success simpliciter is measured on multiple scales. For each concept involved in the 
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speaker’s utterance, there will be a scale which measures that concept’s similarity to 
the corresponding concept grasped by the hearer. Similarly, for each dimension of 
the conceptual variability of the speaker’s concept, there will be a scale which 
measures whether there is a corresponding dimension of the hearer’s concept, and 
how similar these two dimensions are.
242
 Thus, these scales will measure not just 
average similarity of concepts, but similarity in certain respects. The context of 
communication would then determine values for each of these scales which must be 
met for communication to succeed relative to a given context. And we can still 
employ an additional single scale which measures the average success simpliciter of 
an exchange considered independent from any context of communication. This 
revised account may sound complicated, and the way I have presented it involves a 
certain amount of idealisation. However, the basic idea is perfectly intuitive. What 
we are trying to capture is the idea that, in different situations, different aspects of 
objects are important to us. And, as such, when it comes to communicating for a 
particular purpose, certain of the ways in which we think about objects will be more 
important to that purpose than others. For example, for two vets discussing horses it 
might be particularly important that their understanding of horse anatomy is similar, 
whereas for two lasagne chefs discussing horses, it might be completely irrelevant 
whether they have a similar understanding of horse anatomy. Similarly, for two 
musicians discussing Paderewski, it might be particularly important that they each 
believe that he is a pianist, whereas for two politicians this aspect of the concept 
might be irrelevant.  
 
Another thing to stress to an objector who is worried that the present theory of 
communicative success now involves a rather large array of scales measuring various 
aspects of conceptual similarity is the following. I have spent a large portion of this 
chapter outlining how a Holist can endorse Content Similarity which, recall, is the 
following thesis: 
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Content Similarity: Although no two concepts possessed by non-identical 
speakers, S1 and S2, are identical, any two concepts, C1 in S1 and C2 in S2, 
can be compared for similarity. 
 
That is, I have been explaining how to understand the claim that, for any two 
concepts, C1 and C2, there is some way, albeit complex, to compare their similarities 
and differences. Given the view of communicative success pressed earlier in this 
chapter – that communication succeeds to the degree that content is similar – we get 
the more complex success simpliciter scale for free once we have a measure of what 
it is for two concepts to be more or less similar in certain respects. The degree to 
which two concepts are similar in a certain respect just is the degree to which 
communication succeeds in that respect. The context then just selects which 
dimensions of conceptual variability (such as aspects of conceptual-role) of concepts 
and contents are important to the success of the exchange relative to that context (this 
will usually be relatively few dimensions). As such, to endorse this more 
complicated measure of success is really just to put the Holist’s theory to work: it 
does not require introducing any complexity which is not already part of the theory. 
Furthermore, this complexity is extremely useful. It allows us to say more subtle and 
accurate things about human communication; we can say things that a simple, binary, 
Same Content View like LVC could not hope to even gesture at. As such, the 
complexity, I think, should be seen as a major advantage of the Holist’s theory rather 
than as something to worry about. 
 
The above was an enormously simplified story of how we might go about comparing 
similarity of concepts in holistic webs. In practice, systematically comparing all the 
causal properties and relations of concepts in the conceptual network of a human 
would be a daunting task. Concepts have an enormous number of causal properties 
and relations and the project of comparing the groups of properties possessed by 
various concepts, and the relations between them, would be immense. But this should 
not worry the Holist. FL claimed that there was some in principle difficulty in giving 
an analysis of similarity between concepts in holistic conceptual webs. FL thought 
that we would not be able to do this without invoking the Content Identity thesis. But 
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it should now be clear that we do not need to do this. We can give an analysis of 
conceptual similarity in terms of similarities between the causal properties and 
relations of concepts. And we have a clear idea of how to go about comparing 
networks in the simpler cases. The human case is just a much more complex version 
of these simple cases. As stressed above, the complexity involved in measuring 
conceptual similarity is both appropriate and useful.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that although the causal underpinnings of conceptual 
similarity are extremely intricate, the everyday task of determining roughly whether 
any one of your own concepts is relevantly similar to one of your interlocutor’s is 
itself not so difficult. The reason for this is that the environment in which we learn 
language promotes increases in similarity. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is largely 
because of our desire to communicate that this is so. We all acquire our concepts in 
similar learning environments through communicating with humans who, by and 
large, possess similar concepts to each other. And the more we communicate with 
each other, the more similar our concepts become. As Rapaport has argued, our 
continued attempts to communicate will increase the similarities between our 
concepts through our negotiations with each other. This means that, as adults, for 
many of our concepts, especially those that are more mundane, there is already a 
high degree of similarity in place. As such, we tend to have fairly stable reference 
points for identifying dissimilarities in certain of our other concepts when our 
interlocutors utter sentences which appear unusual or unexpected given the context in 
which they were uttered, or the previous conversational score. Our desire to 
communicate efficiently drives us to further similarity in conceptual networks. And 
our continued attempts to communicate make it increasingly easy to identify and 
correct deviant concepts. 
 
Section 5: Empiricism 
 
Is the approach I am advocating some kind of naïve empiricism about concepts? 
Before answering this question, a quick note about the term ‘empiricism’ will be 
200 
 
necessary to avoid potential confusion. Earlier, I talked of ‘Quinean empiricism’ as a 
means of anchoring the semantic network. This form of empiricism is concerned 
primarily with the structure of concepts. The traditional version of the view claims 
that complex concepts are all built out of more simple concepts which represent 
observational properties; however, one could also presumably hold a version of the 
view which claims that, rather than building up more complex concepts from smaller 
concepts, we actually divide one larger concept into smaller ones (or a mixture of 
both). What is important about empiricism in this sense is that all concepts have their 
roots in observational concepts. A second, and not unrelated, thesis about concepts 
which is often labelled empiricist is empiricism about concept acquisition, or 
language learning. This is the thesis that all, or most, concepts are learned (or 
acquired). It is to be contrasted with concept nativism (or ‘rationalism’). Nativism 
about concept acquisition, as I will understand it here, is the view that all, or most, of 
our concepts are innate.
243
 These two empiricist theses are distinct: one can be an 
empiricist about conceptual structure whilst believing that all concepts are innate 
(although this would be a weird view). Conversely, and more plausibly, one can be 
an empiricist about concept acquisition whilst denying empiricism about the 
structure of concepts. As an example of this latter combination of views, consider 
that a physical externalist about content might think that new concepts are acquired 
in virtue of the subject merely coming to stand in certain causal relations to her 
environment, but the content of these concepts may be determined quite 
independently of any relations they bear to observational concepts (for example, their 
content might be determined instead by their relations to the objects to which they 
are appropriately causally related).
244
 A useful distinction to mark between empiricist 
views of concept acquisition is between views which claim that new concepts are 
psychologically learned, and those which claim that new concepts are merely 
acquired without the need for any significant psychological effort. I think that 
internalist views of concepts will typically think that concepts are psychologically 
learned (unless the view is nativist). Externalist views of content, on the other hand, 
may claim instead that concepts can be acquired in the absence of much 
psychological understanding on the part of the subject. This gives rise to the 
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phenomenon of partial understanding of one’s own thoughts distinctive of externalist 
theories. On Holism, by contrast, new concepts are psychologically learned and 
cannot but be understood. 
 
So, what is empiricist about my solution to FL’s objection? As I will argue, on one 
way of understanding the view, it is empiricist in both senses. However, it need not 
be thought of in this way. In what follows, I will first describe how the doubly 
empiricist version of the view might work. I will then explain how one might endorse 
a less empiricist version of the view. On this latter understanding of the view, if one 
thinks that some concepts are native, then one can claim that not all concepts must be 
ultimately analyzable in terms of some complex combination of observational 
concepts. As such, Holism need not take much of stand on the empiricism/nativism 
debate about concept acquisition (although, it should not endorse an extreme 
nativism
245
). Neither must it claim to be fully empiricist in the Quinean sense 
introduced above. 
 
The first version of the view is one that claims that all concepts are learned and that 
these concepts are constructed out of observational concepts. On this view, concepts 
are learned by being constructed out of further concepts which are already grasped, 
with help from any cognitive mechanisms already present in the system from birth. 
As an example of how a new concept is learned consider the following. Suppose you 
hear the word ‘manticore’ for the first time in conversation and you want to know 
what it means. Assuming that the concept is not innate, on the doubly empiricist 
view you really only have two options. You can come to learn the item by having it 
explained in terms of concepts which you already understand, or you can learn it 
through observing instances of objects that it applies to (and hence adding new non-
linguistic elements to your network). Oftentimes, you will rely on a combination of 
both these strategies. When you first hear the term, you create a new node, labelled 
‘MANTICORE’. As you believe very little about what the term means, this concept is 
not well connected to the rest of your conceptual network. It is perhaps connected 
only to a memory of the context in which you learnt the term. It may also be 
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connected to further nodes depending on whether you have inferred anything about 
the nature of the object that it represents from the context of utterance, or perhaps 
even from the grammar of the sentence in which the term was used. For example, if 
the sentence in which you first encountered the term is ‘Manticores are ferocious’, 
then you can connect MANTICORE to your FEROCIOUS concept in a particular way. As 
it is obvious from this sentence that the word is a noun, you might infer that 
‘manticore’ names an object of some kind (in the liberal sense of ‘object’). You can 
then start better connecting your new concept in light or further information that you 
receive and, in doing so, closing off possibilities as to what the term might mean. So, 
for example, if I tell you it is part lion, you will connect it to your LION concept. If I 
tell you it is part scorpion, you will add a further connection to your SCORPION 
concept. If I tell you it is mythical, you will amend your network appropriately and 
so on. If you are stumped because you do not have a LION concept, I can show you a 
picture of it.  
 
I think that consideration of how we come to understand new concepts (where, as 
mentioned above, this may be different from acquiring them) might lend some 
plausibility to the fully empiricist approach. If one thinks that understanding of 
concepts is never innate, I think the picture described above really is the only way we 
can build up an understanding of new concepts (this will be so even on a Fodorian 
picture of concept acquisition upon which concepts themselves are not 
psychologically learned). Given that, on Holism, understanding and content are 
individuated in the same way, it should not be a surprise that we can locate concepts 
in the conceptual network in just the same way: by observing their connections to 
concepts which we have already located. If this picture is plausible for acquisition of 
(subject-sensitive) understanding, it is not obvious why it would not also be plausible 
for concept acquisition given the Holist’s view on the relationship between content 
and understanding. That is: if you are on board with empiricism about acquisition of 
understanding, then even if you disagree with the Holist about what content is, you 
ought to accept that if content is determined by conceptual-role, it could be 




On the fully empiricist picture, all concepts would be learnt and structured in the 
manner described above. This kind of picture of conceptual structure has modern 
advocates. Prinz’s (2002) account has much in common with this picture, although 
Prinz’s account also includes an externalist element. There are also contemporary 
authors who endorse concept acquisition empiricism to varying degrees (See, for 
example, Cowie 1999 and Sampson 2005).
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 However, I don’t think that the Holist 
is committed to the thesis that all concepts are psychologically learned. If the Holist 
wishes, she can adopt a kind of weak nativism according to which certain concepts 
are innate, but can be altered by expansion of the conceptual web. For example, 
suppose I am born with a concept, C. When learning a new concept, D, I may 
understand it in terms of its relation to C but, in doing so, this will alter the causal 
role of C, and thus alter its content (by adding a new causal relation to concept D). If 
there are such native concepts, then the picture of language learning introduced 
above can be made less empiricist in both senses. One need not be able to trace all 
concepts back to some observational periphery if our grasp of new concepts might 
involve connections to native concepts. Indeed, we need not claim that any of our 
concepts are analyzable in terms of purely observational concepts. 
 
One last thing to stress about the options available to Holism is that none of these 
options involve introducing an externalist element into the Holist’s picture of content 
individuation. In the above, I frequently spoke about the role of the environment in 
the acquisition of concepts (and of understanding). But this was merely a 
developmental point. The external environment has only a contingent causal effect 
on concept acquisition on Holism. I stressed this point in Chapter 1: most all 
internalists will think that the external environment does, as a matter of fact, have an 
enormous causal impact on which concepts a subject possesses. However, crucially, 
it has this effect only contingently, through causing certain internal states to obtain in 
the subject. It is a distinctive claim of internalism that, although these states did in 
                                                 
246
 Of course, empiricism in both forms has its detractors. Fodor (1975) argues against concept 
acquisition empiricism, for example. For examples of nativists about concept acquisition, see 
Chomsky (1967, 1988) Pinker (1994) Laurence & Margolis (2001) and Crain & Pietroski (2001). 
Fodor no longer endorses a radical nativism (Fodor 2008): he thinks that concepts are not 




fact come to be through causal interactions with the environment, it is not necessary 
that these states were so caused. The very same internal states (with the very same 
content) could have obtained in a subject with a radically different external 
environment, or perhaps in the absence of any environment at all. It is very important 
to keep separate the necessary conditions on possessing a concept from the actual 
causal history of that concept. Concept acquisition empiricism concerns only the 
latter of these issues. 
 
Section 6: The Holist View of Communicative Success 
 
We are now in a position to set out the various theses which comprise the view I am 
defending. Firstly, recall that there are necessary conditions on communicative 
success which will always be in force. These are as follows: 
 
Necessity of Theory-Neutral conditions: A communicative attempt will 
succeed only if the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied. 
 
Act Understanding: A communicative attempt will succeed only if the 
hearer’s act of understanding is such that the hearer selects an interpretation 
of the content expressed by the speaker by (a) mapping the lexical items 
which comprise the speaker’s utterance onto concepts in her own idiolect, (b) 
combining these to form a content based on her grasp of the utterance’s 
compositional structure, and (c) taking into account relevant background and 
contextual information which determine pragmatic implicatures and 
enrichments of the content. 
 
Secondly, let’s state the theses which concern success simpliciter. Here, a division 
can be made amongst average success simpliciter and success simpliciter with 




Average Success Simpliciter: Communication succeeds to the degree that the 
content grasped by the hearer is similar to the content expressed by the 
speaker.  
 
Success Simpliciter Dimension:  Communication succeeds with respect to 
some dimension of conceptual variability to the degree that the content 
grasped by the hearer is similar along that dimension to the content expressed 
by the speaker. 
 
Thirdly, let’s state the thesis which concerns success relative to a context. Plausibly, 
what is important to success relative to a context is similarity between concepts 
along particular dimensions of conceptual variability rather than average success. 
Which dimensions these are will be determined by context. As such, we have the 
following thesis. 
 
Similar Content Threshold Dimension: (Providing that (a) the Theory-Neutral 
conditions are satisfied and (b) content is grasped via a process of Act 
Understanding) Communication succeeds relative to a context iff the content 
grasped by the hearer and expressed by the speaker are similar along 
dimensions of conceptual variability, d1-dn, to degrees n1-nn respectively. 
Both the dimensions of conceptual variability, d1-dn, relevant to success and 
the degrees of similarity, n1-nn, along these dimensions required for success 
are determined by the context of communication. 
 
It is this last thesis which is supported by my argument in Chapter 3. Let us call this 
collection of all these theses, the ‘Holist View of Communicative Success’. 
 
Section 7: Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I set out my positive proposal for a Holist View of Communicative 
Success. This account is a version of a Similar Content View. The central thesis of 
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the theory is that communicative success is something which comes in degrees: 
communicative success succeeds (simpliciter) to the degree that content is similar 
across communication partners. On this theory, mental content plays a central role in 
communicative success. Success is measured in terms of a relation between mental 
content, where this content is grasped through an act of understanding. In addition to 
the success simpliciter measure, I introduced a further scale with a context-sensitive 
threshold which measures success relative to a context. The context is determined by 
the particular communicative aims of interlocutors. Once I introduced this basic 
account, I considered an objection from Fodor and Lepore. This was the objection 
that the Holist cannot provide a criterion for similarity of content without 
presupposing identity of content. If she cannot do this, then we cannot make sense of 
her Similar Content View of communicative success. In response to the objection, I 
argued that we can provide a criterion for similarity of meaning by appealing to 
extra-semantic factors. Concepts can be located and compared by observing the 
causal relations which they bear to non-semantic elements of the network in addition 
to their relations to other concepts. I argued that this discussion of conceptual 
similarity indicated that the basic account of communicative success should be 
complicated to take into account the fact that concepts can be compared for similarity 
in different respects – along different dimensions of conceptual variability such as 
conceptual-role. As such, instead of a single success simpliciter measure, we should 
employ multiple success simpliciter scales to represent the different respects in 
which two concepts can be similar. Success relative to a context then selects points 
on these scales as those which must be met for communication to succeed relative to 
the particular context of communication.  
 
In the next chapter, I will give some examples of the account in action, and introduce 
a further division amongst kinds of conceptual variability which is of particular 
importance to communicative success. This is a distinction between conceptual-role 
and application-conditions. I will then introduce and respond to an objection which 
claims that the way in which the Holist ascribes truth-conditions to contents will 
force her to claim that communication with singular terms often fails. With my 
response to this objection in place, I will be prepared to deal with one final objection. 
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This objection claims that the Holist’s view cannot underpin a plausible account of 





Chapter 5: Holism, application-conditions and singular terms 
 
In the previous chapter, I set out the Holist View of Communicative Success. After I 
presented the view, I considered an objection from Fodor and Lepore which claimed 
that the Holist could not provide a criterion for similarity of meaning. In presenting 
my response to this objection, I drew attention to the fact that concepts can vary 
along difference dimensions and that certain of these dimensions may be more or less 
relevant to success depending on the context of communication. In this chapter, I will 
introduce a further distinction between kinds of conceptual variability which will be 
of great importance to the account of communicative success. This distinction is 
between conceptual-role (which we dealt with in the previous chapter) and 
application-conditions. Once I have introduced this distinction, I will present some 
examples to illustrate its importance to communicative success. I will then consider 
an objection. This objection claims that the Holist’s account of the relationship 
between conceptual-role and application-conditions cannot adequately explain our 
communicative success with singular terms. I will argue that the Holist can agree 
with externalist theories as to which objects are represented by singular terms and the 
concepts they express. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I will introduce the distinction 
between similarity in conceptual-role and similarity in application-conditions and 
explain the relationship between the two. In Section 2, I will present some examples 
which demonstrate how each dimension can be more or less relevant to success 
depending on the context. In Section 3, I present the objection that Holism cannot 
provide application-conditions which will secure widespread success in 
communication with singular terms. In Section 4, I will present my solution. This 
solution draws on arguments from various philosophers of language who defend 





Section 1: Similarity in conceptual-role and similarity in application-conditions  
 
Aside from the different dimensions along which conceptual-role can vary, there is a 
more general distinction we can make between two kinds of dimension along which 
concepts can be compared for similarity. This is a distinction between what I will call 
‘similarity of application-conditions’ and ‘similarity of conceptual-role’. Because 
Holism is a purely internalist theory of content individuation, the conceptual-role of a 
concept fully determines its application-conditions. And the application-conditions of 
a concept are responsible for determining which object or set of objects is 
represented by that concept. As such, conceptual-role is responsible for determining 
both which object is represented by a concept and how it is represented. A concept or 
content cannot change wildly along one dimension without thereby determining a 
corresponding change along the other. However, as we will see shortly, the two 
dimensions are also somewhat independent. I stress that these two dimensions of 
conceptual variability do not require the positing of two different kinds of content. 
There is just one kind of content – the kind determined by internal conceptual-role – 
and this content is what determines the application-conditions of concepts in the 
manner characteristic of purely internalist theories of content.  
 
1.1 Similarity in application-conditions 
 
Conceptual-roles determine the application-conditions and extensions of individual 
concepts. For example, for a typical subject who possesses standard SS-
understanding of the expression, ‘dog’, the conceptual-role of her DOGS concept will 
determine an extension which contains dogs and only dogs. If she possesses non-
standard understanding of ‘dog’, and thus the conceptual-role of her DOGS concept is 
non-standard, the application-conditions, of her DOGS concept may differ and, as a 
result, the extension of her DOGS concept will also differ: it may contain only some 
dogs, or perhaps none at all. Conceptual-roles also determine the truth-conditions for 
the contents of propositional attitudes, and thus the satisfaction-conditions for the 




As conceptual-role is solely responsible for determining application-conditions, there 
cannot be a change in the application-conditions of a concept without there being a 
change in that concept’s conceptual-role. However, it is a feature of Holism that 
there can be differences between the conceptual-roles of two concepts (and thus 
differences in those concepts themselves) which do not manifest as differences in 
those concepts’ application-conditions or extension; the same goes for contents and 
truth-conditions. That is, the relationship between conceptual-roles and the 
application-conditions they determine is a many-one relationship. For example, a 
subject who gains the new belief that she would express with the word-forms, ‘There 
is a manticore in the basement’, will suffer a very minor change in all her concepts, 
including the concept she expresses with the word-form ‘dog’. But such a change 
will not manifest as a difference in application-conditions. If, however, the new 
belief she gains contains concepts which are more directly connected to her DOGS 
concept, it may change this concept in a way which affects application-conditions 
and extension.
247
 This is a thoroughly individualistic method of determining 
application-conditions and, as such, it might in some instances assign application-
conditions to concepts which conflict with those that would be assigned by semantic 
externalists of various stripes. Some think this is a reason for preferring semantic 
externalism. As will become clear later in this chapter, whether one possesses these 
intuitions or not, the Holist has the resources to accommodate most, if not all, of 
these intuitions about the application-conditions of concepts (and truth-conditions of 
contents) which have traditionally been taken to support externalism. Although 
Holism may entail that any change in conceptual-role will result in a change in 
content, Holism does not entail that the application-conditions of concepts are 
similarly unstable. This is because application-conditions are not straightforwardly 
determined by everything a subject happens to think about the object represented by 
a concept given equal weight. When it comes to determining the application-
conditions of a particular concept for a subject, some inferences and beliefs may 
carry more weight than others. The importance of this feature of the account will 
become clear in Section 4 when I present my response to an objection to the account. 
 
                                                 
247
 As stressed in previous chapters, the change which occurs will be a change from one concept to a 
different concept, not a change in the nature of an enduring concept. 
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1.2 Similarity in conceptual-role 
 
As will be familiar from Chapter 4, the second dimension along which concepts can 
vary is conceptual-role. Even when two conceptual-roles determine the same (or 
highly similar) application-conditions for two different concepts (respectively), there 
is still a further question as to how similar the conceptual-roles of those two concepts 
are. There is a limit to how much the conceptual-role of a concept can change before 
this difference alters the application-conditions of the concept. Conversely, it is also 
the case that the conceptual-roles of two concepts can be highly similar (though not 
identical) and yet still fail to determine the same application-conditions for those 
concepts. For example, the conceptual-roles of my concepts OSCAR and TWIN OSCAR 
are highly similar (though not identical), but the application-conditions of those 
concepts are quite different: I apply OSCAR only to the particular object on Earth, 
whereas TWIN OSCAR will only be applied to Oscar’s duplicate on Twin Earth. 
Conversely, consider that my concept GEORGE OWRELLM and your concept GEORGE 
ORWELLY might pick out the same object despite us having largely non-overlapping 
beliefs as to the object’s properties. I may only believe that he is the author of ‘1984’, 
whereas you may only believe that he is the author of ‘Animal Farm’. In such a case, 
our respective conceptual-roles can still be such as to determine that the same object 
is represented by our concepts, despite this difference. 
 
Section 2: Similarity and context 
 
Just as with dimensions of conceptual-role, the extent to which each of these more 
basic dimensions of conceptual variability are relevant to measuring communicative 
success will depend on the context of communication. Recall from Chapter 3 that 
successful communication requires putting the hearer in a position to employ the 
content communicated in her cognitive economy such that she can attempt to satisfy 
the aim of the communicative attempt. Depending on the aim of the attempt, this 
might involve putting her in a position to act or reason (or both) in a particular way. 
In some contexts, we might not require very high similarity along either dimension in 
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order to succeed in achieving our communicative aims. In other contexts, we might 
require high similarity along one dimension, but not the other. Other contexts might 
require high similarity along both dimensions. To illustrate how this might work, I 
will consider some examples below. 
 
2.1 Getting to the pub 
 
The following is an example in which communication can succeed despite there 
being only a rough similarity between the relevant concepts of two subjects along 
both the application-conditions and conceptual-role dimensions. Take two subjects: a 
speaker, Sandra, and a hearer, Hal. Sandra and Hal differ slightly with respect to 
their SS-understanding of the expression ‘pub’. Sandra’s understanding of ‘pub’ is 
standard. She would explicate her concept PUBS roughly as ‘a building with a bar 
which is licensed for the sale and consumption of alcohol’. Hal, on the other hand, 
has a somewhat non-standard SS-understanding and, as such, his concept PUBH is 
somewhat different. He too thinks that pubs are buildings containing bars which are 
licensed for the sale and consumption of alcohol, but he believes that, in order to 
truly be a pub, a building must have been built after the 11
th
 century. Sandra, let us 
stipulate, does not know of Hal’s idiosyncrasy. Now, further suppose that there is 
only one pub in the village of Ruddington. Fortunately, this pub was built in the 19
th
 
century and so easily satisfies the application-conditions of both Sandra and Hal’s 
concepts. Sandra wishes to meet Hal there and so utters (1). 
 
(1) There is a pub in Ruddington. Let’s meet there. 
 
In this exchange, Sandra and Hal have different concepts in mind and their respective 
thoughts have slightly different conceptual-roles. In addition, the respective 
conceptual-roles for the concepts expressed by ‘pub’ in each of their idiolects 
determine different application-conditions and thus different (though partially 
overlapping) extensions. As such, the first clause in (1) will have different truth-
conditions in Hal and Sandra’s respective idiolects. For example, we might represent 




1') There is a pub in Ruddington. 
 
 for Hal as follows: 
 
H: (1’) is true iff there is a building with a bar which is licensed for the sale 
and consumption of alcohol which was built after the 11
th
 century in 
Ruddington. 
 
Whereas the truth-conditions of Sandra’s content might be the following: 
 
S: (1’) is true iff there is a building with a bar which is licensed for the sale 
and consumption of alcohol (which was built in any century) in Ruddington. 
 
On our success-simpliciter scale, Sandra and Hal have communicated quite 
successfully, although they could have done better. There are plenty of other 
contexts in which the difference between their concepts would cause communication 
to fail. However, relative to the threshold set by Sandra’s communicative aim in the 
present context, the exchange should be considered a success: it was merely Sandra’s 
aim to arrange a meeting with Hal and, given the situation, no more than a rough 
similarity in both the application-conditions and conceptual-role of their respective 
concepts was required for this purpose. The rough similarity was sufficient to put Hal 
in a position to employ the content communicated in such a way that would enable 
him to identify the correct pub. He could then attempt to comply with Sandra’s 
request to meet there if he so chose. 
 
2.2 Singular terms 
 
In the previous example, we saw that communication can succeed even when the 
extensions of a speaker and hearer’s concepts are not quite the same. However, this 
example involved general terms; when it comes to communicating using utterances 
containing singular terms and thoughts containing singular term concepts, the context 
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might be more demanding. Singular terms, as I will understand them here, are those 
terms which represent particulars. Examples are expressions such as proper names 
and indexicals. Singular term concepts are just the concepts which are expressed with 
these terms. It seems plausible that, when communication involves such expressions 
and concepts, a hearer must grasp a content which picks out exactly the object 
intended by the speaker. For example, if a speaker utters (2), 
 
2) Gordon Ramsey is in the kitchen, 
 
it is plausible that communicative success requires that the hearer identify the very 
same object, Gordon Ramsey, not just some similar object such as his identical twin 
or some superficially similar TV chef. It would not be enough for her concept to be 
very similar in conceptual-role if it did not pick out the right object.  
 
There is ongoing debate as to what is involved in communication involving singular 
terms and communication of de re thoughts. It appears that most authors agree that, 
in some sense, communication which concerns particulars requires that reference is 
preserved.
248
 One could hold a view according to which it is only sameness of 
reference which is required for communication with singular terms. Paul (1999) calls 
this the ‘simple object-dependent’ account.
249
 However, few would think that this is 
sufficient for success. Many authors argue that, although identifying the right object 
might be a minimal necessary condition on the threshold for communicative success 
with singular terms, communication requires further similarity in mode of 
presentation (or some similar notion such as sense, or cognitive perspective, or 
conceptual-role). Bezuidenhout argues for this kind of thesis.
250
 She argues that 
communicative success with singular terms requires both preservation of reference 
and similarity in ‘subjective’ or ‘psychological’ modes of presentation. She arrives at 
this view because she thinks aspects of propositional content are pragmatically 
determined.
251
 Heck (1995) argues for a similar thesis but for quite different reasons. 
                                                 
248
 See, for example, Evans (1982) and Perry (1998). 
249
 See Paul (1999), 89. Paul does not endorse this view. 
250
 See also, Recanati (1993). 
251
 Bezuidenhout (1997) 198 ff 
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Heck argues that, on the assumption that belief contents are intensional, more than 
just the reference of the name must be preserved in communication. 
 
There are examples in the literature which suggest that this kind of approach is 
plausible. For example, Loar (1976) offers an example in which mere preservation of 
reference is insufficient for communicative success. The example is as follows. 
 
Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on 
television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in 
that latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stockbroker’, 
intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring 
to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified 
Smith’s referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he 
has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. It would seem that, as Frege held, 
some ‘manner of presentation’ of the referent is, even on referential uses, 




In contrast, perhaps there are also examples which pull our intuitions in the opposite 
direction. For example, suppose a speaker, Stephanie, asks a hearer, Hank, to tell 
their mutual friend, Frederick, that Obama won the election. In such a situation, it 
might seem that all Hank has to do, relative to the context set by Stephanie’s 
communicative aim, is to get the reference right – it doesn’t really matter how he 
conceives of this referent if all he needs to do is pass on the message.
253
 There may 
even be examples of communication with singular terms in which it appears that 




Different examples may pull us in different directions when it comes to considering 
what is required for communication with singular terms. Fortunately, the Holist does 
not need to take a stand on this debate (except in so far as she must resist any attempt 
to move from preservation of reference to preservation of content). In fact, I think the 
Holist View of Communicative Success can explain why we can construct examples 
which pull us in both directions. And it is a virtue of the Holist View of 
                                                 
252
 Loar (1976) 357 
253
 On Holism, there will be some similarity in the conceptual-roles of OBAMAS and OBAMAH – why this 
is will be explained below. However, such an example might motivate a non-Holist to think that 
sameness of reference is sometimes sufficient for success. 
254
 Examples of this kind are offered in Paul (1999, 95ff). 
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Communicative Success that it can account for all these intuitions by mere appeal to 
conceptual-role (and the application-conditions it determines). The Holist can side 
with either of the kinds of views above. For example, she could claim that, when it 
comes to singular terms, the context requires mere referential similarity, or some 
fixed similarity in conceptual-role. What I think she should claim is that the degree 
of similarity of conceptual-role that is required for success will vary with context. 
She can even allow that, for some purposes of communication, even preservation of 
reference is not required.
255
 And, as stressed in Chapter 4, she can also claim that, 
relative to different contexts, the same exchange could be considered both a success 
and a failure. Let’s consider a few more examples to see this. Suppose two subjects 
have slightly different sets of beliefs about Gordon Ramsey. The first subject, Jane, 
believes of Ramsey that he is a chef, but does not know that he is aggressive. The 
second subject, Kate, believes of Ramsey that he is aggressive, but does not know 
that he is a chef. Now suppose that Kate is very hungry but is also very timid, and 
tries to avoid aggressive people at all costs. Knowing this, but not aware of Kate’s 
SS-understanding of GORDON RAMSEYKATE, Jane utters (2) (‘Gordon Ramsey is in the 
kitchen’) with the intention of getting Kate to infer the belief that there is a chef in 
the kitchen so that Kate might then infer that this chef could make her a nice meal. 
However, because of the difference in the conceptual-role of the concept expressed 
by ‘Gordon Ramsey’ for Kate, Jane’s communicative aim will be frustrated: Kate 
will not be put in a position to employ the communicated content as Jane intended. 
Kate, instead of going to the kitchen, will avoid it due to her fear of encountering its 
aggressive occupant. I think what this example shows is that, relative to a particular 
communicative aim, the attempt could be considered quite unsuccessful due to a 
discrepancy in the conceptual-role of the two subjects’ respective concepts, GORDON 
RAMSEYKATE and GORDON RAMSEYJANE. This is an example in which further calibration 
of conceptual-roles – along particular dimensions of variability which are relevant in 
the context – would be required for communicative success (relative to Jane’s aim of 
enabling Kate to get a good meal). However, the two could communicate 
successfully relative to some other purpose even given the discrepancy along certain 
                                                 
255
 Just as she claims that conceptual-role can vary along different dimensions, she can also claim that, 
for certain purposes, success might require different degrees of referential similarity between each of 
the concept-pairs which comprise the contents expressed and grasped. 
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dimensions of the conceptual-roles of their concepts. Suppose, for example, that Kate 
simply wishes to inform Jane that a particular object, Gordon Ramsey, is in the 
kitchen. If we stipulate that their respective concepts expressed by ‘Gordon Ramsey’ 
pick out the same object, it is plausible that Jane’s utterance of (2) can result in 
communicative success (relative to Jane’s aim of informing Kate that Gordon 
Ramsey is in the kitchen). No further similarities in conceptual-role would be 
required in this case. 
 
Section 3: A problem of false beliefs 
 
The above examples indicate that there are cases in which the Holist View of 
Communicative Success works well. It seems to capture the various intuitions which 
pull us in different directions whilst positing only one kind of content: the kind that is 
individuated by conceptual-role. However, in several of the examples above, the 
subjects possessed only true beliefs about the relevant objects. What happens if a 
subject has false beliefs? For example, suppose a subject who has false beliefs about 
Gordon Ramsey is disposed to infer from ‘x is Gordon Ramsey’ to both ‘x is a 
famous chef’ and ‘x is a famous violinist.’ It looks like in this case no object in the 
actual world satisfies her GORDON RAMSEYS concept: for there is no object that is 
called ‘Gordon Ramsey’ which is both a famous chef and a famous violinist. Given 
this, we might think that, if she utters a sentence involving the expression ‘Gordon 
Ramsey’ to a hearer who possesses only true beliefs about Gordon Ramsey, the two 
subjects will not be able to communicate successfully. It appears to be the case that 
their concepts have different application-conditions and pick out different objects. 
Because of this, their utterance and belief contents will not have the same truth-
conditions. This result seems extremely problematic if we consider that subjects are 
likely to have plenty of false beliefs as to the properties of the people they attempt to 
talk about. For example, suppose I believe of my older brother, Liam, that he stole a 
chocolate bar from me on my 4
th
 birthday, but that I am wrong about this. Then it 
looks like the conceptual-role of my LIAM POLLOCK concept doesn’t actually pick-out 
Liam as the object I am thinking about when I token this concept (or talking about 
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when I utter a sentence token involving his name) – for he does not satisfy all of my 
beliefs which purport to be about him. But surely I am talking about my brother 
when I use his name. In fact, surely I can talk and think about all kinds of people and 
objects even if I have a large number of false beliefs about them. This kind of 
problem will be familiar from the literature on descriptive theories of reference. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Kripke’s influential critique of descriptivism claimed that a 
theory of reference which relies only on the cognitive resources of the individual 
speaker will frequently deliver the wrong result when it comes to determining the 
referents of proper names. If Kripke is right, even a theory which restricts the set of 
reference-determining descriptions to some privileged subset of the total descriptions 
a subject holds true of an object will, allegedly, deliver incorrect results. The 
problem is not restricted to proper names and proper name concepts: the arguments 
of Putnam and Burge push for similar conclusions both for general terms and for 
general term concepts. And some internalists have even accepted the externalists’ 
allegations as to which objects their theories must claim are represented by concepts. 
For example, recall from Chapter 1 that some internalists (such as Crane and Segal) 
have suggested that Burge’s arthritis patient, in the actual scenario, possesses an 
idiosyncratic concept which applies not to arthritis (uniquely), but to some 
rheumatoid ailment that occurs both in the joints and bones. Actual Alf, then, 
possesses a concept, THARTHRITIS, which picks out a different object to that which is 
picked out by the expert concept, ARTHRITIS. The externalist intuition is that this is 
false: both Alf and the experts are talking about the same object. For the externalist, 
this is because they share the same concept. Indeed, externalists will claim that 
subjects can routinely talk about the same objects as the experts in their community 
despite possessing all kinds of false beliefs as to the nature of those objects. 
Internalists who endorse a Crane-style reinterpretation strategy, on the other hand, 
must apparently claim that these subjects in fact speak, and think, of different 
objects. On Holism, it seems this might be the case whenever subjects have beliefs as 
to the proper application of concepts which differ from the beliefs of experts – for 
Holism claims that all such beliefs will affect the meaning of a term. This result is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, as stressed above, it seems implausible that 
subjects really are representing different objects in all cases in which they possess 
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non-standard (and even significantly non-standard) understanding of a word or 
concept. Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, it seems that this would 
present a serious obstacle to communication. The result will be that any speaker with 
deviant beliefs as to the application of a concept will be talking about a different 
object to that which the experts (and others) in her community speak of with the 
same word-forms. This might not be problematic in cases such as the first very first 
example in Section 2 when only a rough match in extension is required for success. 
But for singular term concepts this would be disastrous. At best, speakers would be 
required to hold an enormous number of profiles on the concepts of their 
interlocutors. But I think the situation is even worse than this; for it seems that there 
are many cases in which we simply would not become aware of a speaker’s 
misconceptions and thus we would quite often be talking about different objects 
without realising. If this is the case, the Holist View of Communicative Success 
would have to posit a far greater amount of communicative failure than it seems 
appropriate to posit. 
 
Fortunately, due to reasons I hinted at in Section 1, I do not think that the Holist is 
forced to accept this problematic picture of singular reference. Recall that I earlier 
mentioned that Holism does not entail that the object represented by a subject’s 
concept is just whatever object satisfies all of her beliefs as to a concept’s 
application. Rather, I think that some of her beliefs will be overriding in this regard. 
In what follows, I will argue that the internalist is not forced to choose between 
semantic externalism and a reinterpretation strategy like Crane’s in the case of 
general terms. Nor is she forced to choose between an externalist theory of the 
reference of singular terms (and the objects of thought) and an implausible version of 
descriptivism. I will argue that a thoroughgoing internalist, and even a Holist, can 
claim that subjects with idiosyncratic concepts can yet be thinking and talking about 





Section 4: Towards a solution 
 
My strategy will be to demonstrate that it is evident in our inferential practices that 
we take certain inferences and beliefs to be non-negotiable when it comes to 
determining which objects are represented by our thoughts and utterances. I will 
argue that the object of a subject’s thought is picked-out, not by being the object (or 
objects) which satisfy all the properties which that object is thought to have by the 
subject, but by certain crucial inferences and beliefs which the subject is disposed to 
hold fixed in light of conflicts discovered through reasoning or through the gaining 
of new beliefs. It will turn out that internalists about mental content can agree with 
externalists as to which objects are represented with their thoughts and utterances. 
The fact that internalists can accommodate externalist intuitions about reference is 
nothing new. Descriptivists about reference such as Jackson, and deflationists such as 
Field, have already pointed out that internalists are capable of dealing with these 
externalist intuitions. However, the majority of philosophers aren’t convinced. Most 
are persuaded by the arguments of Kripke, Putnam and Burge. As such, it will be 
worth examining how their arguments work and, in particular, how they can be 
extended to apply to mental content. My strategy here will be simply to apply the 
same, or similar, arguments to thought content to achieve the corollary result. Once I 
have shown how subjects with different concepts can represent the same objects, I 
will argue that this approach can even be used to demonstrate that microphysical 
duplicates can represent different objects. The arguments in this chapter, if 
successful, will undermine the support from Twin Earth-style thought experiments 
that content externalism is thought to enjoy. 
 
In the following, I will focus on adapting an argument from Field (1994). But I will 
also bolster this argument with some comments from Jackson (1998, 2007). Field 
argues that Kripkean intuitions which are popularly thought to support a causal 
theory of reference can be reconstrued as consistent with a deflationary theory of 
reference. I will first present Field’s argument, and then adapt his strategy in two 
ways: firstly, I will extend it to apply to the objects of singular term concepts. And, 
secondly, I will argue that we can use Burgean intuitions about deference to motivate 
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an internalism about general-term concepts which respects certain intuitions which 
have been thought to support social externalism. The result of my argument will be 
that Holism can endorse an account of the determination of the application-
conditions of concepts (and thus the truth-conditions of contents) which allows that 
subjects with divergent idiosyncratic concepts can yet be thinking and talking about 
the same objects – even when either a different object, or no object, uniquely 
satisfies all their beliefs as to its properties (given equal weight). 
 
4.1 Field’s Argument 
 
Field’s argument is concerned with the reference of proper names. He argues that 
certain of the motivations which Kripke cites as supporting a causal theory of 
reference are consistent with a deflationary theory. Field’s argument focuses on 
defusing Kripke’s semantic argument in particular, although, as I will argue below, it 
also works against the modal argument. As noted in Chapter 1, Kripke’s semantic 
argument employs the following example to motivate a causal theory of reference for 
proper names over its descriptivist competitors.
256
 According to a very simple 
descriptivist theory, the name ‘Gödel’ ought to refer to whichever person uniquely 
fits the description ‘the prover of the incompleteness theorem’.
257
 Kripke presents a 
thought experiment in which we discover the following fact, (F): 
 
F) The incompleteness theorem was proved by a man baptized “Schmidt” and 
who never called himself anything other than “Schmidt”; a certain person 
who called himself “Gödel” and got a job under that name at the Institute for 




Kripke thinks it is most natural to say that, contra descriptivism, we refer to Gödel, 
even when we are wrong about his having proved the incompleteness theorem: that 
is, even when he does not satisfy the relevant associated description.
259
 Kripke’s 
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arguments have been very successful due to the fact that most people seem to share 
this intuition. This is supposed to support the causal theory of reference. This is the 
thesis that names refer to whomsoever they are appropriately causally related to – to 
the person who was baptised with the name, not (necessarily) to the person who is 




It should be noted that one way to solve the present problem for the Holist would be 
to appeal to a causal theory of reference (or alternative externalist theory such as 
Fodor’s 1987 or Millikan’s 1984) in order to guarantee that our two subjects really 
are talking about the same objects. This would be to abandon a pure internalism 
about content and endorse a two-factor theory. This option is indeed adopted by 
defenders of conceptual-role theories such as Block (1986), and for just the sorts of 
reasons that motivate the objection to Holism under consideration. However, I think 
we can use Field’s treatment of Kripke’s thought experiment to motivate a different 
solution to the present problem without invoking anything in addition to internal 
conceptual-role. Field (and Kripke) are primarily concerned with the reference of 
singular terms rather than with the objects of thought, but I think we can transpose 
Field’s insight from a theory about the reference of expressions in a language to a 
theory about the application-conditions of concepts. In the next section I will present 
Field’s approach before turning to my adaptation of it. 
 
4.1.1 Field’s deflationary theory of reference 
 
Field (1994) advocates a deflationary account of the reference of proper names. On 
Field’s view, there is no more to reference than what is given in a disquotation 
schema for reference. He presents the schema for singular terms as follows: “If b 
exists then “b” refers to b and nothing else; if b doesn’t exist then “b” doesn’t refer to 
anything.”
261
 However, Field notes that, if we adopt the deflationary theory, there is a 
curious question as to how to make sense of the intuitions which support various 
competing theories of reference. He writes,  
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One qualm that one might reasonably have about the deflationist perspective 
is that a lot of work that has gone into the theory of reference in recent years 
seems to be onto something, and it seems at first hard to explain just what it 
could be onto if truth conditions play no central role in the theory of meaning. 
After all, if truth conditions play no central role, reference can hardly play a 
central role: whatever importance reference has surely derives from its 




Field thinks that we can make sense of our intuitions about reference without the 
need to invoke any substantial reference relation between expressions (or uses of 
expressions) and objects. He argues that we can take Kripke’s observations about our 
linguistic intuitions to show merely that subjects regard (F), 
 
F) The incompleteness theorem was proved by a man baptized “Schmidt” and 
who never called himself anything other than “Schmidt”; a certain person 
who called himself “Gödel” and got a job under that name at the Institute for 
advanced Study stole the proof from him. 
 




3) Gödel didn’t prove the incompleteness theorem 
 
rather than inferring the descriptivist (4), 
 





But, Field argues, this could be considered simply a description of the inferential 
practices of individuals, no genuine relation need be invoked. As Field explains,  
 
I think that the deflationist can make sense of Kripke’s observations. On the 
deflationist viewpoint, though, the observations aren’t at the most basic level 




 Ibid, 26ff 
264
 Ibid, 261 
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about reference but about our inferential practice. That is, what Kripke’s 
example really shows is that we would regard the claim (F) as grounds for 
inferring “Gödel didn’t prove the incompleteness theorem” rather than as 





Field suggests that reference comes in indirectly: we can indirectly infer (5) from (F), 
 
5) “Gödel” doesn’t refer to the man that proved the incompleteness theorem. 
 
But this is explained, not by a causal theory of reference, but by the fact that we can 
infer (6) from (F), 
 
6) Gödel isn’t the man that proved the incompleteness theorem. 
 
and then “semantically ascend” to produce (5).266  
 
Thus Field thinks that Kripke’s thought experiment can be construed merely as 
evidence that speakers tend to treat certain beliefs about the properties of objects as 
non-negotiable. As Field writes, “[I]t is just part of our inferential procedure to 
regard claims of roughly the form “The dominant causal source of our beliefs 
involving ‘b’ is b” as pretty much indefeasible.”
267
 What he means by this is that we 
are, on the whole, disposed to treat the belief that an expression, ‘b’, refers to 
whichever object is the dominant causal source of tokenings of ‘b’ as non-negotiable. 
Alternatively, the relevant belief might be, “The object appropriately causally related 
to tokenings of ‘b’,” or perhaps even, “The object named ‘b’,”
268
 or it may be a 
combination of descriptions which are taken to be indefeasible. Which beliefs are 
treated as indefeasible can vary from speaker to speaker, and from expression to 
expression. 
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Importantly, the particular semantic considerations which are taken to support the 
causal theory of reference – those which constitute the ‘semantic problem’ for 
descriptivist theories – are precisely those which motivate the claim that speakers 
have the inferential tendencies that Field identifies. The very fact that we agree with 
Kripke demonstrates that, as Field claims, we are disposed to infer (3) from (F) 
rather than (4). To deny that people reason this way is to also deny that we have this 
particular motivation for the causal theory of reference. Thus, we have this semantic 
motivation for the causal theory only insofar as we have reason to believe that (in 
many cases, at least) people are disposed to reason in the way characteristic of 
Kripke’s thought experiment. Field’s approach can also account for those who do not 
share Kripke’s intuitions by appeal to the same machinery: those with typically 
descriptivist intuitions just take a different belief to be non-negotiable with respect to 
reference – they have different inferential practices. Furthermore, we needn’t even 
think that these inferential tendencies are explicitly reflected upon by subjects 
providing their practices demonstrate such tendencies. After all, Kripke’s argument 
relies on the fact that subjects demonstrate such tendencies, not that they hold 
explicit beliefs as to the referents of proper names. As such, there isn’t any great 




4.1.2 Jackson’s descriptivist approach 
 
Jackson makes some similar points in defence of his descriptive theory of reference. 
Jackson argues that when we test speakers’ intuitions about possible cases – those 
that are taken to support various externalist theses about meaning – we should simply 
take ourselves to be learning what the relevant identifying descriptions actually are 
for those speakers.
270
 Here Jackson is specifically responding to the semantic 
problem – to critics who claim that normal speakers are rarely in possession of any 
uniquely identifying description, let alone one which identifies the (intuitively) 
correct object. He writes, 
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If you say enough about any particular possible world, speakers can say what, 
if anything, words like ‘water’, ‘London’, ‘quark’, and so on refer to in that 
possible world. (This does not mean that there is always a definite answer: 
sometimes saying what ‘London’ refers to in a certain possible world will 
amount to saying that it is indeterminate what if anything it refers to in this 
world.) Our ability to answer questions about what various words refer to in 
various possible worlds, it should be emphasised, is common ground with 
critics of the description theory. The critics’ writings are full of descriptions 
(descriptions) of possible worlds and claims about what refers, or fails to 
refer, to what in these possible worlds. Indeed, their impact has derived 
precisely from the intuitive plausibility of many of their claims about what 
refers, or fails to refer, to what in various possible worlds. But if speakers can 
say what refers to what when various possible worlds are described to them, 
description theorists can identify the property associated in their minds with, 
for example, the word ‘water’: it is the disjunction of the properties that guide 
the speakers in each particular possible world when they say which stuff, if 
any, in each world counts as water. This disjunction is in their minds in the 
sense that they can deliver the answer for each possible world when it is 
described in sufficient detail, but is implicit in the sense that the pattern that 
brings the various disjuncts together as part of the, possibly highly complex, 




Jackson’s point is that it is actually quite easy to identify the descriptions which will 
uniquely and correctly identify the referents of proper names. In fact, externalist 
arguments rely on the fact that such descriptions are available to individual speakers. 
It is common ground between all parties to the debate that speakers can discern 
which objects are picked out by expressions in possible scenarios. Thus, parties on 
all sides of the debate should agree both that, as Jackson claims, speakers are in 
possession of implicit identifying descriptions and that, as Field claims, competent 
speakers have particular inferential practices with proper names which single out 
these descriptions as indefeasible. As Jackson stresses, once we allow that speakers 
can refer by description, it is hard to escape the result that how speakers refer with 
any given expression is dependent upon their dispositions – nothing more is required 
to explain how they refer to the (intuitively) correct object. As Jackson points out, 
Kripke allows that we could refer by description. Kripke writes, “There’s nothing 
really preventing it. You can just stick to that determination. If that’s what you do, 
then if Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic you do refer to him 
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when you say ‘Gödel did such and such’.”
272
 But, as Jackson argues, that we could 
have referred by description with a particular expression (but don’t) suggests that we 
must have made a choice – perhaps an implicit one – about how to use the name.
273
 
But, if we did make such a choice, there must be some disposition that we have to 
employ the name in the way that we do rather than in some alternative way. And we 
can appeal to this disposition to determine the reference of the name. The various 
thought experiments touted as objections to descriptivism are really just ways to 
garner empirical evidence as to which reference-determining descriptions subjects 
are disposed to endorse.
274
 And, of course, these descriptions can differ from subject 
to subject and even in the same subject over time. Thus, this kind of response is well-
equipped to explain intuitions which pull us in different directions when it comes to 
theories of reference. 
 
Given the above, I think that Kripke’s semantic argument – considered apart from 
the rest of his critique – can show only that we have the dispositions and inferential 
practices which are identified by Jackson and Field. As such, we can use these 
supposedly externalist intuitions to motivate a Field-style deflationism, or  a form of 
descriptivism which claims that the description relevant to determining the referent 
of a proper name, for a subject, is whichever description (or descriptions) her 
inferential practices demonstrate to be non-negotiable. On such a theory, subjects can 
succeed in referring by description to Gödel despite believing in any number of false 
associated descriptions providing they display the inferential tendencies that Field 
identifies. Such a theory would be roughly of the kind that Jackson advocates: we 
can discover which associated properties subjects take to be essential to a given term 
by presenting them with possible cases and noting which inferences they are 
disposed to make. The Kripkean semantic intuitions, by themselves, are equally well-
explained by all three theses. Thus Kripke’s semantic argument will not decide 
between the causal theory, the deflationary theory, and the descriptivist theory. 
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4.1.3 Kripke’s remaining objections 
 
Of course, there is more to Kripke’s critique of descriptivism than his semantic 
argument. And there are also further objections pushed by other authors.
275
 There is 
not space in this project to provide a complete defence of descriptivist (or 
deflationist) theories of reference.
276
 However, I will say a few words about how the 
Holist might respond to Kripke’s other lines of argument.
277
 Given that part of 
purpose of this chapter is to explain how the Holist can agree with externalist 
intuitions as to which objects are represented with expressions and concepts, it is 
important that we also meet Kripke’s modal argument. The modal argument, recall, 
stressed that names are rigid designators, but definite descriptions are not.
278
 Rigid 
designators, recall, are expressions which designate the same object with respect to 
every possible world in which that object exists (where which object this is is settled 
by the term’s reference in the actual world). If Kripke is right, then the Holist would 
not be able provide the (intuitively) correct extensions for singular terms, for 
descriptions allegedly pick out different objects in different possible worlds. 
Fortunately, if Field’s defence works against Kripke’s semantic argument, it should 
also work against the modal argument. Just as above, we can agree with Kripke that 
names are rigid designators, but claim that we have reason to believe this only 
insofar as we have reason to believe that subjects have certain inferential practices 
with proper names. That is, the descriptions which determine the referents of names 
are rigidified descriptions. The rigidification strategy, as a defence of descriptivism, 
has been discussed by a number of authors.
279
 And the present approach, I think, 
provides a strong motivation for accepting it.
 
The reason for this is that, once again, 
Kripke’s evidence for the claim that names in natural language are rigid designators 
is simply garnered by asking us to consider our intuitions about what objects are 
referred to by names with respect to other possible worlds. As such, our intuitions to 
the effect that names rigidly designate merely indicate that we have certain 
inferential practices with proper names such that the belief which is non-negotiable 
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with respect to determining the referent of a name is something like “In all worlds in 
which ‘b’ refers, it refers to whatever object is the actual dominant causal source of 
tokenings of ‘b’.” Once again, it is only if we are disposed to treat such a belief to be 
non-negotiable that we would agree with Kripke that names are rigid designators in 
the first place. As such, the descriptivist can agree with Kripke as to the referents of 
singular terms even with respect to their reference across possible worlds. 
 
What about the epistemic problem? This problem, recall, is that certain sentences 
which predicate meaning-giving descriptions of names should, allegedly, be 
knowable a priori if descriptivism is true. That is, if the descriptions give the 
meaning of proper names, subjects who understand the names should be able to 
know from reflection that, for example, Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander. This 
sentence should have the same epistemic status as ‘Aristotle is Aristotle’ (on the 
assumption that ‘the teacher of Alexander’ is a meaning-giving description). But, it is 
argued, they do not have same epistemic status: the latter is knowable a priori and 
the former is not. What can the Holist say in response to this objection? There is 
much more to say about this objection than I will say here. It touches on some further 
issues which are beyond the scope of this project to address. However, I will offer a 
few comments on the way in which the objection confronts Holism in particular. In 
fact, I think there is reason to believe that the Holist might be in quite a good position 
to respond the epistemic problem.  
 
Firstly, consider that the Holist is not trying to give an account of the meaning of the 
name ‘Gödel’, considered as some element of a public and shareable language – for 
there is no such thing. Rather, she is interested in the meaning of, for example, 
‘GödelA’: the meaning of ‘Gödel’, for a subject, A, in her idiolect.
280
 Further, 
consider that the Holist does not claim that ‘GödelA’ and (for example) ‘whatever 
object is the (actual) dominant causal source of tokenings of ‘GödelA’,’ are 
synonyms. Rather, at most, she claims that the description is part of the meaning of 
‘GödelA’. As such, we should not expect these two expressions to make exactly the 
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same contribution towards the sentences in which they figure; nor should we expect 
subjects to treat two sentences which differ only with respect to which of these 
expressions they contain as epistemically equivalent. For the Holist, the inferences 
identified by Field only partially determine (or, perhaps, partially constitute) the 
concept or expression’s meaning. 
 
Secondly, there is reason to think that, on Holism, the rigidified descriptions which 
are (in cases of cooperative speakers) the determiners of reference will be knowable 
a priori. This is because all aspects of the meaning of a term are, in a sense, a priori 
knowable on Holism. Importantly, as will be familiar from Chapter 2, subjects 
cannot help but master the concepts they possess (and the corresponding words 
which express those concepts) – understanding perfectly tracks content. As such, it 
seems that, on Holism, we should expect subjects to be able to discern various 
aspects of the meanings of expressions at their disposal a priori. In effect, whatever 
it is that they understand to be the case is the case with respect to the correct 
application of their concepts and expressions.
281
 If a subject, through a priori 
reflection, determines that “GödelA is the actual dominant causal source of tokenings 
of ‘GödelA’” is a non-negotiable element of the concept expressed by the name 
‘GödelA’, then this is a non-negotiable element of the concept expressed by the name 
‘GödelA’. If she did not discern this to be the case, then the expression would not be 
‘GödelA’, but some different expression, ‘GödelB’ (which refers in a different way). 
Again, when presenting his various arguments Kripke asked us to determine, a 
priori, which objects various expressions referred to (although not how they 
referred). Holism claims that, for each subject, whatever answer she arrives at 
through a priori reflection is the right answer. 
 
One last thing to note is that, although the reference-determining descriptions which 
we identified using Field’s strategy are, of necessity, true of the object referred to, 
the Holist should be careful about what she says about the various other properties 
attributed to an object by a subject. On Holism, for any subject with the relevant 
inferential practices, it is necessary that, for example, ‘GödelA’ refers to whatever 
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object is the (actual) dominant causal source of tokenings of ‘GödelA’. However, it is 
not the case that, for example, it is part of the meaning of ‘GödelA’ that Gödel must 
have proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. As such, the Holist isn’t committed to 
the claim that this property of Gödel be a priori knowable. What is part of the 
meaning of the expression ‘GödelA’ (for a subject who believes that Gödel proved 
the incompleteness of arithmetic) is not that Gödel must have proved the 
incompleteness of arithmetic but, rather, that it is defeasibly held true of him that he 
did this. This latter aspect of the meaning of ‘GödelA’ is something that a subject can 
discern a priori. That is, it is not part of the meaning of ‘GödelA’ that Gödel proved 
the incompleteness of arithmetic; but it is part of the meaning of ‘GödelA’ that the 
concept expressed represents a particular object, Gödel, as having (in the actual 
world) proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. As Field’s argument demonstrates, 
cooperative subjects treat the claim that he proved the incompleteness of arithmetic 
as defeasible, whereas they treat the relevant reference-determining description as 
non-defeasible. 
 
There is, of course, much more to say about the plausibility of descriptivist and 
deflationist theories of reference. But I will not undertake a full defence of either 
view here. My aim in this chapter is primarily just to provide a strategy which will 
allow the Holist to agree with the externalist as to the extensions of concepts. It 
should be borne in mind that this strategy may engender some (though not all) of the 
problems which face descriptivist and/or deflationist theories of reference. For ease 
of exposition, in what follows I will talk largely in terms of the deflationary theory. 
When I talk of subjects representing objects, I will mean this in the deflationary 
sense. However, everything I say below can be endorsed by someone who believes in 
substantial intentional relations between thoughts and their objects. 
 
4.2 From the referents of words to the objects of thought 
 
Armed with Field’s deflationary interpretation of Kripke’s observations, I think that 
we can now begin to answer the objection introduced in Section 3 above. We should 
take the application-conditions of a concept to be determined by those beliefs about 
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the object of thought which a subject would hold fixed in light of conflicting 
information about the properties of the object in question. I will begin by showing 
how this applies to the objects of singular term concepts and then move on to 
considering how this strategy can be applied to general term concepts. To return to 
our Gordon Ramsey example, the approach can be applied as follows. Recall that the 
subject from the example believes that there is some object such that it is called 
‘Gordon Ramsey’ and is a famous chef and violinist. The present approach claims 
that we can still maintain that this subject is talking about Gordon Ramsey despite 
her false beliefs. This is because she is disposed to infer (7) if she finds out that 
Gordon Ramsey is not a famous violinist. 
 
7) Gordon Ramsey is not a famous violinist. 
 
She would not infer (8), 
 
8) There is no such person as Gordon Ramsey.282 
 
I think this shows that she did not take all the properties which she attributed to the 
object she calls ‘Gordon Ramsey’ as collaboratively responsible for determining the 
extension of her concept. Imagine that our subject is told that Gordon Ramsey is not 
a famous chef. Once again, she will infer (9) rather than (8), 
 
9) Gordon Ramsey is not a famous chef. 
 
So which beliefs are essential to determining the extensions of concepts? As above, it 
depends on the dispositions of the individual speaker. But, with respect to 
cooperative speaker, I think something about the Kripkean intuition is quite right: in 
the case of proper name concepts, the belief we do not give up is the belief that our 
concept picks out whichever object is appropriately causally related to our tokening 
of the concept in thought. But, as Field has shown, we can construe this merely as a 
                                                 
282
 Or, perhaps, ‘There is no such person as Gordon Ramsey in the actual world’. 
234 
 
fact about our inferential practices with proper names and the concepts which are 
expressed by those proper names. 
 
What we needed to do to solve the present problem was to demonstrate that subjects 
can be thinking and talking about the same object despite one or both of them 
possessing false beliefs as to its properties, and I take it that Field’s deflationary view 
of reference (transposed into a thesis about the objects of thought) secures this result. 
It, in effect, does all the work of an inflationary theory of reference vis-à-vis 
identifying the objects of thought, but does so without invoking anything over and 
above the inferential practices of the individual. And, just as in the case of reference, 
we needn’t even think that such inferential tendencies are explicitly reflected upon 
by a subject providing her inferential practices demonstrate such tendencies. 
 
Once again, although we can use Kripkean observations to support a deflationary 
theory of intentionality, we can also use these observations to support an internally-
determined, inflationary intentional relation between thoughts and their objects. This 
would be the mental analogue of Jackson’s descriptivist theory. On such a view, the 
belief relevant to determining the extension of a subject’s concept is just whichever 
belief is identified by the subject’s inferential practices as being non-negotiable. 
Given our actual linguistic practices, this will for most subjects be of the form, 
‘Concept, C, applies to whichever object is the actual dominant causal source of 
mental tokenings of C.’ This view about the objects of thought, then, has the very 
same structure as the internalist views of the reference of words introduced above. 
 
Section 5: Deference 
 
In the previous sections, I adapted Field’s argument to apply, not just to the reference 
of singular terms, but also to the concepts expressed by these terms. I will now argue 
that a Field-style strategy can be applied to the social externalist phenomenon of 
deference to motivate a thorough-going internalism about the determination of the 




Just as with Kripke’s examples, we can take certain kinds of evidence used to 
support social externalism – for example, the fact that subjects are disposed to accept 
correction – not as evidence that they somehow think thoughts which involve a 
community concept, but merely as evidence that they represent the same objects as 
others in their linguistic community despite not sharing their concepts.
283
 On this 
proposal, each subject will possess an idiosyncratic concept – this much is a 
consequence of Holism – but these idiosyncratic concepts may be concepts which 
pick out the same objects as the experts’ concepts. Just as above, the approach can be 
given either a deflationary or an inflationary spin. 
 
Burge offers data which is supposed to support social externalism. He writes,  
 
The subject’s willingness to submit his statement and belief to the arbitration 
of an authority suggests a willingness to have his words taken in the normal 
way – regardless of mistaken associations with the word. Typically, the 
subject will regard recourse to a dictionary, and to the rest of us, as at once a 
check on his usage and his belief. When the verdict goes against him, he will 
not usually plead that we have simply misunderstood his views. This sort of 





However, if we apply the Field-style strategy, we can reconstrue this data, not as 
evidence that subjects somehow think thoughts which involve community concepts, 
but merely as evidence that they are thinking about the same objects as others in their 
community. We can say that the object represented by a subject’s concept will be 
determined by certain non-negotiable, or indefeasible, beliefs as to its application, 
where the disposition to treat these beliefs as non-negotiable will be manifest in the 
subject’s inferential practices. As I will show, on this internalist approach, the fact 
that Alf is disposed to accept correction as to the application of his ARTHRITISALF 
concept is simply grounds for thinking that the belief that is non-negotiable with 
respect to the application of this concept is that ARTHRITISALF IS WHATEVER THE 
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 Whatever other beliefs he holds as to the properties of 
arthritis, if they conflict with his non-negotiable belief, he will infer that these 
properties are not properties of arthritis rather than relinquish this non-negotiable 
belief. In particular, he will relinquish the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh. To 
see this, let us return to Burge’s example. 
 
Before speaking to his doctor, Alf believes both THAT ARTHRITISALF CAN OCCUR IN 
THE THIGH and THAT ARTHRITISALF IS WHAT THE EXPERTS CALL ‘ARTHRITIS’.
286
 When 
Alf is corrected by his doctor, he will relinquish one of these beliefs, for no object in 
the actual world satisfies both of these descriptions. As Burge identifies, he will 
relinquish the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh. Burge thinks that the fact that 
Alf accepts correction from his doctor with respect to the application of his concept 
is reason to think that Alf is employing the same concept as his doctor. However, if 
we employ Field’s strategy, we can construe Alf’s actions as merely an indication 
that Alf treats his doctor’s utterance of (10), 
 
10) Arthritis does not occur in the thigh. 
 
As grounds for inferring (11), 
 
11) I do not have arthritis in my thigh. 
 
Rather than (12), 
 
12) Arthritis (the disease which afflicts my joints and bones) is not the disease 
which the experts call ‘arthritis’. 
 
He would infer (12) if he thought that the object picked out by ARTHRITISALF must 
have the property of being a disease that can occur in the joints and bones. In this 
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case, he would take the belief that ARTHRITISALF is what the experts call ‘arthritis’ to 
be inessential to his concept and would relinquish it in the face of (10). The reason 
he accepts correction is indeed because he took himself to be thinking (and talking) 
about the same thing as the experts, but this doesn’t require that he shares their 
concepts. It is enough that his concept applies to the same objects as theirs. And this 
fact can be secured purely by appeal to Alf’s inferential practices as manifest in his 
inference from (10) to (11) (and in his rejection of the inference from (10) to (12)).  I 
submit that any subject who possesses this kind of disposition with respect to the 
application of a concept is a subject who represents the same object(s) as the experts 
in her community with her concept. 
 
Just as I earlier claimed that Kripke’s semantic (and modal) arguments don’t show 
anything more than that we have certain inferential practices with regards to 
sentences containing singular terms, Burge’s argument, too, cannot show anything 
stronger than that we have certain inferential practices with thoughts containing 
general term concepts (and sentences containing general terms). Further argument is 
needed to establish the very radical conclusion that subjects think thoughts which are 
constitutively dependent on their language community rather than that they merely 
possess concepts which, oftentimes, share extensions with the concepts of others in 
their community. And, just as before, we have a choice between an inflationary and 
deflationary theory of intentionality. If we wish to endorse an inflationary intentional 
relation between thoughts and their objects, this relation can be determined 
internally: the belief relevant to determining the extension of a subject’s concept is 
just whichever belief is identified by the subject’s inferential practices as being non-
negotiable. As such, a subject can hold any number of false beliefs as to the 
properties of this object and yet succeed in thinking about it providing she possesses 
the relevant inferential tendencies. In short, much of what Burge says about the 
dispositions of subjects is true. Indeed, most cooperative subjects will be disposed to 
behave this way with respect to the application-conditions of many of their concepts. 
With respect to general term concepts, those of us who do not possess full linguistic 
competence are disposed to hold beliefs of roughly the form “CONCEPT C APPLIES TO 
WHICHEVER OBJECT THE EXPERTS TALK ABOUT WITH TOKENINGS  OF ‘C’”, as essential 
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to the application-conditions of the concept. The experts, of course, hold different 
identifying beliefs which will involve non-deferential descriptions. Jackson, in his 
defence of descriptivism about reference, also argues that descriptions of this form 
are excellent candidates for identifying descriptions. In this vein he writes,  
 
The cases offered to support the claim about ignorance of individuating 
properties all seem to me to overlook obvious candidates to be the needed 
individuating properties. Hilary Putnam claims that he does not know what 
separates beeches from elms but insists that he succeeds in referring to 
beeches when he says, say, that he does not know how beeches differ from 
elms. I agree that he does refer to beeches, but point out that he does know 





It should now be clear that this solution not only demonstrates that idiosyncratic our 
concepts can be co-extensional, but that this co-extensionality will be exactly as 
widespread on internalism as is concept-sharing on social externalism. The reason 
for this is that the dispositions that I appealed to in my solution are precisely those 
which are supposed to motivate social externalism. As such, any case in which social 
externalism would posit a shared concept is a case in which my internalist can posit 
co-extensionality of distinct idiosyncratic concepts. Whereas on social externalism, 
certain practices – for example, the disposition to defer, or to accept correction – are 
utilised as part of the story of how content is individuated, on our internalist theory, 
the fact that we are disposed to accept correction from experts can be explained 
simply by the utility of having certain inferential practices. For example, our 
communicative practices will be far more efficient if we are, on the whole, talking 
about the same things with our utterances. (By comparison, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, sharing content is not of practical use to us when it comes to 
communicative success). Similarly, talking about the same objects allows us to 
divide our epistemic labour when it comes to learning about these objects and 
building bodies of knowledge.
288
 Our concepts tend to be co-extensional, not because 
they are shared, but because it is useful for us to be talking about the same things 
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with our utterances of the same word-forms (and thinking about the same things with 
the concepts expressed by these word-forms). 
 
Section 6: Differences between microphysical duplicates 
 
We have seen how internalism can maintain that two subjects who possess different 
concepts can yet be thinking (and talking) about the same objects. However, what 
should this approach say about Alf and counterfactual-Alf? Burge holds that these 
two subjects possess different concepts with different extensions. Indeed, this is the 
crux of his argument against internalism. I too wish to claim this, for my aim in this 
chapter is to show that internalists can agree with externalists as to the extensions of 
concepts. But Alf and counterfactual-Alf are microphysical duplicates, so how, on 
internalism, can it be that Alf and counterfactual-Alf are thinking about different 
things? In this section, I will demonstrate how we can use the present strategy to 
show that Alf and counterfactual-Alf do indeed possess different concepts with 
different extensions (henceforth, I will refer to Alf in the counterfactual world using 
the name ‘Calf’
289
). It will turn out that my internalist approach to determining the 
extensions of Alf and Calf’s respective arthritis concepts presents us with an instance 
of the internalist’s so-called problem of ‘indexical thought’. However, as we will see, 
this problem can be easily met. I will adapt an argument from Pelczar (2009) to show 
how this can be done. In what follows, I will first introduce the problem of indexical 
thought and Pelczar’s solution. He argues that the internalist can meet this challenge 
by appealing to differences in the intrinsic properties of microphysical duplicates. I 
will then demonstrate how the internalist method for determining thought content for 
microphysical duplicates presents us with an instance of the problem of indexical 
thought. As such, it can be dealt with in the very same way. Differences in Alf and 
Calf’s non-negotiable beliefs will determine differences in the application-conditions 
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and extensions of their respective arthritis concepts which must also reduce to 
differences in their intrinsic properties. 
 
By an ‘indexical thought’ I will mean any thought which is expressed by an utterance 
containing an indexical expression. Here I am following Pelczar’s use of 
terminology.
 
It is plausible that it is only expressions of a language which can be 
genuinely indexical: thought contents themselves cannot contain unresolved 
elements. The phrase ‘indexical thought’ is just shorthand for thoughts which would 
be expressed using indexical words. It is not meant to suggest that the concepts 
expressed by these words are also indexical. Such thoughts are supposed to cause 
problems for the content internalist. The objection goes as follows. Suppose, as many 
internalists claim, that microphysical duplicates are identical with respect to thought 
content. They must then be identical with respect to thought content which is 
expressed with indexicals such as in ‘I am hungry’. But clearly microphysical 
duplicates express different thoughts with these utterances. As Pelczar writes (of 
Putnam’s Twin-subjects), “[W]hen Oscar says “I’m hungry!” he means something 
that is true iff Oscar is hungry, whereas when Toscar utters the same words sincerely, 
he intends something that is true iff Toscar is hungry.”
290
 Thus, if the internalist must 
claim that microphysical duplicates share their indexical thoughts, then content 
internalism is false. A similar line of argument can be found in Putnam. He writes, of 
indexical words (although he does not extend the argument to thought content), 
 
For these (indexical) words no one has ever suggested the traditional theory 
that ‘intension determines extension’. To take our Twin Earth example: if I 
have a Doppelgänger on Twin Earth, then when I think, ‘I have a headache’, 
he thinks ‘I have a headache’. But the extension of the particular token of ‘I’ 
in his verbalized thought is himself […], while the extension of the token of 
‘I’ in my verbalized thought is me […]. So the same word, ‘I’, has two 




The problem for the internalist, with respect to thought content, is that there appears 
to be an obvious difference in the extension of a concept for two speakers but, ex 
hypothesi, no internal difference between them. Pelczar (2009) argues that, although 
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we should accept that microphysical duplicates do not share their indexical thoughts, 
it can be shown that this difference cannot be explained by differences in their 
external environments. He argues that microphysical duplicates differ in their 
intrinsic properties and that differences in the content of their indexical thoughts 
must reduce to these differences in intrinsic properties. Thus, internalism is not 
threatened providing it rejects the thesis that microphysical duplicates must be 
identical with respect to thought content.  
 
Following Pelczar, I will understand an intrinsic property to be any property which a 
thing has, and could have, even if it were the only contingently existing thing.
292
 
These are properties of an individual which do not depend on the existence of any 
objects external to that individual, but which are also not shared by any 
microphysical duplicates of that individual. That such properties exist should be 
uncontroversial. To see that Alf and Calf possess different intrinsic properties 
consider that Alf, for example, stands in an intrinsic relation to Alf’s nose that Calf 
does not stand in (although Calf does stand in an intrinsic relation to a qualitatively 
exactly similar object – Calf’s nose).
293
 The relation that Alf stands in to his own 
nose is one that is intrinsic to him. It does not depend on any externally existing 
object. Nonetheless, this property is not one which is shared by his duplicates. 
Microphysical duplicates, then, do not share all their intrinsic properties. 
 
Now consider the indexical thoughts of microphysical duplicates, such as their self-
referential beliefs. These are the beliefs that a subject would express with utterances 
containing indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘my’, etc. Pelczar argues that differences in the 
contents of the self-referential beliefs of microphysical duplicates do not depend in 
any way on differences in their environments. His claim is that, “a person’s success 
at referring to himself does not—or at any rate need not— depend on anything 
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besides his intrinsic properties.”
294
 To argue for this, Pelczar demonstrates that, when 
referring to themselves, two microphysical duplicates can be in exactly the same 
external environments and yet the truth-conditions of their respective self-referential 
utterances and beliefs will still be different.
295
 If Alf utters ‘I am hungry’, his 
utterance (and the belief it expresses) will be made true only by the state of affairs 
obtaining that Alf is hungry. It will not be made true by any facts about Alf’s 
microphysical duplicates (although, any microphysical duplicate of Alf will also be 
hungry). This will be so even if Alf’s microphysical duplicates are embedded in the 
exact same physical and social environment as Alf. We can place them in the very 
same world, and this will still be so. But if Alf and Calf differ in the content of their 
respective self-referential beliefs even when there is no difference in their external 
environment, this difference must reduce to differences in their intrinsic properties, 
for there simply are no other differences between them that we could appeal to in 
order to explain this difference in content.
296
 Even a social externalist should accept 
this claim. To reject it, they must claim that two subjects who are both microphysical 
duplicates and inhabit exactly similar social and physical environments must 
entertain self-referential beliefs with the very same content. But this is to simply 
endorse the problematic claim that the internalist was accused of being lumbered 
with in the first place. And this, apart from being implausible, would be to abandon 
the argument from indexical thought. As Pelczar has shown, the internalist need not 
claim that microphysical duplicates share their indexical thoughts. And the 
externalist needn’t claim this either providing she is willing to admit that it is 
differences in two subjects’ intrinsic properties which are responsible for the 
difference in indexical thought content after all. I will now show how similar 
considerations demonstrate that Alf and Calf possess different arthritis concepts. 
 
As we have seen, an internalist can claim that no matter what changes we make to 
Alf’s linguistic community, if Alf remains internally the same, the truth-conditions of 
Alf’s self-referential beliefs won’t change. Importantly, the truth-conditions of Alf’s 
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 Pelczar notes that an alternative would be to claim that it is just a brute fact about a subject that she 
refers to herself with her self-referential beliefs. But this too would be an internalist solution to the 
problem (2009, 100). 
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self-referential beliefs will always remain different from those of Calf’s beliefs. Now 
consider Alf and Calf’s respective arthritis concepts: ARTHIRTISALF and ARTHRITISCALF. 
Given the Field-style method for determining the extensions of subjects’ concepts, 
the two Alfs each possess a non-negotiable belief as to the application-conditions of 
their respective arthritis concepts which they might express with an utterance of (13), 
 
13) Arthritis is whatever the experts in my community call ‘arthritis’. 
 
But because of the indexical, ‘my’, involved, (13) expresses a different content in 
Alf’s mouth as it does in Calf’s mouth: the two subjects think different thoughts with 
different truth-conditions. When Alf utters a token of (13), the indexical, ‘my’, refers 
to Alf. As such, the description which determines the extension of his ARTHIRTISALF 
concept picks-out whichever object is referred to by the relevant experts in his 
language community. No other object will satisfy this description. But when Calf 
utters a token of (13), ‘my’ refers to Calf, and thus the description which determines 
the extension of his ARTHIRTISCALF concept picks-out whichever object is referred to 
by the experts in his own distinct language community. The objects which satisfy 
these two descriptions are different. But this is just the alleged ‘problem’ of indexical 
thought introduced above: Alf and Calf are microphysical duplicates, and yet their 
indexical thoughts have different contents. And, as we have seen, accounting for this 
difference is not a problem for internalism after all. Crucially, just as above, we can 
show that this difference is not explained by differences in the external environments 
of the two subjects. We can place Alf and Calf in exactly similar social and physical 
environments and the truth-conditions of their respective beliefs will remain 
unchanged. That is, they will remain different from each other because they each 
involve a self-referential component: Alf’s thought content will always involve 
reference to Alf alone, whereas Calf’s thought content will always involve reference 
to Calf alone. In fact, we can completely remove the social and physical environment 
and this difference between them will remain.
297
 Thus, the difference in their thought 
contents is not explained by differences in their environments as externalism would 
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require. The difference, then, must reduce to differences in their intrinsic properties 
for there is nothing else that this difference could reduce to given that their 
environments are the same. Because of their respective self-referential beliefs, Alf is 
only disposed to accept correction based on facts about Alf’s language community, 
whereas Calf is only disposed to accept correction based on facts about Calf’s 
language community. Alf is not disposed to infer anything about what ‘arthritis’ 
means in his community from facts about some counterfactual community.  
 
Note that the claim here is not that Alf’s arthritis concept is an indexical.
298
 The 
claim is merely that the description which fixes the extension of his concept contains 
a self-referential component (expressed using an indexical) which determines that 
Alf is thinking about his own language community rather than the community of his 
microphysical duplicate. The extension of Alf’s arthritis concept does not vary with 
context. The approach here is just a familiar descriptivist one. Alf and Calf’s 
respective arthritis concepts have different extensions for the same reasons that the 
description ‘The biggest fish in the sea’ would express different concepts and pick 
out different objects in their respective worlds. Alf would be interested in which fish 





A similar account is presented in Searle (1983), although Searle does not argue for it 
in the same way. He presents his account in response to Putnam’s charge that 
microphysical duplicates can have water concepts with different extensions. Searle’s 
account claims that we can account for this difference in extension by appealing to a 
self-referential component involved in the initial baptism of the substance itself. He 
writes (of Oscar and Twin Oscar), “Though they have type-identical visual 
experiences in the situation where “water” is for each identified, they do not have 
type-identical Intentional contents. On the contrary, their Intentional contents can be 
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different because each Intentional content is causally self-referential […].”
300
 What 
he means by this is that two Twin subjects, when naming water and XYZ with the 
word-form “water” (respectively), give definitions of what it is to be water which 
involve indexicals. Specifically, these indexicals refer to certain visual experiences 
of the subject. The description which determines the reference of “water” in each 
world is one which picks out whichever substance is responsible for causing the 
particular visual experience in that world. Searle writes, 
 
The indexical definitions given by Jones on earth of “water” can be analyzed 
as follows: “water” is defined indexically as whatever is identical in structure 
with the stuff causing this visual experience, whatever that structure is. And 
the analysis for twin Jones on twin earth is: “water” is defined indexically as 
whatever is identical in structure with the stuff causing this visual experience, 
whatever that structure is. Thus, in each case we have type-identical 
experiences, type-identical utterances, but in fact in each case something 
different is meant. That is, in each case the conditions of satisfaction 
established by the mental content (in the head) is different because of the 




In giving his account, Searle is concerned with the initial baptism of a new substance 
with a name. His account proceeds by appeal to the self-referentiality of perceptual 
experiences. My own account was less concerned with explaining the introduction of 
new terms into a language, and more concerned with how inexpert doppelgängers 
can succeed in possessing concepts which are coextensive, not with each other’s 
concepts, but with the concepts of experts in their respective language communities. 
To explain this, I appealed to the self-referentiality of the non-negotiable descriptions 
entertained (more or less implicitly) by subjects who are disposed to accept 
correction, or ‘defer’ – in the internalist sense – to more expert subjects. Both 
approaches claim that internalism is consistent with the claim that microphysical 
duplicates can differ in their thought contents. This last section, then, demonstrates 
that on the present approach content internalism must be stated, not in terms of the 
properties shared by microphysical duplicates, but as a thesis which claims that a 
subject’s intentional properties are reducible to her intrinsic properties. 
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Section 7: Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I introduced a further distinction between dimensions of conceptual 
variability which is relevant to communicative success. This is a distinction between 
conceptual-role and application-conditions. I then introduced some examples which 
demonstrated how differences in similarity between two concepts along these two 
dimensions can be more or less important to communicative success depending on 
the communicative aims of interlocutors. Once I had introduced these examples, I 
presented an objection to the Holist View of Communicative Success. The problem 
was that communication with singular terms appeared to require preservation of 
reference. And, as is familiar from the externalist arguments of Kripke, Putnam and 
Burge, internalists appear to struggle when it comes to accounting for widespread co-
reference and co-extensionality of idiosyncratic expressions and concepts. In 
response to the objection, I argued that a content internalist need not uphold a 
revisionary account of the extensions of subjects’ concepts and the reference of her 
words. The Holist can agree with social externalism’s claims as to the extensions of 
concepts and expressions whilst denying that mental content depends on anything 
outside of the individual. To show this, I adapted an argument from Field (with some 
help from Jackson). Field argues that our observations about reference are really just 
observations about our inferential practices with sentences containing proper names. 
Our inferential practices indicate that certain beliefs are treated as non-negotiable 
when it comes to identifying the referents of singular terms. The non-negotiable 
beliefs pick out the (intuitively) correct referents for singular terms, but without 
appeal to anything external to the individual. When we apply this approach to the 
objects of thought, the result is a method for discerning which beliefs are non-
negotiable with respect to the determination of the extensions of concepts. My 
approach can claim that subjects within the same community represent the same 
objects as each other despite possessing idiosyncratic concepts. Furthermore, it can 
agree with Burge that microphysical duplicates do not share thought content whilst 
resisting the externalist conclusion: differences between the thought contents of 
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microphysical duplicates reduce to differences in their intrinsic properties.  A 
consequence of my approach is that internalism should be stated as the thesis that 
differences in content reduce to differences in the intrinsic properties of subjects and 
not as a view which claims that microphysical duplicates share thought content. In 
this chapter, my aim was to demonstrate that the Holist can agree with externalists as 
to which objects are represented by thoughts and utterances. As such, they can allow 
that reference is preserved in communication which involves singular term concepts. 
In the next chapter, we will see how this approach can be used to underpin a similar 
content view of knowledge through testimony. That is, the Holist can endorse a view 





Chapter 6: Holism and testimony 
 
If my arguments have been successful thus far, I have shown that Holism can 
endorse a plausible account of communicative success. In fact, its account of 
communicative success appears to be significantly more attractive than that available 
to sociolectical theories of content. Sociolectical theories must choose between an 
account of communicative success which offers plausible diagnoses as to the success 
of communicative attempts, on the one hand, and an account which allows that 
communicative success should be measured in terms of a Content Relation, on the 
other. Holism does not face this choice. However, I have not yet shown that Holism’s 
account of communicative success can be used to underpin a tenable account of 
testimonial knowledge exchange. Perhaps when it comes to communicative success 
‘close enough’ is good enough, but testimonial exchanges might determine a more 
demanding context. Perhaps the testimonial context does indeed require sameness of 
content. Prima facie, this looks pretty plausible: one might think that surely when a 
speaker testifies that P then, if the hearer can come to know anything at all through 
this testimony, it is that P, and not some merely similar content. In debates in the 
epistemology of testimony it is typically stipulated that in a ‘good’ case of a 
testimonial exchange, the content grasped by the hearer is the very same content as 
that attested to by the speaker. As we have seen, the Holist cannot endorse this 
stipulation. As such, if she wishes to maintain that there is such a thing as knowledge 
through testimony, she must endorse an account upon which testimonial exchanges 
can result in a hearer gaining knowledge even when the content grasped by the 
hearer is not the content of the speaker’s testimony, P, but some similar (yet distinct) 
content, P*. I will call this the ‘Similar Content Account of Knowledge through 
Testimony’ (‘SimTest’, for short). It is this account which I will develop and defend 
in this chapter. 
 
There is reason to think that the stipulation of sameness of content cannot be 
dispensed with. If this is so then SimTest will be untenable. And, if SimTest is 
untenable, then Holism is in trouble once again. Whereas sociolectical theories can 
provide sameness of content in the testimonial context, Holism cannot do so: Holism 
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must endorse SimTest. And if Holism cannot uphold a plausible account of 
testimonial knowledge acquisition this would constitute a serious objection to the 
theory. It is, presumably, required of a theory of communicative success that it can 
underpin a plausible account of testimony. There are even those like Evans (1982) 
who claim that communication is essentially a means of exchanging knowledge.
302
 
As such, we would have reason to reconsider the plausibility of sociolectical 
accounts of communicative success. Sociolectical accounts may look bad at 
explaining mere communicative success, but if they are the only accounts which can 
underpin exchange of knowledge through testimony, this would be a significant mark 
in their favour. Goldberg, in his (2007) book, ‘Anti-Individualism’, argues that 
theories on the model of SimTest are epistemically problematic. There are two kinds 
of problem which Goldberg identifies. The first is a problem for SimTest itself: 
Goldberg argues that SimTest cannot uphold an attractive account of epistemic 
reliance – where epistemic reliance is thought to be an essential feature of knowledge 
through testimony. Instead, Goldberg argues, it must posit a revised notion of 
epistemic reliance which fails to capture certain epistemic features thought to be 
distinctive of testimonial exchanges. And there are several further problems which 
result from adoption of this revised account of epistemic reliance. The second kind of 
problem concerns the plausibility of combining SimTest with content internalism. 
Goldberg argues that, if combined with content internalism, SimTest must claim that 
knowledge is rarely, if ever, gained through testimony. 
 
In this chapter I will argue that, contrary to appearances, neither SimTest, nor 
internalism, need suffer either of these kinds of problem. Given the arguments of 
Chapter 5, my response to both these worries will not be surprising. With regards to 
the first problem, I will argue that the cluster of problems pertaining to epistemic 
reliance only afflicts a version of SimTest which claims that knowledge can be 
gained through testimony even when the content recovered by the hearer represents a 
merely similar state of affairs. I will argue that SimTest should claim instead that 
knowledge through testimony requires that the content proffered by the speaker and 
grasped by the hearer be similar enough that they represent the same state of affairs. 
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That is, the content grasped by the hearer must have the same truth-conditions as the 
content expressed by the speaker. In response to the second problem, I will show 
how an internalist who posits mere similarity of content can endorse this version of 
SimTest by appeal to the method of determining the application-conditions of 
idiosyncratic contents advocated in Chapter 5. 
 
The chapter will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I will introduce what is meant by a 
‘testimonial exchange’. In Section 2, I will present two competing accounts of the 
semantic condition on the success of a testimonial exchange. These will be the Same 
Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (‘SamTest’), and the Similar 
Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (‘SimTest’). In Section 3, I will 
present the first collection of objections which Goldberg levels against SimTest and 
some additional, related, problems. In Section 4, I will show how SimTest can be 
amended to avoid these problems. In Section 5, I shall present Goldberg’s objection 
that an internalist cannot sensibly endorse SimTest, and I will show how the Holist 
can deal with this objection by appeal to the machinery set up in the previous 
chapter. Finally, in Section 6, I will end with some remarks as to the demands placed 
on interlocutors by the testimonial context. It will turn out that the testimonial 
context needn’t be thought of as being particularly demanding after all. 
 
Section 1: Testimony and knowledge through testimony  
 
Testimony is thought to be a vital source of knowledge.
303
 An enormous number of 
our beliefs about the world are gained through the testimony of others. Many of the 
beliefs we hold could only have been gained through testimony, at least in practice. 
For example, if we wish to find out information about certain aspects of past events, 
our only available source of information is the spoken or written accounts of others; 
these accounts are links in a chain leading back to an observation of the event itself. 
It is indisputable that we form an enormous number of beliefs through the testimony 
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of others, and it is widely believed that a large number of these beliefs amount to 
knowledge. 
 
There are many ways in which a hearer can gain knowledge as a result of a 
testimonial exchange. My interest in this chapter is restricted primarily to knowledge 
that is gained through testimony.
304
 Knowledge through testimony is not just any 
knowledge that a hearer might gain as a result of hearing a speaker’s testimony. We 
might say that it is knowledge that is gained through (a) accepting the content of the 
testimony proffered and (b) accepting the content of the testimony proffered. The 
emphasis in (a) is intended to highlight that the content attested to plays a direct role 
in the exchange of testimonial knowledge. Knowledge through testimony cannot be 
gained merely via observation of non-semantic features of the speaker’s utterance. 
As Lackey writes, “[I]t must be based on the content of the proposition to which a 
speaker testifies rather than entirely on features about the speaker’s testimony, e.g., 
how it was testified to, where it was testified to, and so on.”
305
 Similarly, knowledge 
through testimony is not something which can be gained via inferences made by the 
hearer from the content proffered to some further content. The emphasis in (b) is 
intended to highlight the role of acceptance in knowledge through testimony. When a 
hearer accepts a piece of testimony, she does so on the basis of its having been 
attested to by the speaker.
306
 She does not accept it based purely on any non-
testimonial justification that she has for its truth (although she may have such 
justification). Acceptance of a piece of testimony is a matter of the hearer relying on 
the speaker’s justification for the truth of the content attested to rather than a matter 
of her acquiring her own, non-testimonial, justification.
307
 As such, the hearer is 
putting herself in an epistemically vulnerable position: she allows herself to be 
epistemically reliant on the testifier. In accepting a piece of testimony, the hearer is 
relying on the speaker to have gotten things right – to have represented the world in 
                                                 
304
 This distinction between knowledge through testimony and knowledge from testimony is from 
Audi (1997). 
305
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 Although, perhaps not solely on this basis. She may also need positive reasons to trust the speaker, 
or to think that the content of the testimony is plausible. 
307
 If the testimonial chain is longer than two people, the speaker may not herself possess non-
testimonial justification, but may be epistemically reliant on a further speaker who does so, and so on. 
I discuss this in more detail in Section 3. 
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the right way – and to possess sufficient warrant/justification for the belief she 
expresses, or statement she expresses it with. It is thought to be distinctive of 
knowledge through testimony that it involves this epistemic reliance. As Goldberg 
writes, “In casting knowledge as involving belief formed on the basis of a content’s 
having been attested, the proposed characterisation highlights the element of the 
hearer’s epistemic reliance on her source speaker.”
308
 As a result, the epistemic 
properties of the hearer’s testimonial belief will be at least partially dependent on the 
epistemic properties of the speaker’s testimony. 
 
Knowledge from testimony, on the other hand, is any knowledge which is gained as a 
result of a testimonial exchange, but which is not gained directly through acceptance 
of the content proffered. As such, it does not involve the epistemic reliance of the 
hearer on her source speaker. To gain mere knowledge from testimony, the hearer 
need not rely on the speaker to have expressed a belief (or produced a statement) 
which has any particular epistemic properties. And, as such, the epistemic properties 
of the hearer’s testimonial belief do not depend on the epistemic properties of the 
testimony proffered. The justification that the hearer has for her belief does not 
include, or depend on, the justification that the speaker has for her testimony: it must 
have a different, non-testimonial, source. The hearer’s belief from testimony may be 
true, justified, etc. even when the speaker’s testimony is false, unjustified, etc. 
 
To illustrate the difference between the two, Goldberg offers the following examples. 
In the first, which is an example of mere knowledge from testimony, we imagine a 
doctor, Henrietta, who comes to know that it is a sunny day based on her 
observations of reports by her patient, Slobodan.
309
 Henrietta has observed a 
correlation between Slobodan’s utterances of ‘I am in a good mood today’, and its 
being a sunny day. Given this correlation, Henrietta can come to know that it is a 
sunny day from observing Slobodan’s report even when she has not been outside to 
see the weather for herself. Goldberg explains, 
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[H]er knowledge that it is sunny today is based on the empirical 
generalisation, which she has confirmed through careful observation of 
Slobodan, that he reports being in a good mood only on sunny days. She has 
confirmed this generalisation with numerous positive instances in a variety of 





Goldberg thinks that, even if Henrietta can gain knowledge from such exchanges, it 
will not be knowledge through testimony that she has gained. For, in this case, 
Henrietta can be completely indifferent to Slobodan’s epistemic perspective on the 
content he proffers. Goldberg identifies that Henrietta’s knowledge THAT IT IS SUNNY 
epistemically depends only on (a), the correctness of the empirical generalisation 
which connects Slobodan’s utterances of ‘I am in a good mood today’ with the state 
of affairs obtaining that it is a sunny day and (b), her correctly identifying a given 
report of Slobodan’s as falling under this generalisation.
311
 Goldberg explains,  
 
The result is that the total knowledge-relevant support for her belief that it is 
sunny does not outstrip the support she has for the relevant generalisation and 





In particular, Henrietta’s belief, and its status as knowledge, does not depend on the 
epistemic properties of the content of Slobodan’s report. In this case, Henrietta is 
epistemically self-reliant. Goldberg could have set up the example such that 
Slobodan is lying every time he reports being in a good mood, and the 
appropriateness of Henrietta’s forming a belief based on her evidence would remain 
just so long as the correlation between Slobodan’s reports and the state of the 
weather remained.
313
 Providing Slobodan makes this report only when it is in fact 
sunny, Henrietta can gain knowledge that it is sunny outside regardless of the truth of 
Slobodan’s utterance and regardless of whether he has any justification or warrant 
for it. The epistemic properties of the belief that she forms are not dependant on the 






 Ibid, 33 
313
 The correlation is between Slobodan’s reports and the state of the weather, not between Slobodan’s 
beliefs and the state of the weather. Although a similar example could be set up using Slobodan’s 
beliefs instead of his mere reports and the point would still hold. 
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epistemic properties of Slobodan’s report. Her knowledge, then, was formed as a 
result of Slobodan’s testimony, but it is not knowledge through testimony. 
 
In contrast, Goldberg provides an example of knowledge through testimony.
314
 In 
this example, we imagine a different doctor, Hallie, who observes the testimony of 
her patient, Steve. Steve performs an utterance of ‘It is a sunny day today’. In this 
case, Hallie (assuming other things go according to plan) can come to know that it is 
a sunny day by accepting Steve’s testimony. In this second example, Hallie is not 
indifferent to Steve’s epistemic perspective. She is relying on him to have testified 
truly and to be justified/warranted in his belief (or statement). As such, unlike in the 
previous example, the justification/warrant that Hallie has for her testimonial belief 
outstrips the evidence she herself could cite in justification of the content of this 
belief. As Goldberg explains, 
 
The total knowledge-relevant epistemic support enjoyed by Hallie’s belief 
that it is sunny is not exhausted by the support she has for any relevant 
inductive generalisations brought to bear in evaluating the credibility of this 
piece of testimony, together with the support she has for describing the 
testimony as falling under those generalisations. In particular, there remains 
the epistemic support Steve himself had for his testimony – support on whose 




In the second example, Hallie is thus epistemically relying on Steve, and the 
epistemic properties of her testimonial belief are, at least partially, dependent on the 
epistemic properties of his testimony. Epistemic reliance is taken to be distinctive of 
a testimonial exchange. As Goldberg writes, 
 
[W]hat is distinctive of cases of knowledge through speech is precisely the 
element of epistemic reliance: in aiming to acquire knowledge through S’s 
testimony, H is relying on that testimony to have the epistemic features that, 
in virtue of its being a case of testimony, it ought to have.
316
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In what follows, I will treat the presence of epistemic reliance as a precondition for 
something’s counting as a testimonial exchange in the first place, rather than as a 
direct condition on the success of an exchange.
317
 For the purposes of this chapter, I 
will stipulate that a ‘testimonial exchange’ is an event which results in the hearer 
forming a belief through testimony. A successful testimonial exchange is one which 
results in a hearer forming knowledge through testimony. The event involves an act 
on the part of both the speaker and the hearer.
 318
 The speaker’s role in the exchange 
is to perform a speech act which has content which represents some state of affairs 
and which presents this content as being true. The hearer’s role in the exchange is to 
accept the testimony, where this involves her forming a mental representation of the 
content of the speaker’s utterance and taking an attitude of belief towards the content 
she recovers. In accepting the testimony of the speaker, the hearer is relying on the 
speaker both to have represented the world in the right way, and to possess sufficient 
warrant/justification for so doing. 
 
The above is intended as a (partial) characterisation of what is distinctive of a 
testimonial exchange. If the hearer is not epistemically relying on the speaker in the 
way outlined above, then the exchange is not a testimonial exchange, let alone a 
successful one.
319
 As we will see, it is this feature of knowledge through testimony 
that SimTest is alleged to struggle to maintain. An event with the above features will 
result in the hearer forming a belief through testimony. For the hearer to gain 
knowledge through testimony, the testimonial exchange must be successful. 
However, if it is to be successful, certain further conditions must be met. There are 
various additional epistemic conditions which one might think must be met in order 
for an event with the above structure to constitute a successful testimonial exchange. 
For example, a dominant view in the epistemology of testimony is that the speaker in 
                                                 
317
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a testimonial exchange must express her own knowledge with her testimonial 
utterance.
320
 Many believe that there are also various constraints which must be 
placed on the hearer in a testimonial exchange – for example, that she possess a 
capacity for discerning reliable, or trustworthy, testifiers from unreliable testifiers;
321
 
or that she be able to rule out defeaters for the truth of, or justification for, the 
content attested to.
322
 A primary motivation for introducing many of these conditions 
is to rule-out a knowledge-undermining element of accidentality from being present 
in a successful testimonial exchange. It is thought that, if the hearer could easily have 
formed the belief that she did, in the way that she did, when the belief is false, then 
her belief will not amount to knowledge. Most think that, in a successful testimonial 
exchange, a hearer’s testimonial belief must not only be true, but must be non-
accidentally so. 
 
Philosophers who work on testimony are primarily concerned with which epistemic 
conditions must be satisfied in order for the beliefs that a hearer forms through 
accepting testimony to amount to knowledge. They debate the conditions under 
which a hearer’s testimonial belief is justified or warranted, and they debate the 
nature of this justification or warrant. To make this task easier, epistemologists 
commonly keep the semantic conditions fixed. My aim in this chapter is to do the 
opposite. My interest is not, primarily, over which epistemic conditions are essential 
to the success of a testimonial exchange. Rather, my interest is in whether a 
particular thesis as to the semantic features of a testimonial exchange (SimTest) 
impacts upon the epistemic features of the exchange. As such, I wish to work with a 
characterisation of the epistemic dimension of testimonial success which is neutral 
enough to be acceptable to most who are interested in the subject. My thesis is that 
one’s choice between two particular semantic constraints on testimony – SamTest 
and SimTest – is orthogonal to these epistemic issues.
323
 In this chapter, I will remain 
neutral as to which epistemic conditions are required for the success of a testimonial 
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exchange, although, as mentioned above, I will be assuming that, in order to be a 
candidate for a successful testimonial exchange, the exchange must involve the 
epistemic reliance of the hearer on the speaker. In formulating competing views as to 
the semantic dimension of testimony, I will include a clause which abbreviates the 
various epistemic conditions (whatever these may be) on the success of a testimonial 
exchange. With these epistemic considerations bracketed, it will be easier to focus on 
the viability of the semantic constraint with which I will be concerned in this chapter. 
I now turn to two competing options for this semantic constraint. 
 
Section 2: Two semantic conditions on testimonial knowledge exchange 
 
2.1 The Same Content View of Knowledge through Testimony 
 
It is typical for epistemologists who work on testimony to talk as if, in a successful 
testimonial exchange, the hearer forms a belief in the very content attested to by the 
speaker. For example, Lackey writes, “In explaining how we acquire knowledge via 
the testimony of others, we are interested in offering an account of how hearers can 
come to know that p through a speaker’s statement that p.”
324
 Also, Fricker writes, 
“[T]here must be a proposition which the teller intends by her action to present as 
true, and this must be identical with the one grasped by her audience as so presented, 
and accepted by her.”
325
 For many who work on testimony this is simply a 
stipulation. However, Goldberg has recently argued for the necessity of a same 
content condition on testimonial knowledge exchange.
326
 Goldberg offers the 
following characterisation of the basic structure of a successful testimonial exchange: 
 
Successful Communication: S asserts the proposition that p, and on the basis 
of recognising this and relying on S’s say-so (under conditions in which she is 
entitled to do so), H thereby acquires the knowledge that p (where p is the 
propositional content of H’s knowledge).
327
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Goldberg endorses something like the following principle for testimonial knowledge 
which specifies the necessity of an identity relation between the content proffered by 
the speaker and that grasped by the hearer. I present this as follows: 
 
Necessity of Sameness of Content Testimony: A testimonial exchange will 
succeed only if the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is the same as the 
content of the speaker’s testimony. 
 
Based on this principle, we can construct the ‘Same Content View of Knowledge 
through Testimony’ (‘SamTest’). This view states necessary and sufficient 
conditions on knowledge through testimony by incorporating a clause which 
abbreviates the various epistemic constraints on a successful testimonial exchange 
mentioned in Section 2 above. 
 
Same Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (SamTest): A 
testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the epistemic conditions on 
knowledge through testimony are satisfied and (b) the content of the hearer’s 
testimonial belief is the same as the content of the speaker’s testimony. 
 
SamTest has it that a hearer cannot come to know that P through testimony unless the 
content of the speaker’s testimony was that P. (Although, she may come to know that 




In Chapter 2, I explained that sociolectical views of content can easily endorse a 
Same Content View of communicative success. Such accounts of content can also 
easily endorse views like SamTest, and for the same reasons: sociolectical theories 
                                                 
328
 SamTest is a slight simplification. Firstly, perhaps a hearer can come to know that Q from 
testimony that  P if Q is pragmatically implicated by P (although the process by which this implicature 
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claim that concepts are very widely shared and thus any condition which requires 
sameness of content will be easily and often satisfied. Although sociolectical theories 
allow that subjects can possess idiosyncratic concepts, these theories typically claim 
that subjects possess relatively few of them. In fact, the possession of idiosyncratic 
concepts would explain why knowledge exchange sometimes fails for semantic 
reasons on SamTest: a hearer can misunderstand the content of the speaker’s 
testimony by grasping a different content to that which was expressed. She will do 
this if she maps a lexical item in the utterance to her idiosyncratic concept rather than 
the sociolectical concept expressed by the speaker. In such cases, the resultant 
testimonial belief, even if true, will be so only accidentally. As such, it will not 
amount to knowledge. As Goldberg writes, “[M]isunderstanding testimony is a way 





In this chapter, I will not be concerned with whether SamTest is a plausible view of 
testimony. My interest is purely in whether SimTest is defensible. This is because 
SimTest is the only option available to my Holist. For the same reasons that Holism 
should not endorse the Same Content View of communicative success, it should also 
not endorse SamTest. This is because Holism entails that the semantic condition 
stated by SamTest will never be satisfied and, as such, Holism would have to claim 
that knowledge is never gained through testimony. This result, even if it can be 
ameliorated, would be a serious cost of the view. As such, this chapter is devoted to 
demonstrating both that SimTest is a plausible view of knowledge through testimony 
and that Holism can sensibly endorse SimTest. In the next few sections, I first 
present the version of SimTest which is criticised by Goldberg. I will then present a 
collection of problems which supposedly face the account. I will then demonstrate 
how a slight amendment to the account will avoid these worries, and show how a 
Holist can endorse this amended account whilst maintaining that the success of 
testimonial exchanges is a widespread occurrence. As mentioned above, given my 
argument in Chapter 5, I expect that the reader will have anticipated how I will argue 
in this chapter. However, it will be worth taking the time to see just why Goldberg’s 
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objections, although perhaps fatal to one version of SimTest, will be easily avoided 
by the Holist who endorses a version of SimTest based on the Holist View of 
Communicative Success. 
 
2.2 The Similar Content Account of Knowledge through Testimony 
 
The position which I will defend in this chapter is an account of testimony which 
claims that knowledge can be gained through testimony even when the content of the 
testimony recovered by the hearer is not the content of the testimony proffered by the 
speaker, P, but some similar, yet distinct, content, P*. The account I defend is thus 
one which endorses the following principle. 
 
Necessity of Similarity of Content Testimony: A testimonial exchange will 
succeed only if the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is similar to the 
content of the speaker’s testimony. 
 
As with SamTest, I will state the view of testimony based on this principle by 
abbreviating the various epistemic constraints which must be satisfied for the 
exchange to count as an ‘epistemically good’ case of a testimonial exchange. 
 
Similar Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (SimTest): A 
testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the epistemic conditions on 
knowledge through testimony are satisfied and (b) the content of the hearer’s 
testimonial belief is similar to the content of the speaker’s testimony. 
 
The semantic condition stated by SimTest will be satisfied if the content proffered by 
the speaker and recovered by the hearer are identical: that is, if the content of both is 
that P. However, SimTest is weaker than SamTest in that it allows that the recovery 
of a similar content to P would be sufficient for the success of the testimonial 
exchange (assuming the various epistemic constraints are met).
330
 In this statement of 
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SimTest, the appeal to similarity is left vague. In the previous two chapters, I 
explained how different contexts of communicative exchanges might require 
different degrees of similarity between the contents grasped by the hearer and 
expressed by the speaker. And, in the beginning of this chapter, I worried that the 
testimonial context might be a context which is simply too demanding for Holism to 
cope with. The nature of the similarity required by the testimonial context will 
become clear in later sections where I present my solution to the epistemic problems 
which certain versions of SimTest face. 
 
In the above, I have suggested why Holist theories of content in particular should 
endorse SimTest over SamTest. However, it is worth noting that Goldberg has 
argued that internalists – of all stripes – cannot sensibly endorse SamTest.
331
 For the 
purposes of this chapter, I am going to grant that Goldberg is right about the 
implausibility of combining content internalism with SamTest. I will be defending 
theories which eschew SamTest in favour of SimTest. My thesis is that even if a 
theory precludes that content is shared between subjects, that theory can nonetheless 
maintain an epistemically attractive theory of testimony. As such, the arguments in 
this chapter should be of interest to content internalists in general, not just those who 
endorse Holism in particular. Goldberg also argues that SimTest is untenable. It is 
this claim which I will dispute. In what follows, I will present a collection of 
problems which supposedly afflict SimTest (and the combination of SimTest and 
internalism) as a result of its semantic constraint. I will present two broad problems 
in this regard. The first problem concerns epistemic reliance and the nature of 
SimTest’s testimonial chains; the second problem concerns the difficulty of 
achieving sufficient similarity of content on internalism. I will argue that we can 
amend SimTest to avoid the first of these problems. This amendment might appear to 
exacerbate the second problem: the revised formulation of SimTest calls for a degree 
of similarity of content which might appear to be too demanding for the internalist to 
meet. However, by appeal to machinery set up in Chapter 5, I will demonstrate that 
content internalism (and even Holism) can endorse accounts of testimony which 
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facilitate exactly the same amount of knowledge through testimony as their 
externalist rivals. 
 
Section 3: Problems for SimTest 
 
3.1 Epistemic reliance 
 
Goldberg considers a proposal on the model of SimTest. He calls this the ‘close 
enough proposal’. I will use the terms ‘SimTest’ and ‘the close enough proposal’ 
interchangeably to refer to the view. This proposal claims that, “[T]he sort of 
understanding involved in testimonial knowledge does not require recovery of the 
very content attested to; close enough is good enough, epistemically speaking.”
332
 He 
considers that such a theory might be supported by the claim that the belief in this 
‘close enough’ content is likely to be true if the content of the testimony proffered is 
reliable.
333
 After presenting this account, Goldberg offers a number of objections to 
it. The first of Goldberg’s objections concerns the notion of epistemic reliance which 
was earlier introduced as distinctive of knowledge through testimony. He argues that 
the close enough proposal cannot hold onto this notion of epistemic reliance. But, if 
this is so, it is not clear that the kind of knowledge that the close enough proposal 
affords us is really knowledge through testimony. 
 
Epistemic reliance, recall, involves the hearer relying on the speaker both to have 
represented the world correctly with her utterance, and to possess appropriate 
warrant/justification for the belief she expresses or statement she expresses it with. 
The speaker must have non-accidentally gotten things right. The problem for 
SimTest identified by Goldberg is that it is hard to see how a hearer can be said to be 
‘epistemically relying’ on a speaker’s say-so when the hearer herself has not 
correctly represented the content of that say-so. As Goldberg explains,  
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To rely epistemically on a speaker’s say-so is a matter of relying on her to 
have reliably gotten things right. But the notion of ‘getting things right’ is a 





On the ‘close enough’ model, the hearer is not forming her belief through acceptance 
of the speaker’s representation of how the world is for, in close enough cases, the 
hearer has not grasped this. Rather, she has grasped something merely similar: the 
content she grasps might represent a merely similar state of affairs. Thus, Goldberg 
thinks we should wonder in what sense the hearer really is relying epistemically on 
the speaker’s say-so at all. At best, the hearer is relying on the likelihood of the truth 
of the content she grasps, P*, given that P* is similar to the content proffered by the 
speaker, P. 
 
Goldberg considers that the defender of the close enough proposal might attempt to 
provide a revised characterisation of epistemic reliance according to which a hearer 
can be said to be epistemically reliant on the speaker providing that the hear grasps a 
content which is ‘close enough’ to the content proffered by the speaker, where the 
content grasped by the hearer is likely to be true given the reliability of the testimony 
proffered (and its similarity to the content recovered). He writes, 
 
([O]ne might suppose) this process yields beliefs that are reliable enough to 
be candidates for testimonial knowledge. This is because in that case the 
process […] will map observed speech onto contents that have an increased 
likelihood of truth, given the reliability of the speech act observed – even in 
cases in which the reliability of the speech act observed is a reliability 





Unfortunately for SimTest, Goldberg identifies that there are problems with this 
revised notion of epistemic reliance. I will present some of these now. 
 
Problem 1: The responsibility of the testifier 
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A first problem that Goldberg identifies is that, if we adopt the revised notion of 
epistemic reliance, we lose the feature of knowledge through testimony whereby 
hearers can regard speakers as possessing sufficient justification/warrant for their 
(the hearers’) testimonial beliefs. As Goldberg writes, 
 
[B]eliefs grounded in epistemic reliance have a feature whereby the hearer, in 
virtue of her comprehension of the content attested, is ipso facto entitled to 
regard the speaker as having a sufficiently high degree of knowledge-relevant 




Goldberg suggests that the kind of testimonial belief which SimTest countenances 
does not have this feature. No matter how similar the content of the hearer’s belief is 
to the content of the speaker’s testimony, it is not what the speaker attested to. And 
so the hearer cannot regard the speaker as being in an epistemically privileged 
position with respect to the content of her (the hearer’s) testimonial belief.
337
 The 
speaker only possesses warrant/justification for a similar content. 
 
A result of this is that the epistemic support which the hearer has for her testimonial 
belief goes beyond the epistemic support provided by the speaker’s testimony (and 
also beyond any further support provided by the justification the hearer possesses for 
believing the speaker to be a reliable testifier etc.). The hearer is relying on the 
further fact that her testimonial belief is likely to be true, given the reliability of the 
testimony proffered. As Goldberg explains, 
 
In that case, these reasons function as part of the epistemic support for the 
hearer’s belief in the ‘near enough’ content, clearly going beyond the support 
provided by the testimony itself (as well as the support provided by the 
hearer’s reasons for accepting that testimony). For this reason, it is unclear 
whether ‘near enough comprehension’, even assuming that it gives rise to 
reliable belief, underwrites a kind of reliable belief involving the sort of 




This in itself might not seem so bad. After all, we had already conceded that we must 
endorse a different notion of epistemic reliance to the one endorsed by SamTest. As 
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such, it is not surprising that this replacement notion does not possess all the features 
of the original. However, I think we can draw out two further related problems that 
result from this initial issue which may be harder to embrace. These are the 
following. The hearer cannot (a) ‘pass the buck’ with respect to the justification of 
her testimonial belief or (b) blame the speaker if her testimonial belief should turn 
out to be false, or unjustified or unwarranted. I turn to each of these now. 
 
Problem 1a: Buck-passing 
 
Goldberg (2006) argues that knowledge through testimony is distinctive in that it is 
epistemically appropriate for hearers to pass the buck with respect to justification for 
their testimonial beliefs. In this paper, he is not concerned with arguing against 
content internalism or SimTest, but what he says about buck-passing can be used to 
put further pressure on the proposal attacked in his (2007). Goldberg argues that it is 
part of our conception of testimonial knowledge that if a hearer, who has formed a 
testimonial belief based on the testimony of a speaker, is challenged as to the truth 
of, or justification for, this belief, she may first exhaust her own justification for this 
belief (citing reasons for trusting the testifier, for example). But if the challenger 
presses her, it is epistemically appropriate for her to pass the buck to the testifier who 
possesses further epistemic support for the belief’s content. As Goldberg explains, 
 
If the belief was acquired on the basis of another’s testimony […] a subject 
has not exhausted the epistemically appropriate moves available to her, once 
she has exhausted her justification for the belief. On the contrary, when the 
knowledge is testimonial knowledge, even after the subject has exhausted her 
justification for the belief, there remains the ‘move of last resort’, whereby 




This phenomenon is also highlighted by McMyler: 
 
We naturally justify our claims to know based on testimony by citing an 
authority, and when we do so and are challenged, we naturally feel entitled to 
defer these challenges back to the authority.
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However, this practice appears only to make sense on the assumption of SamTest’s 
picture of epistemic reliance. For, on the version of SimTest currently under 
discussion, if a speaker who gained a testimonial belief that P* from testimony that P 
is asked to provide justification for P* it would be epistemically inappropriate for her 
to pass the justificatory buck to the testifier. For the testifier never testified that P*, 
and did not ever present herself as being in an epistemically privileged position with 
respect to P*. In fact, it is possible that the testifier believes that P* is false. 
 
Problem 1b: Blame 
 
A related worry is that it appears that there are cases in which it would not be 
epistemically appropriate for a hearer to blame the testifier if her testimonial belief 
turns out to be false, or unjustified. On SamTest, we can construct examples such as 
the following. Suppose a speaker, Sal, gained a testimonial belief that P from a 
further speaker, Ben. However, suppose that the content of Sal’s testimonial belief is 
false. Now suppose that Sal, unaware of the unreliability of his testimonial belief, 
testifies that P to a hearer, Hannah. Hannah accepts Sal’s testimony, but later finds it 
to be false. If SamTest is true, Hannah may complain that Sal gave false testimony 
and that it is Sal that is to blame for her false belief. Similarly, Sal can also shift the 
blame. He can say that he was told by Ben that P and thus Ben must shoulder at least 
some of the blame for the falsity of the content (although Sal may also be partially 
responsible). Equally, if Ben gained the testimony from a further source, he too can 
shift the blame, and so on. Ultimate responsibility for the testimony seems to lie with 
the original testifier in the chain whose responsibility it is to possess sufficient non-
testimonial justification/warrant for the content she attests to. Each subsequent link 
in a testimonial chain will be (at least partially) epistemically reliant on the initial 
testifier. Similarly, the epistemic properties of the testimonial beliefs of any 
subsequent link in a chain will be (at least partially) dependent upon the epistemic 
properties of the testimony proffered by the initial testifier.
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There may be some sense in which we can preserve a notion of appropriate blame on 
the close enough proposal. For, if Sal offers false testimony, we might think that (a), 
he is to be blamed qua assertor but also that (b), Hannah’s testimonial belief is then 
likely to be false and, as such, Hannah has been put in a position in which she was 
likely to form a false belief as a result of Sal’s testimony. However, there are also 
examples possible on the close enough proposal in which hearers can gain beliefs 
allegedly through testimony which are false, but in which the testifier shoulders no 
blame whatsoever. Consider a case in which Ben offers reliable testimony that P1, 
and Sal gains a testimonial belief that P2 from this testimony, and P2 happens to be 
false (even though similar to P1). Sal cannot hold Ben responsible for his false 
testimonial belief. The testimony that Ben proffered was true and, we can stipulate, 
reliably so. 
 
Problem 2: Testimonial chains 
 
A second kind of epistemic problem with testimony on the model of SimTest 
concerns the properties of SimTest’s testimonial chains. There are at least two 
problems in this regard.  
 
Problem 2a: Instability 
 
The first problem is that SimTest’s testimonial chains become much more unstable 
than SamTest’s. For any chain which comprises exchanges which involve grasp of 
merely similar contents, even assuming that each new link in the chain is likely to be 
true given the truth of the previous link, there is always a chance that each new 
testimonial belief will be false. Of course, only those exchanges which result in true 
testimonial beliefs will count as knowledge through testimony on SimTest, but the 
point is that the chain is easily broken for semantic reasons. In this vein, we might 
further worry whether it really is the case that a content which is similar to the 
content proffered really is likely to be true in virtue of this similarity. Consider that, 
if SimTest is to maintain that anything near the amount of knowledge thought to be 
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gained through testimony is actually so gained, it must be the case that the vast 
majority of exchanges are indeed cases in which the similar content grasped by the 
hearer is true. 
 
Problem 2b: Large shifts in content 
 
A second, and rather strange, problem encountered by SimTest is that two distant 
links in a testimonial chain could, in principle, represent wildly different states of 
affairs.
342
 To see this, consider that, even if each testimonial exchange is successful 
(that is, if each newly formed testimonial belief is true and meets the standards for 
knowledge), if each subject in the testimonial chain recovers a slightly different 
content to the previous one, then after a number of successive exchanges, the content 
grasped by some link in the chain might be completely different to the content 
attested to by the testifier from whom the chain originated. For example, we can start 
with a piece of testimony which represents the state of affairs that there is a red 
squirrel in the garden and it seems in principle possible for successive exchanges to 
shift this content such that, at the end of the chain, a completely different state of 
affairs is represented, such as the state of affairs that there is a brown bear in the 
basement. This might not often happen, but it is surely possible given that successive 
minor shifts in content (and the state of affairs that is represented) can add up to a 
very large shift indeed. And there is nothing in SimTest that would prevent it. 
SimTest, if it endorses the revised notion of epistemic reliance, appears to allow that 
there is nothing wrong with these testimonial chains. But this seems absurd. This 
objection highlights the awkwardness of SimTest’s revised account of epistemic 
reliance. As mentioned above, on a traditional account of epistemic reliance, 
testimonial chains have a feature whereby ultimate responsibility for the non-
testimonial justification/warrant for the testimony lies with the original testifier in the 
chain such that each subsequent link is partially epistemically reliant on this initial 
testifier. Similarly, the epistemic properties enjoyed by each belief are dependent on 
the epistemic properties of the initial testifier’s belief. This is clearly not so on 
SimTest: the first link in a testimonial exchange cannot be held responsible for a 
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piece of testimony which represents a completely different state of affairs to that 
which she initially represented in her testimony. Nor need there be any interesting 
epistemic or semantic relationships between their respective beliefs. It is the revised 
notion of epistemic reliance that is responsible for these problematic features of 
SimTest’s testimonial chains. SimTest allows that beliefs with merely similar 
contents can be properly classed as testimonial beliefs providing they are sufficiently 
similar in content to be likely to be true. And all these apparently innocuous minor 
shifts can add up to one that is large and obviously problematic.  
 
Now, SimTest does not have to claim that a speaker and hearer at the far ends of 
such a chain stand in a relation of epistemic reliance. We could revise the account in 
light of this problem so that it instead claims that epistemic reliance can only occur 
between individual links, or perhaps small groups of links providing that the content 
between them is similar to some specified degree. In fact, I think that the version of 
SimTest under discussion must claim this in order to maintain some shred of 
plausibility. Consider, for example, the belief you have that David Hume was a 
Scotsman. If SimTest allows that testimonial chains can survive large shifts in 
content, then it must also allow that this belief of yours could, in principle, have been 
the product of a testimonial chain which originates in a person’s testimony to the 
effect that Napoleon was a Frenchman. And, worse, that your belief is epistemically 
reliant on this person’s testimony. I think this account would do too much violence 
to our intuitive idea of what it is to be a testimonial chain. Your knowledge that 
David Hume is a Scotsman, if it is a link in a testimonial chain, is a link in a chain 
which originates in some person reporting on the nationality of David Hume, and 
nothing else. Similarly, for some testimonial belief to be epistemically reliant on 
another, it is surely necessary that there is some interesting epistemic and semantic 
relationship between the two beliefs. It cannot be that there is merely some fortuitous 
causal relationship. 
 
SimTest will try to claim, then, that testimonial chains are broken when the content 
grasped by some hearer strays too far from the content initially expressed by some 
prior link in the chain. Underlying this individuation of testimonial chains would be 
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the claim that epistemic reliance requires some relation of semantic closeness 
between a new testimonial belief and any prior links in the chain. As such, what 
might appear to be a single testimonial chain might turn out to be several smaller, 
overlapping chains. Perhaps this revised notion of epistemic reliance doesn’t look 
completely indefensible. However, I think we can put a final nail in the coffin. One 
consequence of SimTest’s picture of testimonial chains is the following: one can 
generate knowledge through testimony of some content, P, even when no subject has 
any non-testimonial warrant or justification for the truth of P whatsoever. In fact, the 
state of affairs that P represents might not have been observed or even imagined by 
any subject prior to P becoming an item of testimonial knowledge. This knowledge 
can be generated, from nowhere, simply as a result of the shifting content of 
testimonial chains. Note that this is a different issue to the question of whether some 
transmission thesis holds of testimony.
343
 In the transmission debate, the discussion 
concerns whether some epistemic properties can be generated in the testimonial 
belief of a hearer when they were not also present in the testimony of the speaker. 
But the present problem is not that epistemic properties are generated in some 
already-grasped content. Rather, the problem is that the content itself, and its status 
as knowledge, are both generated in the hearer when no subject has witnessed the 
obtaining of the state of affairs that that content represents. To see this, consider 
again an example from earlier. Suppose that a speaker, upon witnessing a red squirrel 
in her garden, testifies to a hearer with the utterance ‘There is a red squirrel in the 
garden.’ Now suppose that this initiates a chain (or a series of chains, as suggested 
above) in which each link shifts the content grasped slightly with each testimonial 
event. Some subsequent link eventually grasps the content that there is a brown bear 
in the basement as a result of successive minor shifts. Now suppose that this content 
is true. SimTest, it seems, must class this as a piece of testimonial knowledge. But 
there is no non-testimonial justification for it. It is epistemically groundless. Note 
that the response to the problem of long chains above will not help us here: even if 
we claim that this content lies at the end of a much smaller chain, SimTest must still 
claim that it counts as testimonial knowledge. This is because each smaller chain 
takes us from some piece of knowledge to a distinct, yet sufficiently similar, one via 
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testimonial exchanges. But once we have shifted the content slightly, we can use this 
new knowledge to start a new chain. Thus it seems that positing smaller chains in 
cases of shifting contents does little to alleviate the implausibility of SimTest’s 
account. There seems to be no way to quarantine the damage done by small shifts in 
content. If SimTest endorses the revised notion of epistemic reliance, it must endorse 
these small shifts, and the problems that come with them. 
 
I think this last objection, (2b), is extremely damaging. There is a weaker and a 
stronger form of the objection from epistemic reliance now on the table. The weaker 
form just says that SimTest must endorse an unattractive notion of epistemic reliance 
which fails to cohere with several popular theses as to the characteristics of 
testimonial exchanges. One might think that this is a bullet that SimTest could bite. 
The stronger form of the objection claims that the revised notion of epistemic 
reliance is not really epistemic reliance at all. As such, SimTest cannot claim that 
certain exchanges exhibit epistemic reliance: any exchange in which a merely similar 
content is grasped by the hearer will fail to exhibit epistemic reliance. And 
whichever exchanges do not exhibit epistemic reliance will not count as testimonial 
exchanges after all.  
 
Suppose that the stronger form of the objection succeeds. If one were to combine 
SimTest with social externalism, it may still be the case that some exchanges count 
as testimonial exchanges. Many exchanges in which the same content is shared 
between speaker and hearer will do this: such exchanges satisfy Necessity of 
Similarity of Content Testimony and may also exhibit (the traditional notion of) 
epistemic reliance. Of course, if it appears to be the case that the only exchanges 
which exhibit epistemic reliance are those in which content is shared we would have 
good reason to claim that SimTest is too weak, and that SamTest is the proper 
characterisation of testimonial knowledge. If we endorse the stronger form of the 
objection from epistemic reliance, the result for Holism is fairly devastating. The 
reason for this is that all exchanges on Holism are exchanges in which a hearer 
recovers only a merely similar content to that proffered by the speaker. But, given 
the strong objection from epistemic reliance, it will turn out that none of these 
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exchanges exhibit epistemic reliance after all. As such, no exchange on Holism can 
be classified as a testimonial exchange. If this is so, Holism must claim that there is 
no such thing as knowledge through testimony. Rather, Holism can at best 
countenance mere knowledge from testimony. This would be to just admit that 
SimTest has failed. For it was introduced to salvage knowledge through testimony in 
the face of the claim that only SamTest could facilitate it. Thus, if the strong 
objection succeeds, it may appear that a theory cannot underpin knowledge through 
testimony without positing shared content after all. 
 
Unfortunately for SimTest, I think the combination of the above objections weighs in 
favour of the stronger reading of the objection. A chain of knowledge through 
testimony should originate in some testifier who possesses some non-testimonial 
justification for the content entertained by each link in the chain. This knowledge 
cannot just spring from the chain itself and claim to be testimonial knowledge. If we 
accept the strong objection, then SimTest is left in the following predicament.  
SimTest, when combined with Holism, provides a defective account of knowledge 
through testimony. I assumed at the outset that a testimonial exchange (that is, one 
which is capable of resulting in knowledge through testimony) must exhibit 
epistemic reliance (and, I hope, consideration of what theories might look like 
without this assumption will serve to increase the assumption’s plausibility), but we 
have seen that SimTest cannot uphold epistemic reliance. As such, on the 
combination of Holism and SimTest, there will be no exchanges which are genuine 
testimonial exchanges. And if there are no testimonial exchanges, there are no 
testimonial exchanges which are successful. But knowledge through testimony can 
only be gained through successful testimonial exchanges. As such, the Holist must 
deny that there is such a thing as knowledge through testimony. The conditions (both 
semantic and epistemic) on the success of an exchange, then, are irrelevant, for there 
are no testimonial exchanges which could be evaluated for success. As such, SimTest 
can, at best, afford us mere knowledge from testimony. 
 
It is possible that we can ameliorate the knowledge-from-testimony approach. But I 
will not pursue this option here, as I think it can be argued that Holism need not 
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endorse Goldberg’s ‘close enough’ version of SimTest. Things are not as bleak as 
they seem. The reason for this is that it is not the case that the Holist is committed to 
the revised notion of epistemic reliance. I will present a revised version of SimTest 
which can uphold the traditional notion of epistemic reliance and, as such, need not 
claim that there is no such thing as genuine testimonial exchanges. 
 
Section 4: Amending SimTest 
 
Given the above cluster of objections, the outlook for SimTest (and those theories of 
content which must endorse it) looks grim. It looks like the picture of testimony 
enjoyed by the proposal simply jettisons certain features thought to be distinctive of 
knowledge through testimony. The remaining picture looks to border on the absurd: 
the ‘testimonial chains’, if they can be so-called, countenance the generation of 
testimonial knowledge in contents which possess no non-testimonial justification. 
 
Fortunately, I think these apparent problems all follow from an assumption which 
SimTest need not endorse. This is the assumption that merely similar contents must 
represent distinct states of affairs (and, similarly, that merely similar concepts must 
represent distinct objects or sets of objects). This assumption is implicit in 
Goldberg’s presentation of the ‘close enough’ proposal. Goldberg states the view in 
the following way, “so long as the hearer’s belief is a belief in a content that is ‘close 
enough’ to what was actually said, then the belief in that ‘close enough’ content will 
likely be true.”
344
 That this content is only likely to be true suggests that it represents 
a distinct state of affairs. For if it represented the same state of affairs it would be 
guaranteed to be true given the truth of the testimony proffered. In what follows, I 
will first show how rejecting the assumption enables SimTest to uphold a traditional 
account of epistemic reliance. However, doing so might appear to render the account 
unavailable to internalist views, including Holism. I will then go on to argue we can 
use the machinery set up in Chapter 5 to show how an internalist can endorse this 
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revised version of SimTest without having to maintain that knowledge through 
testimony is a rare phenomenon. 
 
To avoid having to endorse the revised notion of epistemic reliance, we should 
simply amend SimTest in the following way: 
 
Revised SimTest (RSimTest): A testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the 
epistemic conditions on knowledge through testimony are satisfied and (b) 
the content of the testimony proffered by the speaker and recovered by the 
hearer are similar to the degree that they represent the same state of affairs. 
 
On Revised SimTest (henceforth, just ‘RSimTest’), it is easy to see how certain of 
the above problems will disappear. This is because RSimTest will be in a position to 
maintain the traditional notion of epistemic reliance which SamTest endorses. 
RSimTest, although it allows that a hearer can recover a merely similar content, 
requires that the hearer’s testimonial belief represent the very same state of affairs as 
that which is represented by the speaker’s testimony. Because of this, the content 
grasped by the hearer is no longer merely likely to be true given the reliability of the 
testimony, but guaranteed to be true. As such, the hearer need no longer rely on any 
additional epistemic support for her testimonial belief over and above what is 
required on SamTest. In forming her testimonial belief, she is relying on the speaker 
to have testified to a content which represents a particular state of affairs as 
obtaining, and to possess sufficient justification/warrant for her belief that this state 
of affairs obtains (and perhaps some additional justification or warrant for believing 
the testifier to be reliable etc). Nothing more is needed. So, for example, if a speaker 
utters (1), 
 
(1) There is a red squirrel in the garden. 
 
RSimTest requires that the hearer form a mental representation of the content of the 
speaker’s utterance which has the very same truth-conditions as (1). As we have seen 
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in previous chapters, and as I will reiterate later on, Holism allows that there is a fine 
spectrum of contents that are capable of doing this. 
 
Now that we have recaptured the traditional notion of epistemic reliance, the worries 
introduced earlier do not arise for RSimTest. Consider the first problem: that of the 
epistemic responsibility of the speaker. Given that the testimonial belief that the 
hearer forms represents the very same state of affairs as that which is represented in 
the speaker’s testimony, the hearer can rely on the speaker’s justification/warrant for 
believing that this state of affairs obtains. Crucially, the hearer can properly regard 
the speaker as being in an epistemically privileged position with regard to the truth of 
the content she (the hearer) grasps, for the two contents are true in all and only the 
same situations. And, because the speaker is now properly responsible for the 
epistemic properties of the hearer’s belief, we no longer suffer the related problems 
of buck-passing and blame. The hearer can indeed pass the justificatory buck to the 
speaker, deferring to her authority regarding justification for the content of her 
testimonial belief. Equally, should the testimony be unreliable, the speaker will be (at 
least partially) to blame for testifying to a content that was either false or 
unjustified/unwarranted. 
 
Lastly, consider the second problem of testimonial chains. It should also be clear to 
see why this is no longer problematic. In each exchange, success demands that the 
hearer grasp a content which represents the very same state of affairs as that which 
was represented by the speaker. And, given this, there can be no small shifts in the 
state of affairs which is represented by each link in a testimonial chain. Furthermore, 
any subsequent hearer in a testimonial chain will be epistemically reliant on the very 
first speaker in the chain who possesses non-testimonial justification/warrant for the 
testimonial belief, for it is the very same state of affairs which is represented by all 
links in the chain. Whatever non-testimonial justification/warrant the initial testifier 
has for believing that a particular state of affairs obtains will also underpin the 
justification/warrant of the relevant testimonial beliefs of subsequent links in the 
chain. It is this initial testifier’s justification/warrant that subsequent links are relying 
on. As mentioned before, one need not claim that subsequent links in the testimonial 
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chain possess the very same non-testimonial justification as the initial testifier. But, 
rather, the fact that each subsequent link possesses testimonial justification is, in 
some way, dependent on the non-testimonial justification of the initial testifier. It 
was the absence of this feature which proved especially problematic for the initial 
formulation of SimTest. 
 
Section 5: An outlying problem 
 
In his criticism of the close enough proposal, Goldberg advances an additional 
argument which is not avoided by the amendment to SimTest introduced above. This 
argument is not aimed against SimTest itself but, rather, is aimed at the plausibility 
of combining SimTest with internalism. As we will see, endorsing RSimTest might 
appear to make this problem worse. 
 
Goldberg’s original objection (aimed at SimTest rather than RSimTest) runs as 
follows.
345
 Suppose that it is granted that the content of a hearer’s testimonial belief 
is likely to be true if it is similar to the content of the testimony proffered. Even 
granting this, Goldberg thinks that, on internalism, our beliefs are simply not often 
even similar enough to facilitate knowledge exchange. I noted in Chapter 3 that 
Goldberg argues that the internalist cannot provide sameness of content between 
speaker and hearer. To this end he writes, 
 
Once a theorist shelves the hypothesis of public linguistic norms, the 
resources available to the theory, in its attempt to explain how individual 
hearers systematically attain a reliable comprehension of the words of their 
(apparent) co-linguals, are too meagre to account for the sort of 
comprehension that we suppose goes on all the time in our ordinary, everyday 




But Goldberg thinks similar considerations suggest that the internalist will not be 
able to provide sufficient similarity either. Consider that, on externalism, our 
dispositions to employ terms can be quite diverse whilst we still succeed in talking 
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(and thinking) about the same objects. On many internalist theories, by contrast, 
differences between the dispositions of subjects to employ a given term are taken to 
determine quite significant differences in content. This is essentially the line taken by 
those to adopt the reinterpretation strategy in opposition to Burge’s social 
externalism: subjects who are disposed to apply concepts in significantly different 
ways are subjects who employ different concepts. 
 
To take an example, consider what an advocate of the reinterpretation strategy might 
say about Alf and his doctor. Suppose Alf’s doctor utters “William Musgrave 
published on arthritis is 1715.” Alf, according to certain internalists, comes to form a 
belief with an idiosyncratic arthritis concept. We could paraphrase Alf’s testimonial 
belief as follows: WILLIAM MUSGRAVE PUBLISHED ON A DISEASE OF THE JOINTS AND 
BONES IN 1715. But this belief is false. Some internalists may wish to claim that Alf’s 
testimonial belief was not similar enough to the testimony proffered and that this 
explains the failure of knowledge exchange. The problem is that it seems plausible 
that Alf can gain knowledge from his doctor’s testimony despite his idiosyncrasies. 
Such examples, it seems, will be widespread on certain forms of internalism. As 
such, the combination of such internalist views with SimTest results in a picture of 
testimony upon which we must posit a greater number of failures of knowledge 
exchange. In contrast, the combination of SamTest and various externalist theories 
can underpin a picture upon which knowledge is far more easily and often gained 
through testimony. Such theories can claim that testimonial knowledge exchange can 
easily survive the false beliefs that subjects have as to the application-conditions of 
the concepts employed in the content of the testimony. 
 
If RSimTest is tenable, then any theory which endorses it can maintain a perfectly 
traditional account of knowledge through testimony. However, at this point an 
obvious problem faces any would-be internalist defender of RSimTest. RSimTest 
now demands that two contents be so similar that they represent the very same state 
of affairs but, if Goldberg is right, we should already be concerned that internalists 
couldn’t provide enough conceptual similarity to meet the less demanding 
formulation of SimTest with which we began. This same kind of problem was 
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pressed against SimTest in problem (2a) above. To belabour the point: if internalists 
are to offer an account of knowledge through testimony which will rival the 
externalist’s account, it is not enough that it can maintain that it is possible for two 
subjects to satisfy RSimTest. Rather, it must be the case that subjects often satisfy 
RSimTest. Otherwise internalism will not be able to underpin the widespread success 
of our testimonial exchanges. If it cannot do this then it is not much better off than 
the combination of SamTest and internalism rejected earlier on: it will have to claim 
that knowledge through testimony is rarely, if ever, achieved. 
 
What is needed, then, is a principled mechanism for determining widespread co-
reference of idiosyncratic concepts. Fortunately, I think we already have the 
resources to handle this issue. For, as I argued in the previous chapter, an internalist 
can claim that subjects with divergent idiosyncratic concepts can still succeed in 
representing the same things with these concepts. I argued that an internalist can 
claim that, when it comes to determining the object represented by a concept, this 
object is picked-out, not by being the object which satisfies all the properties which 
that object is thought to have by the subject, but by certain crucial beliefs which the 
subject is disposed to hold fixed in the face of conflicting information. Distinct 
idiosyncratic concepts can apply to the same objects and, because of this, two merely 
similar contents, P and P* (comprised of these idiosyncratic concepts), can represent 
the same state of affairs. This strategy affords us the result that semantically diverse 
concepts may apply to the same objects providing that subjects share certain 
dispositions. What is crucial for present purposes is the following. In the previous 
chapter, I demonstrated that co-reference of idiosyncratic concepts, on Holism, will 
be near enough exactly as widespread as is concept-sharing on social externalism. 
This is because the dispositions that I appealed to in my argument were exactly the 
same dispositions that a social externalist must appeal to in order to make her 
argument. As such, any case in which social externalism would posit shared meaning 
is a case in which my internalist can posit co-reference. Given this, RSimTest will be 
easily and often satisfied on Holism. Thus the Holist can endorse RSimTest without 
having to maintain that knowledge through testimony is a rarer phenomenon than it 
is on externalism. Testimonial chains are not easily broken for semantic reasons on 
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Holism, because the dispositions needed to secure co-reference (and thus shared 
truth-conditions) are extremely widely shared. 
 
Section 6: The demands of the testimonial context 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I considered that the context determined by a 
testimonial exchange might be particularly demanding. Initially, the worry was that, 
even if one is persuaded that communication can succeed when content is merely 
similar, one might still think that for knowledge to be gained through testimony only 
sameness of content will do. However, given the above approach, it appears that this 
is not so after all. The speaker and hearer can diverge quite widely with respect to the 
conceptual-role of the respective contents testified to and recovered; and yet they can 
still succeed in exchanging knowledge. One consequence of the above approach, 
then, is that interlocutors can succeed in exchanging testimonial knowledge whilst 
communicating quite unsuccessfully, given the success simpliciter scale introduced 
in the previous chapter. That is, what appears to be required for testimonial 
knowledge exchange is that the hearer gets the truth-conditions of the speaker’s 
attitude correct. But, providing this is so, the content she grasps can be quite different 
in conceptual-role to that of the content the speaker expressed. 
 
It should be stressed that this non-demanding approach to testimonial knowledge 
acquisition is not unique to the Holist’s account. It perfectly parallels the line taken 
by Goldberg in his social externalist account. According to this account, testimonial 
knowledge is ‘thin’ in the sense that it requires very little linguistic understanding of 
the content proffered. So long as the correct content is grasped, two subjects can 
quite wildly diverge in their understanding of that content. Indeed, this was a 
motivation for the account: it allowed that testimonial knowledge was very easily 
acquired. Similarly, the Holist can claim that testimonial knowledge is ‘thin’ in that 
one can gain knowledge from an exchange despite grasping only a roughly similar 
content to that expressed by the speaker (which, for the Holist, amounts to having 
only a roughly similar understanding), providing that content has the right truth-
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conditions. So, both views of mental content can claim that testimonial knowledge 
can be exchanged between subjects despite both subjects understanding the 
content(s) in divergent and/or incorrect ways. It is just that, for the Holist, this 
difference in understanding amounts to a difference in content.  
 
Section 7: Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have presented and defended an account of knowledge through 
testimony based on the similar content approach to communication developed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. I began by describing what it is that epistemologists are interested 
in when they discuss knowledge that is distinctively testimonial. Testimonial 
knowledge is knowledge that is gained as a result of accepting the testimony of the 
speaker. In accepting a piece of testimony, a hearer renders herself epistemically 
reliant on the testifier. And the epistemic properties of her testimonial belief are 
epistemically dependent on the epistemic properties of the testimony. With this set 
up in place, I presented the default view of knowledge through testimony, SamTest, 
which claims that knowledge through testimony requires that the content grasped by 
the hearer must be the very same content as that attested to by the speaker. I then 
presented SimTest, which claims instead that mere similarity of content would be 
sufficient for success in the testimonial context. I considered a collection of 
objections to SimTest. Several of these were from Goldberg. The combined force of 
these objections was extremely damaging to SimTest. However, I then demonstrated 
how SimTest could be easily reformulated to avoid the objections. Finally, using the 
strategy developed in Chapter 5, I showed how an internalist could claim that the 
revised version of SimTest (‘RSimTest’) could be sensibly endorsed by the Holist 
(and other internalists). We began with the worry that the testimonial context might 
be too demanding for the Holist to cope with. However, it turns out that knowledge 
through testimony is actually not very demanding: a subject can acquire knowledge 





This project concerned the way in which considerations pertaining to communicative 
success impact upon the plausibility of theories of mental content. It was not my aim 
to provide a complete theory of communication, nor was it my aim to argue for, or 
fully defend, any theory of content. The main purpose of the project was to defend 
one particular theory of content from one particular objection. The theory was 
Holism, and the objection was the claim that Holism cannot provide a plausible 
account of communicative success. This aim might seem quite a modest one. 
However, I hope that over the course of the previous six chapters I have shown that 
the consequences of my defence extend beyond the tenability of Holism. I will have 
shown that Holism is not only defensible, but that it actually offers us an extremely 
attractive picture of communicative success. In fact, if my arguments have been 
successful, it is actually Holism’s competitors which face the serious problems 
explaining communication. If this is true, it is an interesting result for a number of 
reasons. In this concluding chapter, I will first briefly summarize the project. And I 
will then explain what I take to be the most important consequences of the success of 
my arguments. 
 
I began in Chapter 1 by introducing the mental content debate and locating Holism 
within this debate. I presented the pro-externalist arguments of Kripke, Putnam and 
Burge and explained how these arguments had divided authors into three camps: 
content internalism, content externalism and two-factor theories. Lastly, I presented 
Holism as a combination of three theses: (a) content internalism, (b) conceptual-role 
semantics, and (c) holism about conceptual-role. Holism is distinctive in that it 
claims that no two subjects can share thought content or mean the same things by 
their utterances of the same word-forms. 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced the Objection from Communication. This objection claims 
that sharing content is necessary for communicative success. As Holism entails that 
subjects never share thought content, this would mean that it must claim that 
communication never succeeds. I also explained that there are weaker versions of 
283 
 
this objection which are also very damaging to Holism. After introducing the 
objection, I went on to consider what the options are for constructing a theory of 
communicative success, and how these might affect the plausibility of theories of 
mental content, such that we might assess the objection. The two kinds of condition 
on communicative success which are directly relevant to the present project are the 
Content Relation and the Understanding Requirement. I identified two ways of 
specifying the Content Relation (as well as an intermediary position) and four 
different ways of specifying the Understanding Requirement. I explained that there 
are different ways in which these theses can be mixed and matched to yield different 
theories of communicative success. These theses featured heavily in my argument in 
Chapter 3. In addition to these conditions, I identified and set aside so-called 
‘Theory-Neutral’ conditions; these are conditions on communicative success that are 
not directly relevant to one’s choice of a theory of mental content. 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that, on the assumption of social externalism, it is both 
necessary and sufficient for communicative success that (alongside satisfaction of the 
Theory-Neutral conditions) the hearer’s subject-sensitive understanding on the 
content she grasps is similar to the speaker’s subject-sensitive understanding on the 
content she expressed. This argument served a dual purpose. The first was to 
motivate the claim that cognitive perspective (and, with it, SS-understanding) must 
play a central role in an account of communicative success. The second was to 
present a dilemma for the social externalist. If my argument succeeds, the social 
externalist will be on the first horn the dilemma. On this horn, the social externalist 
has to reject the Content Relations. She must claim that the relationship between the 
content grasped by the hearer and expressed by the speaker is irrelevant to 
communicative success – the contents of interlocutors need not even be similar. 
However, the social externalist cannot simply reject my argument without incurring a 
different kind of cost. If she rejects the argument, she will end up on the second horn 
of the dilemma. On the second horn, she must endorse an account of communicative 
success which gives highly implausible diagnoses as to the success and failure of 
communicative exchanges. The resultant account divorces communicative success 
from the aims of communication. One consequence of my argument in this chapter 
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was that we lose motivation for the Objection from Communication levelled against 
Holism. My argument claimed that even views which can posit shared content should 
reject the idea that sharing content is relevant to communicative success. As such, 
there is little reason to think that Holism must endorse an account of communicative 
success which requires shared content. This argument, especially when considered 
alongside the plausibility of my positive account in Chapter 4, should be sufficient to 
silence the Objection from Communication. 
 
In Chapter 4, I presented my positive account. I called this the ‘Holist View of 
Communicative Success’. The basic idea of the account is that communication 
succeeds to the degree that content (or understanding) is similar across subjects. The 
account contained two measures of communicative success. The first, I called 
‘success simpliciter’. This measured the overall success of the communicative 
attempt considered independently of the context of utterance. The second measure I 
called ‘success relative to a context’. This measured the success of an exchange 
relative to the particular context, where this context is set by the communicative aims 
of interlocutors. The greater the degree of success simpliciter, the fewer contexts 
there are in which communication can fail. After presenting this account, I 
considered a famous objection from Fodor and Lepore. This is the objection that 
there is no workable criterion for conceptual similarity available to the Holist. I 
argued that the Holist can provide a criterion for similarity of meaning by appeal to 
concepts’ connections to various non-semantic elements of the networks of which 
they are parts. This response prompted a complication of the initial account of 
communicative success to take into account the various dimensions along which 
conceptual-role can vary. I suggested that different contexts might require similarity 
along different dimensions of conceptual variability. 
 
In Chapter 5, I introduced another distinction amongst dimensions of conceptual 
variability which is relevant to communicative success. This is a distinction between 
conceptual-role and application-conditions. As many authors have suggested, it 
seems plausible that getting the reference right is necessary for communicative 
success with singular terms – or, at the very least, it is often required. This led us to a 
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further objection to the Holist View of Communicative Success. This objection 
claimed that Holism (along with various other internalist views of content) cannot 
provide application-conditions or extensions for concepts which will secure 
widespread success in communication with singular terms and singular term 
concepts. The reason for this is that such views appear to be committed to ascribing 
idiosyncratic application-conditions to many of a subject’s concepts. In response to 
this objection, I argued that we can adapt arguments employed in defence of certain 
theories of reference (which face similar kinds of objections) to provide a response 
for the content internalist. By adapting arguments from Jackson and Field, I argued 
that it is evident in a subject’s inferential practices that the objects that she takes her 
concepts to apply to are the very same objects as those which the externalists claim 
they apply to. As such, an internalist can agree with externalists as to the extensions 
of concepts without appealing to anything external to the subject to fix a concept’s 
reference or extension. 
 
In Chapter 6, I considered one final objection to the Holist View of Communicative 
Success. This objection claimed that the Holist cannot use her account to underpin a 
plausible account of knowledge through testimony. The suggestion was that the 
testimonial context required sameness of content, and this was something that the 
Holist could not provide. The Holist must instead endorse a Similar Content View of 
Knowledge through Testimony. Initially, it looked like this account was in serious 
trouble. I presented a collection of objections which centred around the idea that the 
Holist’s account could not endorse a traditional notion of epistemic reliance; and I 
also considered the objection that, even if a similar content account is tenable, an 
internalist could not sensibly endorse it. Several of these objections were from 
Goldberg. In response to the objections, I argued that these problems all disappear 
once we reject a particular assumption. This was the assumption that Holism must 
claim that merely similar concepts must have merely similar application-conditions 
and extensions. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, this is not the case: on 
Holism, concepts can be quite dissimilar and yet still be co-extensive. Once this 
assumption is dropped, I argued that the Holist can endorse the traditional account of 
epistemic reliance, and she can maintain that testimonial knowledge exchange is just 
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as widespread on Holism as it is on externalist theories of content which appeal to 
sameness of content.  
 
If my arguments across these chapters have been successful, we will have arrived at a 
number of interesting conclusions. In the remainder of this final chapter, I will 
outline what I take to be the most important consequences of the project. 
 
The first aspect of my project which I will draw attention to here is the following. 
My argument from Chapter 3, especially when coupled with the plausibility of my 
positive account, constitutes a novel objection to externalist theories of content 
individuation (and also any internalist theory which tries to posit shared content). 
This aspect of the project has the greatest impact on the broader philosophical 
landscape. Externalist theories of content are extremely popular, but there are an 
increasing number of pressing objections being launched against these views. I see 
my project as a contribution towards this effort, and towards increasing the perceived 
tenability of content internalism. Externalism now faces a whole host of difficulties. 
It is alleged to struggle to explain privileged access, mental causation, subjective 
rationality, and now communicative success. This growing list should worry the 
externalist. Recall, from Chapter 1, that I gave a summary of the kinds of phenomena 
mental content was supposed to explain. There is really only one significant item left 
on this list for externalism to brandish as a mark in its favour: externalism is 
supposedly the only kind of theory which gets the truth-conditions of contents (and 
application-conditions of concepts) right. However, in Chapter 5, I argued that this 
simply isn’t true. There is much work which has been undertaken in the philosophy 
of language to argue that internalist theories of reference can agree with their 
competitors as to the referents of words. And, I argued, we can appeal to the very 
same kinds of arguments to motivate the claim that content internalists can agree 
with externalists as to the application-conditions of concepts. But, if this is the case, 
this seriously undermines the classic motivation for externalism. For all its 
popularity, it appears to be a thesis which faces several serious objections and yet 




A second consequence of the project concerns the nature of testimony. This result, 
too, should be of interest beyond the debate surrounding Holism. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, it is usually just stipulated in debates surrounding testimonial knowledge 
exchange that the content grasped by the hearer must be the very same content as that 
expressed by the speaker. Indeed, it seems that, even upon reflection, it is plausible 
that testimonial exchanges must be content preserving. However, if my arguments 
are successful, I have shown that there is an alternative account of the semantic 
dimension of testimony on offer. This account claims that a subject can gain 
knowledge that P from testimony that Q, providing Q and P have the same truth-
conditions. The plausibility of this account is vital to the Holist’s project. However, I 
think this kind of account might also be attractive to externalist theories of content. 
For, on externalism as well, two distinct contents can have the same truth-conditions. 
As such, I think some version of my similar content account might be adopted by 
parties on all sides of the mental content debate. 
 
A third interesting result of the project concerns the relationship between communal 
languages and communicative success. I think it seems natural to think that being 
able to posit a communal language (or shared content) should put one in a good 
position to explain communicative success; one might even go further and think that 
it is necessary for communicative success that the hearer grasp the very content that 
was expressed by the speaker. What my argument in Chapter 3 demonstrates is that 
this could not be further from the truth. In fact, sharing content with an interlocutor 
is, at best, irrelevant to communicative success; and views which posit shared 
content face a serious dilemma. The reason for this is that theories of content, in 
pursuit of their communal languages, must allow that content and cognitive 
perspective (and, with it, SS-understanding) can come apart. This is because 
cognitive perspective, as I have characterised it, is not something which is shared by 
subjects. Cognitive perspective is idiosyncratic: the dispositions which subjects have 
to employ a given concept or expression will always vary (although in some cases 
only slightly). As I argued, once a theory allows that a subject’s cognitive 
perspective can come apart from mental content, it should give up on the hope of 
claiming that mental content facilitates communicative success. And, if it tries to 
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maintain one of the Content Relations, it will have to maintain implausible diagnoses 
as to the success of communicative attempts. Surprisingly, it is certain theories which 
can only posit mere similarity of content which are best placed to explain 
communicative success. This brings me to the last issue that I will emphasise in this 
chapter. 
 
Finally, and most important to the particular aims of this project, I have shown that 
Holism, far from being incapable of explaining communicative success, is actually 
capable of underpinning an extremely plausible account. To show this, I argued for 
the central role of similarity of cognitive perspective in an account of communicative 
success. The reason that coordination of cognitive perspectives is so important is that 
communication has practical aims, and it is only the coordination of cognitive 
perspectives that is relevant when it comes to attempting to satisfy these aims. All 
theories of content can incorporate cognitive perspective into their accounts of 
communicative success. However, only theories like Holism, which claim that 
mental content tracks cognitive perspective, can hold this alongside the claim that 
communicative success is measured in terms of a relation between the mental 
contents of interlocutors. The Holist’s account appeals to mere similarity of content. 
But, as I argued, a plausible Similar Content View for the Holist can be developed 
and defended. The aim of this project was to defend Holism from the charge that it 
could not explain communicative success. I hope I have given reason for thinking 
that Holism is not just defensible in this regard, but that it actually offers one of the 
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Act Understanding:  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer’s act of understanding is such that 
the hearer selects an interpretation of the content expressed by the speaker by (a) mapping 
the lexical items which comprise the speaker’s utterance onto concepts in her own idiolect, 
(b) combining these to form a content based on her grasp of the utterance’s compositional 
structure, and (c) taking into account relevant background and contextual information which 




The way in which a subject is disposed to employ content in her cognitive economy. This 
includes how she cognizes the following: 
 
(a) the inferential relations between contents; 
(b)  the conceptual relations which the comprised concepts bear to other concepts 
in her cognitive economy; 
(c) the way in which the objects which those concepts apply to are represented; and 
(d)  the way in which the states of affairs which are represented by the content are 
represented.  
(84) 
Conservative View of Communicative Success (‘CVC’):  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed iff (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied, (b) 
the content of the terminal state of the hearer is the same as the content of the initial state of 
the speaker, and (c) the hearer correctly SS-Understands the content of the speaker’s 
utterance to some specified degree (where this requires that the hearer’s cognitive perspective 
on the content communicated is correct relative to standards set by her community). 
(106) 
Content Identity:  
 





A communicative attempt with succeed only if some particular relation holds between the 
content of the terminal state of the hearer and the content of the initial state of the speaker.  
(62) 
Content Similarity:  
 
Although no two concepts possessed by non-identical speakers, S1 and S2, are identical, any 




A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer correctly understands the content 










Any view of communicative success which claims that coordination of cognitive 




A) Content internalism: for any subject, the content of her thoughts and concepts is individuated 
solely by factors intrinsic to that subject. 
B) Conceptual-role semantics: the content of a thought or concept for a subject is fully 
determined (or constituted) by that content or concept’s conceptual-role in the subject’s 
cognitive economy. Conceptual-role is determined by a content or concept’s causal relations 
to other contents or concepts in that subject’s cognitive economy, and includes relations to 
sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, imaginings, memories, etc. 
C) Holism about conceptual-role: the content of a thought or concept for a subject is determined 
(or constituted) by that content or concept’s causal relations to all other contents or concepts 
in that subject’s cognitive economy (including its relations to sensory inputs, behavioural 
outputs, imaginings, memories etc.).  
(46) 
Holist View of Communicative Success: 
 
The combination of Necessity of Theory-Neutral Conditions, Act Understanding, Average 
Success Simpliciter, Success Simpliciter Dimension, and Similar Content Threshold 
Dimension. 
(204) 
Instability Thesis:  
 
Instability Thesis: Any change, however minute, in a subject’s web of attitudes will 
determine a change in all concepts and contents within that web.  
(48) 
Liberal View of Communicative Success (‘LVC’):  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed iff (a), the Theory-Neutral Conditions are satisfied, 
(b) the content of the terminal state of the hearer is the same as the content of the initial state 
of the speaker, and (c), the hearer correctly SI-Understands the content of the speaker’s 





 See entry for ‘Liberal View of Communicative Success’ 
 
Necessity of Sameness of Content (‘SamConN’): 
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the content of the terminal state of the hearer 
is the same as the content of the initial state of the speaker.  
(66) 
Necessity of Sameness of Content Testimony:  
 
A testimonial exchange will succeed only if the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is 
the same as the content of the speaker’s testimony. 
(259) 
Necessity of Similarity of Cognitive Perspective: 
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the 





Necessity of Similarity of Content (‘SimConS’): 
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the content of the terminal state of the hearer 
is similar to the content of the initial state of the speaker.  
(67) 
Necessity of Similarity of Content Testimony:  
 
A testimonial exchange will succeed only if the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is 
similar to the content of the speaker’s testimony. 
(261) 
 
Necessity of Subject-Sensitive Content Understanding:  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer possesses the correct cognitive 
perspective on the content she grasps (where standards for correctness are set by the language 
community). 
(107) 
Necessity of Subject-Insensitive Understanding (‘SI-UnderstandingN’):  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer correctly SI-Understands the 
content of the speaker’s utterance (where a hearer can achieve this correct understanding by 
reliance on public linguistic norms). 
(104) 
Necessity of Theory-Neutral conditions:  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied. 
(204) 
Revised SimTest (‘RSimTest’):  
 
A testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the epistemic conditions on knowledge through 
testimony are satisfied and (b) the content of the testimony proffered by the speaker and 








 See entry for ‘Necessity of Sameness of Content’. 
 
Same Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (‘SamTest’):  
 
A testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the epistemic conditions on knowledge through 
testimony are satisfied and (b) the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is the same as the 
content of the speaker’s testimony. 
(258) 
Same Content View 
 
Any view of communicative success which claims that sameness of content is at least 










Any view of communicative success which claims that coordination of cognitive perspective 




A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer understands the content she grasps 
in a way which is the same as, or similar to, the way in which the speaker understands the 




 See entry for ‘Necessity of Similarity of Content’. 
 
Similar Content Threshold Dimension:  
 
(Providing that (a) the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied and (b) content is grasped via 
a process of Act Understanding) Communication succeeds relative to a context iff the content 
grasped by the hearer and expressed by the speaker are similar along dimensions of 
conceptual variability, d1-dn, to degrees n1-nn respectively. Both the dimensions of conceptual 
variability, d1-dn, relevant to success and the degrees of similarity, n1-nn, along these 
dimensions required for success are determined by the context of communication. 
(205) 
Similar Content View 
 
Any view of communicative success which claims that mere similarity of content is 
necessary for communicative success (and sameness of content is never required). 
(53) 
Similar Content View of Knowledge through Testimony (‘SimTest’):  
 
A testimonial exchange will succeed iff (a) the epistemic conditions on knowledge through 
testimony are satisfied and (b) the content of the hearer’s testimonial belief is similar to the 
content of the speaker’s testimony. 
(261) 
Similarity of Cognitive Perspective:  
 
A communicative exchange will succeed iff (a), the Theory-Neutral conditions are satisfied 
and (b), the hearer’s cognitive perspective on the content she grasps is similar to the 




















Subject-Insensitive Understanding (‘SI-Understanding’): 
 
The kind of understanding relevant to communicative success is understanding which is 
individuated by the language community (and, as such, is not sensitive to the cognitive 
perspective of the subject).  
(89) 
Subject-Sensitive Understanding (‘SS-Understanding’): 
 
The kind of understanding relevant to communicative success is understanding which tracks 
the cognitive perspective of the subject.  
(84) 
Subject-Sensitive Shared Understanding Requirement:  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer’s SS-Understanding of the content 
she grasps is similar to the speaker’s SS-Understanding of the content she expressed.  
(97) 
Success Simpliciter Dimension:   
 
Communication succeeds with respect to some dimension of conceptual-role to the degree 
that the content grasped by the hearer is similar along that dimension of conceptual-role to 




Conditions on communicative success which do not affect the plausibility of endorsing any 




Any view of communicative success which rejects Similarity of Cognitive Perspective. 
(103) 
Understanding Requirement:  
 
A communicative attempt will succeed only if the hearer understands the speaker.  
(71) 
 
